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ABSTRACT 
 
THE ANALYSIS OF TURKEY’S APPROACH TO PEACE OPERATIONS 
Güngör, Uğur 
Ph.D., Department of International Relations 
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu 
February 2007 
 
This dissertation aims at analyzing the motivations that lie at the roots of 
Turkey’s involvement in peace operations, mostly organized under the leadership of the 
United Nations in the post-Cold War era. The main contention is that participation in 
such operations has been an identity-constructing activity in the sense that Turkey has 
tried to reinforce its eroding western identity in the 1990s through this particular way. 
This dissertation also discusses alternative motivations behind Turkey’s involvement in 
peace operations, such as security-related considerations in a neo-realist vein and 
domestic influence of ethnic and religion pressure groups, but argues that these accounts 
fail short of offering convincing explanations.  
Methodologically, the research for this dissertation will be thematic, not 
theoretical. The purpose of this study is not to make value judgments concerning 
Turkey’s participation in peace operations, but instead to describe, understand, and 
explain its role. 
Based on Turkey’s experiences in peace operations, this dissertation reaches the 
following conclusions. First, Turkey’s western image has improved. Second, Turkey 
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could transform its security identity and interests in line with the changing security 
conceptualizations in the West. Third, the modernization process of Turkish armed 
forces has become much easier following Turkey’s presence in such operations. Fourth, 
the prospects of Turkey’s membership in the EU have increased following Turkey’s 
cooperation with EU members in various peace operations in different regions of the 
world. Fifth, participation in peace operations has contributed to the improvement of 
Turkey’s relations with the United States which have gradually deteriorated in the post-
Cold War era.  
 
Keywords: peacekeeping, peace force, motivation, security, identity, participation, 
military, United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, European Union 
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ÖZET 
 
TÜRKİYE’NİN BARIŞ OPERASYONLARINA YAKLAŞIMININ ANALİZİ  
Güngör, Uğur 
Doktora, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Dr. Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu 
Şubat 2007 
 
  Bu tez çoğunlukla Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde Birleşmiş Milletler liderliğinde 
düzenlenen barış operasyonlarına Türkiye’nin katılmasının temelinde yatan güdüleri 
analiz etmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Tezin ana iddiası şudur; Türkiye’nin yıpranan batı 
kimliğini 1990 larda bu yol aracılığıyla güçlendirmeye çalışmış olması anlamında bu tip 
operasyonlara katılım kimlik yapıcı bir faaliyet olmuştur. Bu tez Türkiye’nin barış 
operasyonlarına katılmasının ardındaki güvenlikle ilgili hususlar ve etnik ve dinsel baskı 
gruplarının ülke içindeki etkileri gibi diğer güdüleri de tartışmakta fakat bu 
açıklamaların ikna edici açıklamalar sunmakta yetersiz olduğunu savunmaktadır. 
Yöntemsel olarak, bu tez için yapılan araştırma teorik değil konusal olacaktır. Bu 
çalışmanın maksadı Türkiye’nin barış operasyonlarına katılımıyla ilgili değer yargılarına 
varmak değil, bundan ziyade Türkiye’nin rolünü tanımlamak, anlamak ve açıklamaktır. 
Türkiye’nin barış operasyonlarındaki deneyimlerine dayanarak, bu tez şu 
sonuçlara ulaşmaktadır. Öncelikle Türkiye’nin batılı imajı gelişmiştir. İkinci olarak, 
Türkiye batının değişen güvenlik tanımlamalarına uyumlu olarak kendi güvenlik 
kimliğini ve güvenlik çıkarlarını dönüştürebilmiştir. Üçüncü olarak, Türkiye’nin bu tip 
operasyonlarda varlık göstermesini müteakip Türk Silahlı Kuvvetlerinin modernizasyon 
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süreci daha da kolaylaşmıştır. Dördüncü olarak, Türkiye’nin dünyanın değişik 
bölgelerindeki değişik barış operasyonlarında AB üyeleri ile işbirliğini müteakip 
Türkiye’nin Avrupa Birliğine üyelik ihtimali artmıştır. Son olarak, barış operasyonlarına 
katılımı Türkiye’nin Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde kötüleşen ABD ile ilişkilerinin 
iyileşmesine katkıda bulunmuştur 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Barışı koruma, barış gücü, güdüleme, güvenlik, kimlik, katılım, 
askeri, Birleşmiş Milletler, Kuzey Atlantik İttifakı, Avrupa Birliği  
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 CHAPTER I  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
The United Nations (UN) peace operations began in 1947 in Greece and 
Indonesia as international observer missions. They evolved in size, complexity, 
legitimacy, and effectiveness and went through periods of innovation, development, 
and expansion at times with periods of difficulty, failure, and disillusionment. During 
the Cold War, the UN undertook 13 peace operations of varying scope and duration. 
In recent years, there has been a remarkable growth in demands for the services of 
the UN in the field of international security. Since 1948, there have been 61 United 
Nations peace operations. The Security Council (SC) created 48 peace operations in 
the years between 1988 and 2006. There are currently 16 peace operations under way 
involving 96.682 peacekeepers. UN peacekeepers are currently involved in India and 
Pakistan, Ethiopia and Eritrea, Kosovo, Cyprus, Palestine, Lebanon, Western Sahara, 
Congo, on the Golan Heights in the Israel-Syria, Georgia, Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire, 
Haiti, Burundi, Sudan and Timur-Leste.1  
New conflicts that are likely to challenge the UN in the twenty-first century 
will have a very different character from those that the UN was designed to address. 
Conflicts are likely to be intra-state rather than international conflicts, triggered by a 
range of factors, including social, ethnic or religious strife, the violation of human 
rights, poverty, inequitable distribution of resources, environmental degradation, 
                                               
1
 See TABLE I and TABLE II for present and past UN peace operations, respectively. 
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/bnote.htm. 
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large-scale migration, drug trafficking, organized crime, and terrorism. These 
conflicts will be generated by a variety of causes. Dissatisfied populations identify 
with ever-smaller groups, often based on ethnicity, which may or may not respect 
national boundaries. Competition for scarce resources intensifies as anger and 
frustration grow among people trapped in poverty. These elements provide fertile 
soil for violence within or between States.  
The violence is fed by massive numbers of virtually all kinds of weapons 
readily available worldwide, such as nuclear, chemical, biological, and radiological 
weaponization, long range missiles, electro-dynamic weapons, and weapons of mass 
destruction. The results are human suffering, often on a massive scale, threats to 
wider international peace and security, and the destruction of the economic and 
social life of entire populations. International cooperation is needed to deal with 
these and other global problems. Peace operations responded to both these inter-State 
and intra-State conflicts. In recent years, peace operations have more often addressed 
conflicts within States. Peacekeepers have been given more challenging mandates, 
such as promotion of national reconciliation, organization and supervision of 
elections, protection of human rights, and humanitarian tasks.  
Peace operations, in general, have contributed to international peace and 
stability, but they have not always achieved all of their goals. Sometimes they failed, 
but they have provided officials and researchers with valuable lessons by reflecting 
on limitations and deficiencies. Despite all of their imperfections and shortcomings, 
peace operations have become a significant instrument for the maintenance of 
international peace and security. The UN peace operation, built on a half-century of 
experience in the field, is an indispensable tool. Its legitimacy is universally 
  3 
recognized, derived from its character as an action taken on behalf of a global 
organization with 192 Member States. 
Turkey’s contribution to the UN peace efforts is increasing. Turkey’s policy, 
since its inception, has always been to integrate with the community of modern 
nations. Therefore, it has become a vigorous supporter of values of the western world 
and the ideals of the UN. To this end, it has supported peace initiatives by the UN, 
NATO, and other regional organizations in order to prevent or terminate regional and 
ethnic conflicts. Within this framework, Turkey’s participation in UN military 
operations started in 1950 when it participated in the Korean War with a brigade. 
Between the years 1950-1953 a total of 15.000 Turks served in Korea on a rotational 
basis. Following the Cold War, efforts to support peace were deployed more often. 
Since 1988, the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) have actively participated in various 
peace operations with various observation functions: 9 peace operations with military 
observers, and 9 peace operations with military contingents.2 Since that time, UN 
peace operations have been a distinctive feature of Turkey’s security and foreign 
policy. Turkish commitment to peace operations is reaffirmed in the Ministry of 
National Defense White Paper 2000 which states that “Turkey provides support to 
the Peace Operations carried out under the sanctions or control of the UN, NATO or 
the OSCE for world and regional peace, in the direction of the principle of Peace at 
home, Peace in the World.”3 
The major significance of this study arises from the fact that Turkey’s 
contributions to peace operations have so far not been researched from a scholarly 
                                               
2
 For detailed information, see ‘Genel Kurmay Başkanlığı, Türk Silahlı Kuvvetlerinin Barışı 
Destekleme Harekatına Katkıları’ at 
http://www.tsk.mil.tr/uluslararasi/barisidestekharekatkatki/index.htm 
 
3
 White Paper, 2000 
http://www.msb.gov.tr/Birimler/GnPPD/GnPPDBeyazKitap.htm#WHITE%20PAPER 
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perspective. Since the beginning of the first peace operations, there have been many 
articles and books written on various aspects of peace operations such as Evolution of 
Peacekeeping, “General Characteristics of Peace Operations,” Lessons of the Past: 
Experiences in Peace Operations, Concept for post-Cold War Peacekeeping, “the 
Environment and Tasks of Peace Operations,” “UN Peacekeeping Operations and 
How Their Role Might Be Enhanced,” etc. However, there are only a few studies 
about a specific country’s contributions to peace operations, its motivations, and 
impact of its participation in these operations (Jockel, 1994; Crawford, 1995). 
In the 1990s, Turkey led an active policy in the field of UN, North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO), Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE) and the European Union (EU) peace operations. Turkish policy on peace 
operations became part of its foreign and security policy. But the stakes, risks, and 
implications of these operations for Turkey have not been closely investigated. In 
fact, there has not been any study on Turkish policy towards peace operations, nor 
does Turkey have a peace operations policy guide. The present study covers 
Turkey’s contribution to peace operations mainly in military sectors. Turkey’s other 
significant civilian contributions made through peace operations are not mentioned in 
this dissertation. My purpose is not to write a policy paper. The aim is rather to 
establish the first academic study written on the topic.  
Methodologically, the research for this dissertation will be thematic, not 
theoretical. In other words, I will use the terminology of peace operations and the 
concepts of the discipline of International Relations. I may even benefit from the 
insights offered by the theories of IR. This, however, does not imply that the research 
will intend to prove or disprove a particular IR theory, nor will it imprison itself in a 
given theoretical structure. There is not a theory on peacekeeping but there are 
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doctrines. The purpose of this study is not to make value judgments concerning 
Turkey’s participation in peace operations, but instead to describe, understand, and 
explain its role. My empirical data collection will primarily rely on my own 
qualitative research consisting of interviews with officers who have served within 
Turkish contingents in various peace operations in the past but also with some 
officers from the Turkish Army working in related branches. Interviews with officers 
who have served in peace operations in the past are of great importance for this 
dissertation since there is a lack of literature on the subject. Concerning my 
discussion of the ideational motivation and impact I will not collect empirical data 
myself but rely on the existing literature on the subject. The main contribution of this 
dissertation to the field will be the analysis of motives that helped shape Turkey’s 
participation in peace operations. 
This dissertation has three main chapters dealing with three specific research 
questions. The first chapter will answer the first question: how one can analyze the 
attempts of the international community at undertaking peace operations during the 
Cold War and post-Cold War eras? What were the main factors in this regard? What 
was the relationship between such operations and the prevailing security 
conceptualizations of the time periods under consideration? This chapter will first of 
all describe the changing nature of the UN peace operations which have evolved out 
of the collective security’s failure. The common belief is that the UN has developed 
peace operations to help control and resolve armed conflicts. However, it seems to be 
an insufficient description of the UN peace operation mandate. We need to better 
define, basically on the basis of the provisions of UN Charter, what a peace operation 
is, what it does, and where it fits into the larger array of tools for conflict 
management within the UN Charter.  
  6 
The first part of Chapter I deals with the problems concerning the definition 
of certain fundamental concepts. Following the end of the Cold War, the use of peace 
operations as an instrument of management and resolution of conflicts has attracted 
the attention of a considerable number of international relations analysts. This 
renewed interest in peace operations in general has led to the birth of a great number 
of classifications and definitions. The first part accordingly examines the definitions 
of the fundamental concepts such as conflict prevention, conflict management, 
conflict resolution, peace-making, peacekeeping, humanitarian aid, peace 
enforcement, and peace-building which are listed in the UN document “An Agenda 
for Peace” and NATO document “Peace Support Operations AJP-3.4.1.”  
Being the initial part of the study, Section 2.1 explores the genesis of peace 
operations, which took place in the period of the Cold War. Moreover, apart from the 
genesis of the UN peacekeeping, the legal and political basis of peacekeeping has to 
be studied in the initial chapter for both a clear understanding of the concept and 
oncoming observations with regard to Turkey’s participation in the peace operations. 
A strictly related matter is the principles supervising and guiding the peace 
operations. The second part of Chapter I overviews all of these fundamental aspects 
of the UN peace operations.  
The third part of the Chapter examines the UN peace operations which have 
been launched in the post-Cold War era. This part also touches upon the reasons why 
the peace operations had to expand and change in their nature. This also allows for 
making observations on the characteristics of peace operations. The main goal is to 
demonstrate that such operations have increasingly gained an ideational dimension 
and played a vital role in the re-construction of the western identity through the 
projection of the constitutive norms of the West onto conflict-laden geographies.  
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Such transformative peace operations have also been in accordance with the 
changing security understanding of the West, according to which democratization 
and liberalization in the non-western world through peace operations has been one of 
the most important western security strategies. The more security has gained a 
human/societal/interdependent/transregionalised character, the more peace 
operations gained an ideational dimension.  
The second chapter will answer the second question: how one can explain 
Turkey’s participation in such operations. This chapter will examine alternative sets 
of motivations behind Turkey’s active involvement in peace operations in the 1990s 
in three different sub-titles, namely the ‘Ideational Factors’, ‘Security-related 
Factors’ and ‘Domestic Factors.’ These factors will be compared and contrasted in 
light of Turkey’s experiences in various peace operations. This dissertation aims at 
analyzing the motivations that lie at the root of Turkey’s involvement in peace 
operations, mostly organized under the leadership of the United Nations in the post-
Cold War era.  
Under the title of ‘Ideational Factors’ I will examine whether Turkey’s 
participation in such operations were informed by Turkey’s concern to be seen as 
western as well as considered a legitimate member of the international community. Is 
Turkey’s approach to peace-operations a function of its relationship with the western 
international community? Despite this ideational motivation, alternative explanations 
can also be offered as to why Turkey has become increasingly involved in peace 
operations. Theoretically speaking, security-related considerations in a neo-realist 
vein can offer a rival account. To this logic, the changing dynamics in Turkey’s 
regional environment might have endangered Turkey’s security and Turkish 
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authorities might have, in turn, considered participation in peace operations as an 
effective strategy to deal with the emerging security challenges.    
Under the title of ‘Security-related Factors’, I will examine Turkey’s 
participation in such operations from a security perspective. Has Turkey behaved as 
such in order to increase its security? Has Turkey joined these operations because it 
felt itself threatened by the developments in those crises situations? To what extent 
can Turkey’s participation in such operations be attributed to Turkey’s security 
culture? Has Turkey’s security culture been a facilitating factor in this regard?  
Under the title of ‘Domestic Factors’ I will examine to what extent pressure 
groups inside Turkey have played a role in this regard. Domestic Factors might 
prioritize the efforts of pressure groups inside the country as the main motivating 
factor. To this view, Turkey’s decisions in taking part in peace operations might be 
influenced by the lobbying efforts of Turkish people who have kinship relations with 
the Muslim people of neighboring countries in the Balkans and Caucasus. 
Of these alternative accounts, this dissertation will underline the ideational 
concern of being recognized as western as the main motivating factor. This ideational 
concern also has a security dimension, but not in the neo-realist vein as described 
above. This security dimension concerns Turkey’s aspirations to be recognized as a 
part of the western international community. Turkey’s most important security 
interest since the foundation of the Republic has been to gain western identity. This 
has been thought of being the only realistic way not to experience the fate of the 
Ottoman Empire. Stated somewhat differently westernization has been a security 
strategy (Oğuzlu, 2002:61-82). While this was relatively easy during the Cold War 
era, the credentials of Turkey’s western identity began to be seriously questioned in 
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the 1990s. Therefore, active involvement in peace operations might have been seen 
as a panacea to help re-emphasize Turkey’s western identity in the West. 
The third chapter will answer the third question: What is the impact of 
participation in such operations on Turkey? Has the act of participation served 
Turkey’s interests? This chapter will examine the impact of Turkey’s active 
involvement in peace operations in the 1990s in three different sections, namely 
under the headings ‘Ideational Impact,’ ‘Security-related Impact’ and ‘Domestic 
Impact’ by answering these questions: Has Turkey’s western image improved? Has 
Turkey transformed its security identity and interests in line with the changing 
security conceptualizations in the West? Has the modernization process of the 
Turkish Armed Forces become easier following Turkey’s presence in such 
operations? Has Turkey’s participation in peace operations changed Turkey’s 
security culture radically? Has it contributed to the elimination of security concerns 
in a neo-realist vein or to Turkey’s security in this way? Have the prospects of 
Turkey’s membership in the EU increased following Turkey’s cooperation with EU 
members in various peace operations across the globe and how?  Has Turkey’s 
participation in peace operations contributed to the improvement of Turkey’s 
relations with the United States which have gradually deteriorated in the post-Cold 
War era? 
 The conclusion will simply summarize the findings of the research and 
discuss the possible consequences of Turkey’s participation in peace operations on 
its western identity, security interests, relations with the EU, military modernization 
process, etc.    
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
THE CHANGING NATURE OF THE UNITED NATIONS PEACE 
 
OPERATIONS 
 
 
 
The main goal of this chapter is to analyze the changing nature of peace operations, 
mostly led by the United Nations. This is important because the motivations that 
guided peace operations during the Cold War era are radically different from the 
motivations that have helped shape peace operations in the post-Cold War era. While 
the peace operations of the Cold War era can be understood as typical conflict-
management exercises, those of the post-Cold War era are rather conflict-resolution 
exercises colored by strong ideational concerns. Peace operations in the 1990s have, 
to a significant extent, been motivated by the ideal concern of projecting the 
constitutive norms of the western international community on to the problematical 
non-western areas. In this regard, many peace operations in the post-Cold War era 
are, in fact, nation-building exercises in the image of the West. Such ideational 
features of the post-Cold War era peace operations are in harmony with the changing 
meaning of security.     
Against such a background this chapter will first discuss the nature of peace 
operations during the Cold War era and then the attention will switch to peace 
operations during the post-Cold War era. The chapter will mainly cover four case 
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studies, namely Somalia-Bosnia-Kosova-Afghanistan, with a view to demonstrating 
the changing nature of peace operations. 
 
2.1. The Cold War Era: The Genesis of Peacekeeping Operations  
Neither the states nor the international community have always been able to settle 
their disputes peacefully or by undertaking the requisite collective action whenever 
peace is threatened. The UN has seldom been united and effective in its use of force 
for the prevention of aggression and it has never managed such use in the manner 
prescribed in its Charter, except in Korea and Kuwait. The system proved inoperable 
when confronted with the realities of the post-World War II era. However, the failure 
to implement Articles 43-48 of the Charter did not lead to a complete abandonment of 
efforts to develop collective uses of armed force. Yet, as long as the bipolar struggle 
laid important constraints on an effective Security Council, the scope of collective 
security remained very limited indeed.  
Collective security is one of the approaches which has been adopted for 
responding to threats to international peace and security. The second approach is 
collective defense (Smith, 1994:3). These two approaches have similarities in their 
reliance on collective modalities of response against an aggressor. Because of these 
similarities, the terms are sometimes used interchangeably. Although the two can 
overlap, they often mean rather different terms. Therefore, before defining collective 
security, the distinction between collective defense and collective security needs to be 
established.  
Collective defense establishes a commitment by members of a limited alliance 
to act for mutual self-defense. Another word for collective defense is alliance. In the 
alliance system, a determinate enemy is required for a determinate purpose 
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(deterrence, defense or specific target, or geographical area). Alliances must 
necessarily be built on the formula A+B+n against X+Y+n (Joffee, 1992:36). 
Collective defense depends on the formation of alliances by limited numbers of states 
against commonly recognized threats. Members of the alliance agree to come to the 
assistance of any member only when one of them is threatened or militarily 
aggressed. Conflicts that do not involve the members of the alliance do not 
necessarily merit any collective alliance response. NATO stands as an example of a 
collective defense institution.  
In contrast, collective security adopts a universalistic approach. It requires 
universal participation in a system of multilateral responses to any potential threat to 
any individual state. Collective security does not require predetermined enemies. It is 
built on the formula A+B+X+Y+n against Z. Z as the presumed aggressor can be any 
member of the system, unknown beforehand (Joffee, 1992: 36-37). As Inis Claude 
noted, collective security recognizes no traditional friendships and no inveterate 
enmities and permits no alliances with or alliances against (Claude, 1971:255). 
Collective security assumes that wars are likely to occur and the aggressor ought to be 
punished. Every member of the international community must respond by sanctioning 
the actions of any aggressor that breaches or threatens to breach the peace. The UN 
stands as the primary example of an institutional structure founded on the principle of 
collective security.  
Taking the above assumptions into consideration, this system necessitates the 
willingness of nations to fight for the status quo (Claude, 1971:254). As Morgenthau 
states, the purpose of collective security lies in the “defense of the status quo” 
(Morgenthau, 1973: 65). Others, highlighting the military aspect of the concept, 
have, like Martin Wight, described collective security as “internationalized defense” 
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(Buffoy, 1994:491). In light of these facts, collective security can be defined as a 
system in which each state in the system accepts that the security of one is the 
concern of all. Each state agrees to join in a collective response to aggression to 
defend the status quo. The idea of collective security, which was first introduced at 
the negotiations that led to the 1648 Peace of Westphalia, has a history almost as 
long as the systems of states.  
After 1945, the ambitious scheme for collective security in Chapter VII 
(Enforcement Chapter) of the UN Charter was not implemented. The most obvious 
reason was the inability of the Permanent Members of the Security Council to reach 
an agreement on identifying the aggressor. Article 43 agreements, necessary to place 
national forces at the disposal of the UN, have never been concluded, because there 
was ideological mistrust and many states were reluctant to see their forces in distant, 
controversial, and risky military operations. Nonetheless, the determination and 
imagination of people to seek new concepts and devise new methods instead of the 
collective security system in an effort to make order out of chaos and prescribe 
peaceful measures forced member states of the UN to take measures. Because of its 
inability to carry out its task within a framework of collective security, the UN was 
compelled to seek alternative ways of securing peace, even if only on a minor scale.  
It is not the purpose of this dissertation to examine and elaborate upon the 
debate surrounding “collective security.” Instead, this dissertation will primarily 
focus on the methods developed in the UN for responding to many situations of 
international and internal violent conflicts, and ensuring international peace and 
security. The Charter has envisioned two mechanisms for ensuring international 
peace and security: 1) regional alliances, and 2) UN authorizations for the use of 
force. In practice, the UN has developed peacekeeping as a useful instrument for the 
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management of conflict. Despite important exceptions, there has been a tendency to 
prefer low risk methods of control (economic sanctions, air exclusion zones, arms 
embargoes, and attempts to broker cease-fire) or limited involvement with the consent 
of the parties (peacekeeping forces, observer missions, and humanitarian activities) 
(Roberts and Kingsbury, 1993: 39).  
Today, the most common way in which the UN helps maintain international 
peace and security is through peace operations. Peacekeeping was set up as an 
instrument to supervise peaceful settlements or freeze the situation with the consent 
of all parties (Nopens, 1995: 23). Peacekeeping came into being as an invention of 
the UN to fill the gap in the system provided by the Charter. It was not specifically 
defined in the Charter, but evolved as a non-coercive instrument of conflict control at 
a time when the Cold War constraints prevented the Security Council from taking 
more forceful steps permitted by the Charter (Ghali, 1992: 89). 
 
2.1.1. Terminology 
In the post-Cold War, the use of peace operations as an instrument for the 
management and resolution of conflicts has attracted the attention of a considerable 
number of international relations analysts. This renewed interest toward peace 
operations in general has led to the birth of a great number of classifications and 
definitions. A short list includes terms such as: enhanced peacekeeping, peace 
enforcing without force, wider peacekeeping, peacekeeping-plus, prickly-
peacekeeping, peace-stabilizing, peace-preserving, order restoring, aggravated 
peacekeeping, peace-pushing, peacekeeping with muscles, peace support, etc. 
Mackinlay and Chopra listed nine different kinds of operations: observer 
mission, traditional peacekeeping, preventive peacekeeping, supervision of a cease-
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fire between irregular forces, assistance in the maintenance of law and order, 
protection of the delivery of humanitarian assistance, assurance of the rights of 
passage, sanctions, and enforcement (Mackinlay and Chopra, 1992: 113-131). The 
methods of conflict management are listed and defined under various categories both 
in the literature and official publications. In ‘An Agenda for Peace’ developed by 
former UN Secretary- General Boutros Ghali, January 31, 1992, the methods of 
peace operations are defined as follows: 
Preventive diplomacy: Preventive diplomacy is action to prevent disputes 
from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into 
conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur. 
Peace-making: Peace-making is action to bring hostile parties to agreement, 
essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the 
Charter of the United Nations. Peace-making operations are generally initiated when 
the combatants agree to halt their fire and usually conclude when armistices are 
signed.  
Peacekeeping: Peacekeeping is the deployment of a United Nations presence 
in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving 
United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well. 
Peacekeeping is a technique that expands the possibilities for both the prevention of 
conflict and the making of peace. 
Post-conflict peace-building: Peace-building is one of the conflict 
management methods and aims at promoting political, economic, social, and 
psychological environment in the conflict region following provision of peace. 
Preventive diplomacy is to avoid a crisis; post-conflict peace-building is to prevent a 
recurrence. 
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As of July 2001, the NATO document ‘Peace Support Operations AJP-
3.4.1’ which aims to develop and describe military doctrine for the conduct of Peace 
Support Operations, these definitions were redifined as follows: 
Conflict prevention: Conflict prevention activities are normally conducted 
in accordance with the principles of Chapter VI of the UN Charter. Conflict 
prevention activities may range from diplomatic initiatives, through efforts designed 
to reform a country’s security sector. These activities make it more accountable to 
democratic control, to preventive deployments of forces designed to prevent or 
contain disputes from escalating to armed conflict. Other conflict prevention 
activities may include military fact-finding missions, consultations, warnings, 
inspections, and monitoring (NATO, 2001: AJP 3.4.1, No. 0212). 
Peace-making: Peace-making covers the diplomatic activities conducted 
after the commencement of a conflict aimed at establishing a cease-fire or a rapid 
peaceful settlement. They can include the provision of good offices, mediation, 
conciliation, and such actions as diplomatic pressure, isolation, sanctions or other 
operations as directed by the North Atlantic Council (NAC) (NATO, 2001: AJP 
3.4.1, No.0221). 
Peacekeeping: Peacekeeping operations are generally undertaken in 
accordance with the principles of Chapter VI of the UN Charter in order to monitor 
and facilitate the implementation of a peace agreement (NATO, 2001: AJP 3.4.1, 
No.0216). 
Peace enforcement: Peace enforcement operations normally take place 
under the principles of Chapter VII of the UN Charter. They are coercive in nature 
and are conducted when the consent of all parties to the conflict has not been 
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achieved or might be uncertain. They are designed to maintain or re-establish peace 
or enforce the terms specified in the mandate (NATO, 2001: AJP 3.4.1, No.0217). 
The British Army defines peace enforcement as “operations carried out to 
restore peace between belligerent parties who do not consent to intervention and who 
may be engaged in combat activities” (Wider Peacekeeping, 1994: 2-5). The “Report 
on Improving the UN's Capacity for Peacekeeping” defines peace enforcement as:  
Action under Articles 42 and 43 of Chapter VII of the Charter, 
including the use of armed force, to maintain or restore 
international peace and security in situations where the Security 
Council has determined the existence of a threat to peace, breach 
of the peace or act of aggression (Nopens, 1995: 84).  
 
Peacekeeping is premised on cooperation and, except for self-defense, its 
methods are inherently peaceful. It relies on peaceful means of achieving its goals 
and assumes the consent of most, if not all, parties. On the other hand, peace 
enforcement abandons the principles and techniques which sustain consent and 
presumes resistance by one or more parties. Therefore what divides peacekeeping 
from peace enforcement is not the level of violence, but simply consent. Consent of 
the parties concerned, as it were, emerges as the fundamental and key differential 
factor (Wider Peacekeeping, 1994: 2-11). It involves taking sides. The peace 
enforcer becomes, in effect, a party to the conflict and assumes the need to use force 
for its ends (Evans, 1993:128). Peace enforcement occurs when peacekeeping goes 
wrong. If a cease-fire breaks down, a revolt breaks out, or the peacekeepers lose the 
support of one side and become targets of a warring faction, the use of force can 
pacify the aggressor (Holmes, 1993: 329). With the advent of peace enforcement, 
impartiality may be neither possible nor desirable. 
 Peace-building: Peace-building covers actions that support political, 
economic, social and military measures aimed at strengthening political settlements 
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of a conflict. This includes mechanisms to identify and support structures that tend to 
consolidate peace, foster a sense of confidence and well-being, and support economic 
reconstruction. All too often, once the conflict has been brought to an end, the 
attention of the international community moves on, the peace-building phase of the 
mission plan is under-resourced, and the operation stalls (NATO, 2001: AJP 3.4.1, 
No.0222). 
Humanitarian Relief: Humanitarian relief activities are conducted to 
alleviate human suffering. They may be conducted independently or as an element of 
a peace operation. Humanitarian relief provided by military forces of the Alliance 
may precede or accompany humanitarian activities provided by specialized civilian 
organizations. However, the prime responsibility for the provision of humanitarian 
aid and assistance rests with specialized civilian, national, international, government, 
or non-government organizations and agencies. (NATO, 2001: AJP 3.4.1, No.0225) 
This proliferation of terms reflects the existing confusion on the organization 
and conduct of peace operations. Every UN intervention has a particular political, 
military, cultural, geographical, and economical environment. Trying to force the 
peace operations phenomenon into categories creates weak classifications and 
produces new hybrids. In general, all of the detailed divisions of UN operations are 
useless. Therefore, I will use the general term ‘Peace Operation’  
Peace Operation: Peace Operation is a more general term which is used for 
the general scope of activities such as peacekeeping, peace enforcement, peace 
support, peace-making, peace building, etc. It refers to activities covering the full 
range of operations carried out under a strong political diplomatic lead (conflict 
prevention, peace-making, and peace-building) and operations conducted under a 
military lead (peacekeeping and peace enforcement). It signifies mainly the operation 
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undertaken in the post-Cold War era. Peace operations are briefly defined as 
operations, which are carried out by multinational forces for peacekeeping, and peace 
enforcement. Conflict prevention, peace-making, peace-building, peacekeeping and 
peace enforcement operations are included in these operations. 
Conflict Prevention, Conflict-Management and Conflict-Resolution: In 
principle, conflict prevention, conflict-management and conflict-resolution are 
regarded as applicable in different phases of a conflict. Conflict prevention measures 
are designed for the early phases, before a conflict has become manifest (open). 
Management measures are applied in later phases when a conflict is manifest, but 
before violence has occurred. Conflict-resolution could, on the other hand, be applied 
in the de-escalation phase after a violent conflict has occurred. 
Conflict prevention is a set of instruments used to prevent or solve disputes 
before they have developed into active conflicts (Clément, 1997:18). Conflict-
management is a theoretical concept focusing on the limitation, mitigation, and/or 
containment of a conflict without necessarily solving it (Swanström and Weissmann, 
2005:5). 4 On a general level, conflict prevention and conflict-management are broad 
terms for methods and mechanisms used to avoid, minimize, and manage conflicts 
between different parties (Swanström and Weissmann, 2005:5). Fred Tanner has 
defined conflict-management as the limitation, mitigation and containment of a 
conflict without necessarily solving it (Tanner, 2000:541). William I. Zartman has 
argued that conflict-management refers to eliminating violent and violence-related 
actions and leaving the conflict to be dealt with on the political level (Zartman, 1997: 
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 Swanström, Niklas L.P., Ed, Conflict Prevention and Conflict Management in Northeast Asia, 
Uppsala & Washington: CACI & SRSP, 2005. Central Asia -Caucasus Institute and Silk Road Studies 
Program, a Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy Center affiliated with Johns Hopkins University-
SAIS and Uppsala University at  
 http://silkroadstudies.org/new/inside/staff/staff_web/niklas_swanstrom.htm 
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11). Wallensteen has also claimed that conflict-management typically focuses on the 
armed aspects of a conflict (Wallensteen, 2002:53). 
There are two sets of conflict management activities: mediation and 
peacekeeping (Greig and Diehl, 2005:623). Of all of the conflict-management 
techniques performed by international organizations, mediation and peacekeeping 
have the greatest direct impact on conflicts. Conflict-management attempts only to 
settle conflicts into a status quo (for example, Linklater and Macmillan, 1995: 5). It 
aims to facilitate the resolution of disputes between states. Conflict- resolution 
moves beyond this state-centrism by concentrating on the human needs, human 
security, and the structural causes of conflict. 
Conflict-resolution developed out of a need to find a process that could 
facilitate “resolution,” rather than management, of intractable conflicts- often ethnic 
conflict. Conflict-resolution attempts to bring the individual back into the realm of 
conflict management and made the case that conflict can be resolved at the 
diplomatic level only with the consent of the individual citizen. It aims to transform 
conflict “into peaceful nonviolent process of social and political change” rather than 
attempt to eliminate conflict (Miall, and et al., 1999:22). Conflict-resolution refers to 
the resolution of the underlying incompatibilities in a conflict and mutual acceptance 
of each party’s existence (Wallensteen, 2002: 53), while conflict-management refers 
to measures that limit, mitigate and/or contain a conflict without necessarily solving 
it. They are in fact, often applied in different stages of a conflict and address 
fundamentally different issues. In sum, conflict-management and conflict- resolution 
are different concepts, but at the same time they are closely interrelated. Conflict-
management is required in order to enable the initiation of preventive measures 
aiming at resolving the dispute.  
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Against the background of such definitional issues, the next part will simply 
discuss the nature of peace operations during the Cold War era. In doing this one of 
the assumptions will be that such peacekeeping operations can be defined as typical 
conflict management exercises and peacekeeping essentially plays a conflict 
management role (Greig and Diehl, 2005:625). The post-Cold War era does, on the 
other hand, demonstrate that peace operations have increasingly transformed into 
conflict resolution exercises. 
 
2.1.2. Political Basis for Peace Operations 
Peace operation is one of the measures initiated by the United Nations as part of the 
overall process for the management of violent conflict. It is, in fact, “the predominant 
mechanism” used by the United Nations for conflict control and management 
(Urquhart, 1993:92). Peace operation is not, and never was intended to be an 
alternative to a system of collective security. But in the absence of such a system, as 
outlined in Chapter VII of the Charter, peace operations were considered as a useful 
instrument of the management of conflict.  
The concept of a peace operation was gradually devised to undertake certain 
functions. As Holmes states that the kind of peacekeeping we have developed did not, 
of course, have its roots in Article 43; it developed when the effort by the Military 
Staff Committee to implement Article 43 failed.5 Peace operations evolved out of 
necessity (Holmes, 1964: 85). In other words, due to the lack of a clear Charter basis, 
these operations were ‘improvised in response to the specific requirements of 
individual conflicts’ (Weiss, Forsythe and Coate, 1997: 53). Peace operations are not 
explicitly provided for by the UN Charter. They have been developed in an ad hoc 
                                               
5
 the Military Staff Committee (MSC) is comprised of the chiefs of staff of the five Permanent 
Members, who will advise the Council on military matters. As the Cold War tensions emerged, the 
MSC never really ever functioned.  
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manner through the practice of the World Organization. They were a product of 
necessity rather than design. 
One of the main incentives behind the development of UN peacekeeping was 
the Cold War political climate in which it evolved. During the Cold War era, the 
superpowers had an interest in bringing to an end proxy wars before they were 
themselves dragged into direct confrontation. Thus, peacekeeping tended to be 
limited to preserving an agreed truce between opposing national armed forces while 
alternative mechanisms were used to address a conflict's underlying issues. 
The main concern was to localize conflicts and tensions and prevent them 
from escalating to a great power confrontation. Localizing the conflict has been an 
objective in all of the peace operations. When explaining the concept of “preventive 
diplomacy,” Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold described it as “the filling of 
vacuums by the United Nations” in order to prevent the competitive interference of 
the parties concerned (Claude, 1964: 286-289). Inis L. Claude in his Power and 
International Relations accurately explained the underlying political objective of 
peacekeeping: 
This, it should be noted, is not a device for defeating aggressors-and 
certainly not for coercing great powers...but for assisting the major 
powers in avoiding the extension and sharpening of their conflicts 
and the consequent degeneration of whatever stability they may have 
been able to achieve in their mutual relationships... The greatest 
potential contribution of the United Nations in our time to the 
management of international power relationships lies not in 
implementing collective security... but in helping to improve and 
stabilize the working of the balance of power system, which is for 
better or for worse, the operative mechanism of contemporary 
international politics. The immediate task, in short, is to make the 
world safe for the balance of power system and the balance system 
safe for the world (Claude, 1962: 283-284). 
 
If peacekeeping is envisaged to contribute to the smooth functioning of the 
balance of a power system (regional or global), then it should not impair the validity 
  23 
of the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned. It should essentially defend 
the status quo (Karaosmanoğlu, 2002:91). On the one hand, peace operations 
essentially defend the status quo. On the other hand, they are not intended merely to 
be a guardian of the status quo, but rather, help to facilitate efforts towards a 
comprehensive settlement of the regional conflict in which they are involved 
(Rikhye, 1990:4). The purpose here is to prolong cease-fires in order to give time to 
the parties concerned for negotiations to succeed in resolving substantial 
disagreements. As a product of peace operations’ role in helping suspend a conflict 
and gaining time, the belligerents can be brought closer to the negotiating table. In 
addition to stabilizing the situation and separating conflicting states or factions, 
peace operations have had the task of preventing further atrocities and human 
suffering and creating a favorable climate conducive to peace-making 
(Karaosmanoğlu, 2002:91).  
According to Wiseman, “Peacekeeping is not an end but a means to an end” 
(Wiseman, 1983: 210). It is not, in itself, a solution to violent conflict but only a 
mechanism to relax tension and to prevent the situation from deteriorating and 
provide a measure of stability while peace talks proceed or start. In other words, it is a 
“mechanism to assist the ongoing peace-making process” (Evans, 1993: 100) and is 
intended to be an interim step to buy time for conflict resolution and diplomacy. It is 
primarily a political and diplomatic activity. As Perez de Cuellar stated, 
“peacekeeping operations symbolize the world community’s will to peace and 
represent the impartial, practical expression of that will.”6  
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 Mr. Javier Perez de Cuellar (served as the fifth United Nations Secretary-General, from 1 January 
1982 until 31 December 1991) said this when accepting the Nobel Peace Prize on behalf of the UN 
peacekeepers in 1988. 
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Peacekeeping was developed progressively and pragmatically, largely due to 
the visions and efforts initiated by Lester G. Pearson, the Canadian Foreign Minister 
at the time of United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) operation, and Dag 
Hammarskjöld, then Secretary-General of the UN. Dag Hammarskjöld was widely 
considered as the father of UN peacekeeping. As part of his report to the Security 
Council concerning the UNEF’s establishment in 1956, the first peacekeeping 
experience in UN history, he defined the principles of peacekeeping. 
Before examining the principles of peacekeeping, it is first necessary to 
define UNEF I as it was the first peacekeeping force and made for almost all future 
peacekeeping efforts. UNEF I was the first “dramatically innovative venture” into 
peacekeeping (White, 1993:193). This mission established fundamental 
peacekeeping guidelines which have remained relevant today. In the Suez Crisis, the 
Cold War did not adversely affect the operation of the Security Council because both 
the US and the Soviet Union wanted the withdrawal of France and Britain from 
Egyptian territory. But effective action in the Security Council had been blocked 
since two permanent members, France and Britain, were involved in this crisis. So 
the question was passed to the General Assembly. Hence, the normative framework 
for a peacekeeping force was first established in resolutions adopted during the 
General Assembly’s First Emergency Special Session (1-10 November 1956) 
convened under the “Uniting for Peace” resolution.7 This session resulted in the 
deployment of the UN Emergency Force (UNEF) on November 15, 1956, after the 
Suez Crisis. 
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 UNGA Resolution 377 (1950). This is a procedure for transferring discussion of a problem to the 
General Assembly if the Security Council is unable to make decisions on the problem because of the 
use of vetoes. 
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What made UNEF I different was that all of its components were new; it was 
unprecedented. First, UNEF I was under the direction of a neutral officer appointed 
by the UN, unlike any previous peace observation missions in which their own 
national commanders directed units. In this sense, the troops were truly international 
servants. Second, the major powers did not contribute any force to UNEF I. This 
strategy had been used in a few observation missions in the past, but now it became a 
guiding principle for peace operations. Third, UNEF I did not want to affect the 
military balance in the area or to favor one side or the other in its activities. So it was 
designed to be a strictly neutral force in action and in purpose. It was authorized to 
use force only in self-defense. Finally and perhaps most importantly, UNEF I acted 
as an interposition force between the rivals. This was the first time the UN served as 
a physical barrier between hostile parties. For the first time, the words “UN 
command, emergency force, secure and supervise a cease-fire” appeared in a UN 
mandate.8 UNEF I involved not only an expansion of numbers of personnel, but also 
a new level of complexity beyond any previous mission. Therefore, UNEF I is 
important because it was the first peacekeeping force, and its mode of operation 
became the model for almost all future efforts in peacekeeping. 
Dag Hammarskjöld defined the principles of peacekeeping as requiring that:  
-A mission must have the authorization of the Security Council or the General 
Assembly; 
-UN involvement in a conflict requires the consent of the parties to that conflict; 
-A mission must maintain operational neutrality and so must not influence the 
political balance of power between warring parties; 
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-Peacekeepers should not use coercive force, except in self-defense; 
-And personnel for an operation must be recruited voluntarily from UN member 
states, excluding the Permanent Five members of the Security Council and states 
with interests in the conflict.9 
Three interrelated guiding principles of the above-mentioned principles are 
accepted as the pillars of traditional peacekeeping. First, unlike the enforcement 
action provided for in Chapter VII, peacekeeping operations are dependent on 
consent and not on coercion. Second, they must be completely neutral. Third, their 
military personnel are empowered to use force except in self-defense. Hammarskjöld 
described the principle of non-use of force except in self-defense as the prohibition 
against any initiative in the use of armed force.10 
In his 1995 Supplement to An Agenda for Peace, then Secretary-General 
Boutros Ghali stated that there is a clear link between respecting the three tenets of 
peacekeeping (consent, impartiality, and limited use of force) and operational 
success; “Analysis of recent successes and failures shows that in all successes those 
principles were respected and in most of the less successful operations one or another 
of them was not” (Ghali, 1995: paras.33-4). The removal of one of the principles 
would impair the other two principles and consequently destroy the whole structure 
(Karaosmanoğlu, 2002:92). The first principle of peacekeeping is that an operation 
must be based on the consent of all of the parties in the conflict, including the 
recognized state government. It is also important to remember that the peacekeepers 
need to obtain the consent not only for the establishment of the operation, but also 
for how the operation will be carried out. Consent to the establishment of the 
operation may not be a guarantee that they will cooperate in fulfilling the mandate. 
                                               
9
 See A/3943, pars. 70-71, 166-167 and 179; and A/3302, pars. 10-12.  
 
10
 See A/3943, pars. 179-180 
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For example, during the conflict in Cambodia, both the Khmer Rouge and the Phnom 
Penh regime consented to UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), but 
they also refused to cooperate with several aspects of its mandate (Bratt, 1997: 63). 
The presence of consent is also indispensable to attain the mandate of a 
peacekeeping operation. In order to perform their mandate effectively, the 
peacekeepers must rely on cooperation with all parties concerned. Consent also helps 
considerably, an operation’s ability to limit casualties. Particularly, the peacekeepers 
should not be seen as an alien force intervening into the conflict, but rather as invited 
guests. In the final account, the chances that the parties to the conflict attack the 
peacekeepers are greatly reduced. Although it has not been a guarantee for 
peacekeeping success, the consent to the deployment of the peacekeeping force is 
necessary to ensure the support of the parties to the conflict for the operation. 
Consent for a peacekeeping operation should be considered as the first sign that the 
parties are willing to compromise and negotiate. The United Nations assumes that the 
parties, in giving their consent, agree to cooperate with the peacekeepers. Under such 
conditions, use of force becomes both unnecessary and counterproductive 
(Karaosmanoğlu, 2002:92). Therefore, the principle of consent is closely linked with 
that of non-use of force except in self-defense. 
The second principle of peacekeeping is the adherence to the principle of the 
non-use of force except in self-defense. In a peacekeeping mission, soldiers are not 
allowed to utilize force as a means of imposing the will of the UN. The 
Peacekeeper’s Handbook illustrates the generally accepted rules governing the use of 
force by United Nations peacekeeping troops:  
A peacekeeping soldier may use his weapon only in defense of his 
life or in conjunction with his fellow soldiers to defend UN positions 
and/or property against attack. Such action is only meant to be taken 
in the event of physical attack and then only as a last resort; it is not 
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for the UN troops to initiate the action (International Peace Academy, 
1984: 439).  
There is also a widespread assumption among politicians, journalists, and 
academics that the use of force is in itself incompatible with impartiality. The 
moment peacekeepers use force beyond the purpose of self-defense, they become 
accused of “taking sides.” Disarmament provides a good example of how the 
principle of the limited use of force enhances operational performance. UNTAC did 
not resort to force when faced with the refusal of the Khmer Rouge to disarm. 
Instead, it decided to concentrate on its electoral functions (Bratt, 1997: 65). 
The third principle of peacekeeping is impartiality, the extent to which 
peacekeepers act in the interests of international peace and security, rather than the 
interests of special states or other external actors. A wide range of studies 
(Fetherston, 1995; Goulding, 1993; James, 1990) has emphasized the vital 
importance of peacekeeping impartiality. In recent years, impartiality has come to 
mean not impartiality between the belligerents, but impartiality in carrying out UN 
Security Council decisions (Roberts, 1994: 115). It is widely assumed that 
peacekeeping forces operate as objective and disinterested parties in special areas of 
crisis. Such impartiality is regarded as a desirable objective in its own right; it also 
provides peacekeepers with a sense of legitimacy which helps facilitate the success 
of the operation. Alan James, one of the most distinguished authorities on this topic 
notes that: It is impartiality which gives peacekeeping its distinctiveness, 
“impartiality is the life blood of peacekeeping” (James 1990: 211).  
Maintaining impartiality increases the possibility of a more successful 
operation because it ensures that the peacekeepers do not become a party to the 
conflict. The purpose of impartiality is to show that the UN is an honest broker with 
no interests other than to assist the warring parties to obtain a peaceful resolution of 
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the conflict (Bratt, 1997: 63). There is an interaction between the principle of consent 
and that of impartiality. Peacekeepers should treat all of the parties on the same 
footing of equality. If the UN relies on the consent of only one of the conflicting 
parties, overlooking the other party or parties, the operation would cease to be 
impartial. To remain impartial, forces involved in peace operations cannot take sides 
in disputes. Once the UN violates impartiality and takes sides, its role as an honest 
broker breaks down and any initiative it takes becomes suspect. Additionally, the 
peacekeepers can perform their mandate more effectively if they do not fear for their 
safety. Otherwise, too much time and too many resources are spent on protecting the 
peacekeepers and not enough on ways to improve the performance of their mandate. 
When peacekeeper casualties greatly increase due to the loss of their impartiality, 
their ability to limit casualties is reduced (Bratt, 1997: 65). 
One of the various factors that has affected the performance of UN peace 
operations both in Cold War and post-Cold War internal conflicts is the maintenance 
of the three traditional principles of peacekeeping: consent, impartiality, and the non-
use of force except in self-defense (Bratt, 1997: 46). To what extent has the UN 
observed these three fundamental principles of traditional peacekeeping in the Cold 
War and the post-Cold War era? If it deviated from them, to what extent and in what 
ways? The United Nations peacekeeping practice deviated from these principles to a 
considerable extent on the occasion of the Congo operation 1960-1964 (ONUC). 
ONUC deserves special mention because it was by far the most important instance of 
peacekeeping during the Cold War and the UN’s largest, and bloodiest peacekeeping 
mission. From 1960 to 1964, under a broad vague mandate from the Security Council 
and under the control of the Secretary-General, ONUC conducted military missions 
unseen before or since in the annals of the UN.  
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ONUC came about in response to fighting between Belgian and Congolese 
troops who had mutinied against their white officers immediately following the 
independence of Congo from Belgian colonial administration (Cervanek, 1995: 49). 
In July 1960, following the breakdown of order on Belgian decolonization the 
Security Council constituted ONUC at the request of the Congo government to 
provide technical assistance to the newly independent government and to assist in 
maintaining law and order until the Congolese security forces could fulfill their tasks 
(White, 1994: 149). After deliberation, the Security Council stated that the situation 
in the Congo was a “threat to international peace and security” and that all measures, 
including the use of force, be used to end the civil war.11 Later the Security Council 
authorized ONUC to undertake enforcement action to prevent civil war, maintain the 
territorial integrity, and complete the removal of mercenaries.12  
The Congo operation broke new ground in the history of UN military 
involvement. Because, for the first time, the Secretary-General directly deployed a 
military force under Chapter VII. This case is interesting in the contemporary context 
for four reasons. First, it was initially deployed as a peacekeeping operation. ONUC, 
as all other peace operations, was deployed with the consent and invitation of the 
parties. But when it became clear that the peacekeeping would not enable it to 
achieve its objectives, the Security Council authorized it to use force on a 
considerable scale to end the secession of Katanga. This was the first, and until 
Somalia, the only case of a transition from peacekeeping to peace enforcement 
(Goulding, 1993:452). Second, command and control of the whole operation was 
delegated by the Council to the Secretariat, not to a member state or group of states. 
Third, it was the first example of a UN peacekeeping operation expanded to include 
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 See, SC Res. 169 of November 24, 1961 
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very substantial civilian elements mandated to create and strengthen local institutions 
and designed to reconstruct a ruined state and to avoid a recurrence of conflict. 
Fourth, it was deployed in a country where the institutions of state were collapsing.  
The UN’s reputation suffered tremendous damage as a result of this mission. 
After the Congo crisis, the UN Security Council refused to intervene in civil wars in 
Africa, citing the difficulties of keeping peace in the shadow of a Cold War (Adebajo 
and Landsberg, 2000:165-166). Congo was the ancestor of later UN involvement in 
civil wars where the military task was more complex and demanding. It put peace 
operations in a wider framework of securing and maintaining peace and did not limit 
it to the solving of the specific aspects of a particular crisis (Nopens, 1995:34).  
In UNEF, the UN had to deal only with the external aspects of the conflict 
without getting involved in the domestic politics of Egypt. Therefore, it had no 
difficulty strictly following the guiding principles of peacekeeping. In the Congo 
Crisis, for example, it was extremely difficult for ONUC to remain in the established 
framework. The complexities of the internal conflict broke down the delicate line 
between the maintenance of minimum public order and involvement in domestic 
issues. The force was increasingly involved in domestic politics and finally became a 
party to the conflict. It was implicitly authorized by the Security Council to have 
recourse to arms beyond self-defense. 
Unlike ONUC, United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) 
has strictly observed the afore-mentioned three basic principles of traditional 
peacekeeping (Karaosmanoğlu, 2002:95). Like the previous peace operations, UNEF 
and ONUC, UNFICYP is a pragmatic success. It was set up on an ad hoc basis and 
now serves under the authority of the United Nations Secretary-General. However, it 
differs from UNEF and ONUC in that it is functionally and organizationally much 
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more developed and it applies a much wider range of improved methods for dealing 
with the conflict (Karaosmanoğlu, 1972: 39). The first political purpose of the UN in 
Cyprus was to localize the conflict and to insulate the intercommunal conflict area 
from the intervention of Greece and Turkey, averting a possible war between these 
two nations. The second major purpose of the UN presence in Cyprus is to contribute 
to the resolution of the conflict by creating on the island an atmosphere of calm and 
non-violence. UNFICYP aims to prevent a settlement by force and to encourage one 
by negotiation (Karaosmanoğlu, 1972: 42). UNFICYP has remained as a prototypical 
case of traditional peacekeeping in internal conflict. UNFICYP to a great extent 
avoided undesired involvement in domestic affairs. Its guiding principle is to remain 
neutral and not to fire unless fired upon. In a broad sense, it is a means of persuasion 
rather than an instrument of enforcement. It has strictly obeyed the principle of non-
use of force except in self-defense. 
The most significant departures from the basic principles of the United 
Nations peacekeeping took place in the post-Cold War era. In the post-Cold War 
circumstances, the principles and practices which had evolved in the Cold War 
period seemed self-limiting. Being designed during the Cold War period and suited 
mainly for the international conflicts, principles of consent and impartiality often 
don’t fit the pattern of necessary requirements for the resolution of intra-state 
conflicts. The nature of intra-state conflict has complicated the ability of the UN to 
act as an impartial force (Duke, 1994: 388). Moreover, it can be argued that for intra-
state conflicts these principles limit the flexibility necessary for conflict resolution 
and give a certain degree of international recognition to different secessionist and 
separatist regimes, warring fractions, guerilla movements, and terrorist groups by 
equalizing them with the official governments and requesting their consent for 
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international involvement. Therefore, in the post-Cold War era, the three traditional 
principles of consent, impartiality, and non-use of force except in self-defense 
became inadequate when the UN was confronted with internal conflicts and civil war 
situations. They are just as difficult to uphold in internal conflicts where there are no 
clear geographical front lines and where the warring parties do not divide neatly into 
two hostile camps.  
The UN operations in Bosnia and Somalia, however, suggest that the UN has 
moved rather far from the established principles of peacekeeping. In these 
operations, the Security Council went far beyond the three fundamental principles by 
disregarding the consent of certain parties to the conflict; acting impartiality, against 
certain parties, and using armed force beyond self-defense. The military operations in 
Somalia violated every one of the traditional principles of peacekeeping. UNOSOM 
II, which lacked the consent of the conflicting Somali side, suffered extremely high 
casualty rates for a peacekeeping operation. Although this could be regarded as a 
consequence to a loss of impartiality and an escalation in the use of force, it is 
important to remember that these are related to the two traditional principles of 
peacekeeping. Thus, the fundamental cause of UNOSOM II’s casualties was the 
absence of consent from the Somali parties. 
The consequences of violating impartiality were grave as clearly 
demonstrated in Somalia when US forces, under UN authorization, pursued a 
disarmament campaign against General Aideed. This led to UNOSOM II becoming a 
party to the conflict, thus ending any credible role that the UN could play in conflict 
resolution. The disarmament mandate and the manhunt for Aideed imposed during 
UNOSOM II became a direct threat to the position of the clans within the local 
power structure and were resisted accordingly. By attempting to disarm the warring 
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factions and capture Aideed, peacekeeping forces forfeited all pretenses of 
impartiality and became active belligerents in the conflict. UNOSOM II’s credibility 
and operational effectiveness were destroyed when it resorted to using force and it 
could no longer effectively facilitate conflict resolution in Somalia. UNOSOM II 
increased, rather than limited, the number of casualties among combatants, civilians, 
and peacekeepers. Moreover, UNOSOM II was diverted from implementing the 
other aspects of its mandate.  
In Bosnia, absence of cooperation from all parties made it increasingly 
difficult for UNPROFOR to fulfill its mandate of meeting pressing humanitarian 
needs and protecting threatened civilian populations. Peacekeepers came under direct 
military attack. The use of force would give credibility to UNPROFOR, even though 
it would increase its vulnerability (Roberts, 1994: 102). In response to growing 
international pressure to take action, the Security Council adopted a resolution under 
the enforcement provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter calling upon all states “to 
take all measures necessary” to facilitate, in coordination with the UN, the delivery 
of humanitarian aid to Sarajevo and other parts of Bosnia.13 UNPROFOR II was 
established under the enforcement provisions of Chapter VII of the UN Charter. 
Missions were to be conducted in the absence of a prearranged and sustained cease-
fire and without the consent of the parties to the conflict. In February 1993, the 
Council specifically cited Chapter VII as a basis for UNPROFOR’s duties in Croatia 
and Bosnia-Herzegovina.14 
Although the traditional principles of consent, impartiality and non-use of 
force except in self-defense have been contested and challenged, particularly in the 
debate concerning the application of peacekeeping in post-Cold War conflict, they 
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still define the essence of peacekeeping today. The failed experiments in Somalia and 
Bosnia have reaffirmed the importance of these principles. 
 
2.1.3. Legal Basis for Peace Operations 
There is no explicit legal basis for peacekeeping in the Charter. In the absence of 
‘Article 43 Agreements’ the Organisation has to find the legal basis for each 
peacekeeping operation. This task involves the questions of functional interpretation 
of the UN Charter in order to make it clear which governing bodies of the UN are 
competent to establish peacekeeping forces.  
The legal basis of the practice has mostly depended on Chapter VI and VII of 
the Charter, albeit implicitly. The only authoritative guidance in this regard is 
provided by the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on 
Certain Expenses of the United Nations (ICJ Reports, 1962:163-164). In 1962, the 
International Court of Justice affirmed the legality of peacekeeping on the basis of the 
purposes and principles of the World Organization through a functional interpretation 
of the Charter. The Certain Expenses case is an advisory opinion directly concerned 
with the constitutionality of peacekeeping. Today, the legality debate seems to have 
diminished since the World Court’s decision in the Certain Expenses case during the 
early 1960s. Today, there is a broad consensus on the legality of peace operation 
(Karaosmanoğlu, 2002:92). 
In the Certain Expenses case a financial crisis over payment for the UN’s 
peacekeeping operations in the Middle East (UNEF I) and in the Congo (ONUC), led 
the UN General Assembly to request an advisory opinion from the Court on the 
question of whether these expenditures constituted expenses of the organization 
within the meaning of Art. 17(2) of the UN Charter. The request raised the question 
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of whether the General Assembly was entitled to authorize peace operations or 
whether exclusive competence in the field of peace and security lay with the Security 
Council. The World Court in this case clearly stated that the UN General Assembly 
had the power to create peacekeeping forces. 
As the International Court of Justice has confirmed, the primary responsibility 
of the Security Council in the area of international peace and security is not an 
exclusive one. The assessment by the ICJ of UNEF and ONUC as non-enforcement 
actions were designed to demonstrate that establishment of those forces was not 
exclusively within the powers of the Security Council. Other governing bodies of the 
UN may also assume certain responsibility in this field. Besides Security Council, 
the bodies relevant in peacekeeping context are the General Assembly and the 
Secretary-General. The Charter of the United Nations does not contain express 
authorization for any organ of the UN to establish peacekeeping forces. Therefore, 
relevance of any UN body for establishing peacekeeping forces should be focused 
upon in light of the functions and powers entrusted to it under the Charter. 
Chapter VI, Pacific Settlement of Disputes, provides for investigation, 
mediation and settlement for the Security Council, the principal UN body vested with 
the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, and the 
General Assembly in solving regional and local disputes. It is generally admitted that 
‘the Security Council is empowered to establish peacekeeping forces in the case of a 
chapter VI situation’ (Simma, 1995: 590-591). Chapter VI of the UN Charter gives a 
prominent role to the Security Council in seeking solutions to international disputes. 
In other words, the Council can launch a peacekeeping operation to contribute to the 
peaceful settlement of a dispute which is ‘likely’ to endanger international peace and 
security. However, under Chapter VI the Council is empowered to deal not only with 
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disputes in a strict sense, but also with situations which may, in case of their 
continuance, endanger international peace and security (Kelsen, 2000: 401). 
On the basis of an extensive interpretation of Articles 33 and 36, the Council 
can formulate recommendations relating to the establishment of a peacekeeping 
operation as an ‘appropriate method of adjustment.’ The enumeration of settlement 
procedures in Article 33, probably the most important article in Chapter VI, is not 
exhaustive. Bruno Simma’s Commentary (1995: 511) is clear on the issue; 
Although the catalogue of Art. 33(1) lists nearly all mechanisms of 
dispute settlement which are known in international practice, it has 
been deliberately left open-ended (‘other peaceful means’). Parties 
are consequently free to combine different types or to modify them 
in such a way as may seem most appropriate for the solution of a 
pending dispute. 
 
Article 33 of the Charter obligates States to settle their disputes by 
negotiation, conciliation, arbitration, or judicial methods. According to article 33(2) 
the Council may “call upon the parties to settle the dispute by such means.” It can be 
deduced from article 33 that the Security Council, under 36(1), can recommend 
appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment for the settlement of a specific 
conflict. For that reason, a peacekeeping operation that the parties agree to can be 
considered under articles 33 and 36 as an auxiliary or preparatory method aimed at 
facilitating the solution of a conflict. One can conclude that Chapter VI of the UN 
Charter may provide legal basis for the establishment of peacekeeping forces. 
On the other hand, Chapter VII defines how and when the Security Council 
may authorize the use of military force. It deals with the “existence of any threat to 
the peace, breach of the peace or act or aggression.” It also calls for the severing of 
diplomatic relations, disrupting economic relations, and boycotts with the aggressor. 
According to article 39, the Security Council may either take coercive measures or 
make recommendations with a view of maintaining or restoring international peace 
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and security. Such recommendations may undeniably serve as a basis for 
peacekeeping operations.  
As for Articles 41 and 42, the International Court of Justice clearly stated in 
the Certain Expenses case that peacekeeping operations are not enforcement actions 
(ICJ Reports, 1962: 166, 171). It has been argued therefore, by some scholars that 
articles 41 and 42 of the Charter are not in a position to provide legal basis for the 
establishment of peacekeeping forces. Article 42 of the UN Charter empowers the 
Security Council in case the non-military measures are inadequate or would be 
inadequate, to take military actions for maintenance or restoration of international 
peace and security. According to the original Charter scheme, the Security Council 
should have been provided with military units for taking military enforcement 
actions on the basis of agreements concluded on the basis of Article 43 of the 
Charter. Such agreements have never been concluded. The Charter, however, does 
not require troops to be placed at the disposal of the Security Council according to 
Article 43. In the Certain Expenses case, the International Court of Justice clearly 
indicated that the absence of conclusion of Article 43 agreements shall not render the 
Security Council impotent when it is facing urgent needs to discharge its 
responsibilities in the area of peace and security (ICJ Reports, 1962). 
According to the prevailing opinion, the most proper legal basis for 
peacekeeping operations may be Article 40 of the Charter (Higgins, 1981: 144). 
Certain jurists consider peacekeeping operations as provisional measures in terms of 
Article 40 of the Charter. Article 40 of the Charter empowers the Security Council to 
“call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it 
deems necessary or desirable.” “The peacekeeping is simply a provisional measure 
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aimed at stopping the fighting. It does not, at least in its basic form, sort out the 
underlying problem” (McCoubrey and White, 1996: 5). 
Article 29 of the Charter enables the Security Council “to establish such 
subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions.” Article 
29 of the Charter may provide merely institutional or procedural background for 
establishment of peacekeeping operations, for alone it is insufficient to explain the 
legal basis of peacekeeping operation as such as it follows from its nature (Hilf, 
1994: 485). The recourse should therefore be made to one of the powers of the 
Security Council analysed above. 
The legal basis of peacekeeping operations established by the Security 
Council is provided for in the UN Charter by virtue of operation of: 
• Recommendatory power under article 36(1) and 39 in conjunction with article 29 
• Provisional measures under article 40 in conjunction with article 29 
• Powers to take measures under articles 41 or 42 in conjunction with artcile 29 
The General Assembly has both recommendatory and institutional powers in 
establishing peace operations. The Court in the Certain Expenses case affirmed that 
Article 11(2) and Article 14 of the Charter providing for powers of General 
Assembly similar to those of the Council under article 36 may serve as a basis for 
establishment of peace operations. As we have seen when looking at the World 
Court’s judgment in the Expenses case, Article 11(2) only forbids the Assembly from 
ordering member states to adopt coercive measures, whether military or economic. 
This does not prohibit the Assembly from creating a consensual peacekeeping force 
(White, 1996: 50). The Court in the Certain Expenses case directly referred to article 
11, paragraph 2 of the Charter, which deals with power of the General Assembly to 
issue recommendations to States concerning the “questions relating maintenance of 
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international peace and security.” The Court indicated that this provision empowers 
the General Assembly to organize peace operations by means of recommendations. 
The General Assembly could act unless enforcement measures against a State are 
involved (ICJ Reports, 1962: 164).  
The first step by the General Assembly to assert its own role in the area of 
peace and security was the resolution 377 ‘Uniting for Peace’ adopted in 1950 
concerning the situation in Korea and dealing with the residual role of the General 
Assembly in maintenance of international peace and security. The Uniting for Peace 
Resolution adopted in 1950 stated; 
If the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the 
permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for 
the maintenance of international peace and security in any case where 
there appears to be a threat to peace, breach of the peace, or act of 
aggression, the General Assembly shall consider the matter 
immediately with a view to making appropriate recommendations to 
members for collective measures, including in the case of a breach of 
the peace or acts of aggression the use of armed force when 
necessary, to maintain or restore international peace and security.  
 
This provision makes it clear that the General Assembly did not consider its 
residual competence in the area of peace and security as limited to enforcement 
measures. And if the General Assembly asserts its power to recommend forcible 
measures, it shall naturally be considered as also asserting its power to organize 
peacekeeping operations on the basis of consent given by the parties. Following the 
example of UNEF, the Court indicated that the General Assembly may establish 
peace operations either under article 11 or under article 14 (ICJ Reports, 1962: 172). 
The General Assembly also has institutional power in establishing peace operations. 
Article 22 empowers the General Assembly to establish subsidiary organs for 
performance of its functions and this power may be used for the establishment of a 
peacekeeping force. UNEF, in particular, has been established under this article 
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(Hilf, 1994: 386-387). It has been thus established that Chapters IV, VI and VII of 
the UN Charter are in a position to provide legal basis for peace operations. Also, in 
an institutional sense, peacekeeping forces established by the UN are subsidiary 
organs of this organization based on Article 7, Article 22 and Article 29 of the UN 
Charter.  
According to another view which is political rather than legal, a peace 
operation is often referred to as a “Chapter VI and a half” activity, meaning that it 
fell somewhere between Chapter VI “On the Pacific Settlement of Disputes” and 
Chapter VII on “Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace 
and Acts of Aggression.” It goes beyond purely diplomatic means for the peaceful 
settlement of disputes described in Chapter VI, but falls short of the military or other 
enforcement provisions of Chapter VII. Since there was no specific reference to 
peace keeping in the Charter, former Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld coined 
an expression and stated that a peace operation might be put in a new Chapter “Six 
and a half” referring to an expansion of Chapter VI (Weiss, and et al., 1994: 48). 
 
2.1.4. The Nature of Peace Operations 
Peace operations have never been purely military while carrying out their functions 
mentioned above. They have always included civilian personnel to carry out essential 
political or administrative functions. They have traditionally fallen into two broad 
categories: observation missions and peace operation forces. Peace operation forces 
generally carry out a wide variety of tasks such as the monitoring and enforcement of 
cease-fires, interposition between belligerents, election monitoring, protection, and 
delivery of humanitarian aid and the maintenance of government and public order. 
Peace operation forces are significantly different from both traditional military forces 
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and observer missions in several ways. Whereas a traditional military mission 
involves the defense or attempted seizure of territory, the role of a peace operation 
force is to occupy a given area and act as an interposition force between the rivals. As 
understood, peacekeepers have no offensive role in the conflict. The activities which 
peace operation forces carry out involve patrolling the deployment area and searching 
for violations of the cease-fire agreement as a conciliator between the hostile parties. 
These are not functions regularly carried out by a military force.  
Peace operation forces are also different from observation missions in several 
ways. They assume different roles and are constituted differently. The net effect is 
that they cannot properly be compared on the same dimensions as observation 
missions, and they are likely to be influenced by different factors. However, the 
division between observation and peace operation forces is unclear because there are 
gray areas in which one function merges into another. Nevertheless, these distinctions 
are important in order to understand the legal principles governing peace operations. 
The major difference between peace operation forces and observation missions is that 
observation missions are not designed to act as interposition forces that restore order 
or defend territory, although they may be placed in a neutral zone between the rivals. 
Furthermore, they may also patrol areas and help resolve cease-fire disputes.  
Whereas the size of a peace operation force ranges from 1,000 to 40,000, 
observation missions are often much fewer in number. Indeed, a single individual 
may constitute such a force. Observation missions consist largely of officers who are 
almost invariably unarmed. Their function is limited to reporting the state of 
hostilities. Observation teams are not meant as buffer forces. They only observe the 
cease-fire and are not usually large enough to make the cease-fire as effective as 
peace operation forces do. The difference between an observation mission and a 
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peace operation force is also more evident in their respective military equipment and 
use of military force. Unlike observers, peace operation troops must protect 
themselves. Peace operation forces must also provide a visible deterrent to the threat 
of defensive military actions by patrolling buffer and other demilitarized zones. Small 
unarmed observation missions are generally considered inadequate for this task. 
Missions of observers have been initiated as a type of assistance offered by the states 
to the UN, while the missions of peace operation forces have been based on voluntary 
contributions and the consent of the states.  
 
2.1.5. The Application of Peace Operations 
Many violent conflicts which have dominated international relations since World War 
II have been debated in the Security Council. However, the Council has but on rare 
occasions, been able to agree on pressures against those that have broken the peace or 
threatened to do so. The UN has not always been a suitable or effective vehicle for 
peace operation activity in all situations. In other words, peace operations have not 
been a remedy to all violent conflicts. In fact they have not been used very often. 
There have been a number of international crises, including the Soviet armed 
interventions in Hungary 1956 and Czechoslovakia 1968, the United States’ 
incursions into Guatemala 1954, Vietnam (late 1950s to early 1970s), Ethiopia and 
Somalia in 1977, Tanzania and Uganda between 1978-79, China and the Soviet 
Union in 1969, India and China 1962, Afghanistan in 1979, and Grenada in 1983, in 
which peace operations played no part (White, 1993: 51). The first and foremost 
reason for not using peace operations in these crises has been the lack of willingness 
of states to bring their conflicts to the UN. They did not want public debates over the 
issues at the UN and to come under the international spotlight. They felt unease 
  44 
concerning national sovereignty issues, particularly if a peace operation force was 
likely to be authorized.  
The second important reason why peace operations have not been applied to 
all violent conflicts is that peace operations can work only in favorable political 
conditions. A peace operation does not work well if there is not some peace to keep. 
Attempts to use it in unsuitable conditions will probably be volatile. The peace 
operation bodies can be afflicted by huge difficulties and the task may be close to 
impossible, especially if there are no viable geographical lines separating combatants 
and the types of weapons used are easily available and difficult to control (Wiseman, 
1983: 16).  
These considerations often resulted in a situation in which a violent conflict 
has only been brought to the UN as a last resort. In commenting on this problem, 
Urquhart notes that “the position of the UN has declined to a last resort, last minute, 
reluctantly accepted safety net” (Urquhart, 1987: 254). For the Security Council, the 
question of whether to act upon a violent conflict because it threatens international 
peace and security may only be discussed when the situation has reached an intensity 
level making it impossible to ignore. Moreover, insufficient resources have led to 
situations where the Council has been unable to take concerted action even though 
help was requested (Fetherston, 1995: 38). 
The UN has been called upon to play a marginal or nominal role in areas 
where the super power interests were directly involved. The Czechoslovakian and 
Hungarian crises in the Soviet bloc, and the conflicts in Latin America, which were 
within the sphere of influence of the United States can be given as examples. The 
resolution by the General Assembly calling upon the Soviet Union to withdraw its 
forces from Hungary was ignored. The Soviet Union saw it necessary to protect its 
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interests by using its veto in the Security Council. The American backed coup in 
Guatemala in 1954 illustrates how the United States protected its interests in its own 
bloc. The United States prevented the issue from being raised at the Security Council. 
The reason why a peace operation played no part in Czechoslovakia in 1968 was 
simply because the situation in Czechoslovakia affected the vital interests of the 
Soviet Union and the Soviet Union behaved in the same way as the US. 
As for the Vietnam case, there were certain factors which restricted the ability 
of the UN to deal with the conflict in Vietnam. The Vietnamese situation was more 
complicated. The gradual escalation of the conflict in Vietnam limited the potential of 
United Nations’ action. The Vietnam War only involved one super power directly and 
so the other superpower, the Soviet Union, was quite content to block any peace 
operation.  
The UN peace operation also played no part in Afghanistan. The Soviet 
intervention in Afghanistan in 1979 was different in geopolitical terms from its 
previous interventions in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, because it represented the 
first time the Soviet Union had pushed its troops beyond the zone inherited after the 
Second World War. The resolution by the Non-Aligned group in the Security Council 
calling for “the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all foreign troops from 
Afghanistan” was vetoed by the Soviet Union.15 The United States warned the Soviet 
Union not to advance any further towards the Gulf. The US was treating the 
intervention as politically allowable, because the US did not want to escalate this 
conflict into a global military confrontation.  
Contrary to intra-bloc conflicts, inter-bloc conflicts often occurred on the 
“power frontiers” between the “spheres of influence” of the super powers. Good 
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 See, UN doc. S/13729 (1980) 
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examples of such violent conflicts were the Berlin blockade in 1948 and the Cuban 
missile crisis in 1962 (White, 1993: 13). The UN peace operations were not applied to 
these conflicts either. In super power confrontation situations, as in Berlin and the 
Cuban missile crisis, the UN played only a peripheral role. As for the conflict 
between India and China in 1962, the UN was not an appropriate body to deal with 
this dispute because one of the major players, the People’s Republic of China, did not 
represent China at the UN until 1971. 
During the Cold War, the attitude of the two superpowers had a crucial 
impact on the performance of traditional peace operations The UN was excluded 
from playing any peace operation role within the super powers’ own “spheres of 
interest” not only in disputes in the western hemisphere, but also in conflicts arising 
within socialist states (Wiseman, 1983: 377). Experience has shown that in order to 
set up such operations, the United Nations had to secure not only the consent of the 
main parties directly concerned, but also the support, or at least the acquiescence, of 
the two superpowers. However, despite those difficulties, UN peace operations were 
an important stabilizing factor during the Cold War; they contained several 
potentially dangerous conflicts and insulated them from superpower rivalry. 
To conclude, the main purpose of setting up peacekeeping operations was to 
help contain local conflicts to their limited area so that such conflicts did not escalate 
in such a way to engulf major superpowers (Richmond, 2001:317-348). The principle 
of non-involvement in domestic affairs of states was regarded as sacred, in harmony 
with the prevailing security conceptualization of the time period under consideration, 
and this kept the number of peace operations to a minimum. External sovereignty 
used to be more important than internal sovereignty.  
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The main characteristics of peace operations during the Cold War era 
consisted of the following. First, force was to be used only in self-defense. Second, 
the force used should be proportional. Third, deployment of peace troops required 
the consent of the parties concerned. Fourth, major powers abstained from providing 
operations with troops. Fifth, troops used to carry light arms. Finally, missions were 
mainly authorized to oversea armistices and to separate belligerent parties from each 
other (Richmond, 2004:83-101). Peace operations of the Cold War era were short of 
having ideational aspects and can not be explained by any ideational perspective. 
They could rather be considered as strategic initiatives undertaken with a view to 
helping preserve the balance of power between two rival blocks. They were missions 
empowered to ‘manage’ conflicts rather than ‘resolve’ them. The peace operations 
undertaken during the Cold War era were conflict-management activities rather than 
conflict-resolution activities. 
Indar Jit Rikhye insisted that peace operations fulfilled three key roles. First, 
they provided a mechanism for resolving conflict without the direct intervention of 
the Cold War superpowers, thereby reducing the risk of cataclysmic escalation. 
Second, peace operations mobilized international society to make a commitment to 
the maintenance of peace. Third, peacekeeping provided ‘a diplomatic key opening 
the way to further negotiations for a peaceful resolution of conflicts’ (Rikhye, 
1984:221, 234 and 245). Cold War UN peacekeeping was supposed to prevent overt 
violence, prevent the global and regional escalation of localized conflicts, and 
provide the conditions of stability in which peacemaking could occur (Richmond, 
2004:86). This instrumental approach to peace operations developed alongside the 
proliferation of peace operations in the 1990s. New approaches attempted to identify 
the ‘symptoms’ that peace operations ought to address, the concepts and tools that 
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peacekeepers have at their disposal, and the most effective way and time to utilize 
them. The first task is to identify the characteristics, functions and types of different 
peace operations (Bellamy, 2004: 20). 
United Nations peace operation has only been employed in a limited number 
of wars and crises during which a consensus developed over UN involvement. More 
often than not, peace operations have dealt with regional violent conflicts which have 
a wider potential for threatening international peace and security, in which the great 
powers are likely to become involved. In almost every case, peace operation has been 
applied to areas beyond the dominance of super powers. Yet, what remains 
surprising is the number of times that the Security Council (and sometimes the 
General Assembly) has been able to set up peace operations in spite of the Cold 
War.16 The majority of these operations (seven of the 13) were deployed in the 
Middle East, a region of clear geo-strategic importance to the permanent members of 
the Security Council. 
  
2.2. The post-Cold War Era 
According to some authors, the UN peace operations in the post-Cold War era are 
best defined as “Second-generation operations,” “the New Peacekeeping,” “Wider 
Peacekeeping,” or “Expanded Peacekeeping” (Ratner, 1995: 17). It will be more 
convenient to use the term “the New Peacekeeping” and “Second generation” in this 
study since the term “generation” focuses upon the changing nature of the operations, 
not only the time period in which they commenced. It points to a clear shift in the 
purpose of the operations.  
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 United Nations Emergency Force I (UNEF I) in 1956 and United Nations Security Force (UNSF) in 
1962 were authorized by the General Assembly. 
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The demand for and the scope of peace operations has steadily increased in 
the post-Cold War era. The United Nations has authorized or deployed a series of 
new missions. The international politics witnessed a remarkable revival of the United 
Nations. In order to understand the reasons for this expansion, it will be better to 
examine the international climate in this new era. The post-Cold War era marked the 
downfall of the bipolar system that had governed the understanding and conduct of 
international relations since the end of the Second World War (Mawlawi, 1993: 391-
413). Beginning with the Gorbachev era, changes such as the success of the 1986 
CSCE negotiations in Stockholm on the development of confidence building 
measures, the conclusion of arms reduction agreements (the 1987 Treaty on 
Intermediate Nuclear Forces, the 1990 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in 
Europe and the 1991 and 1993 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties), the destruction of 
the Berlin Wall, the reunification of Germany, the changes of regimes in Eastern 
Europe, the collapse of communism in the USSR, and the emergence of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States have put the UN in a totally different situation 
(Roberts and Kingsbury, 1993: 428).  
The threat of a US-Russian nuclear confrontation has virtually disappeared 
since the end of the Cold War and the number of major armed conflicts has decreased 
slightly (SIPRI, 1993: 86). However, the specter of war, both civil and international, 
has not ended. Over the same period minor armed conflicts have increased 
(Wallensteen and Axell, 1993: 332). The end of the Cold War has brought many 
long-standing rivalries and feuds to the surface that had been suppressed before. 
Many conflicts in the post-Cold War era have derived from ancient and enduring 
features of international politics. They originated from partitions and disputes 
following the end of WW I. Conflicts have increasingly resulted from tensions 
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between regional or intrastate parties rather than from the influence or intervention of 
external factors, because there were uncertainties about the legitimacy of new post-
colonial states, regimes, institutions and frontiers. Many urgent crises which crowd 
the UN's agenda today derive from these uncertainties as well as the regional 
animosities and communal cleavages. In this complicated new environment, the 
United Nations has set up 47 peace operations.  
It is interesting to note that Africa has been the area in which peace operation 
has been most utilized in the post-Cold War era with 20 peace operations (54 per cent 
of post-Cold War total) (TABLE III). Despite the fact that most of the UN peace 
operations were in the Middle East during the Cold War (53.8 per cent of the Cold 
War total), the Middle East has become a region in which peace operations have been 
least established in the post-Cold War era (only one operation, 2.7 per cent of the 
post-Cold War total) (TABLE III).  
 
2.2.1. The Reasons for Expansion and Change  
The end of the Cold War increased the need for international peace operations in 
several distinct ways, each of which presented different problems and opportunities 
for the UN. The main reason for the increase in the number of peace operations and 
observer missions has been the increased capacity of the UN Security Council to 
agree on action in particular crises. The decline of East-West tensions and the 
agreements between the USA and Russia to put an end to numerous local and 
regional conflicts led to greater cooperation between the super powers. So the five 
permanent members of the Security Council found themselves able to agree on 
numerous problems and demonstrated a greater political will to use the Security 
Council to seek solutions to conflicts (Evans, 1993: 100).  
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The decline in the use of the veto was a symbol of this. For instance, from 
1945 to 1990 the permanent members of the Security Council cast the following 
number of vetoes: China, 3; France, 18; United Kingdom, 30; US, 69; and the Soviet 
Union, 114. Then, between June 1990 and May 1993 there was not a single veto. 
One exception occurred in May 1993 when Russia blocked a resolution on financing 
the peacekeeping force in Cyprus. With this exception, the post-Cold War capacity 
of the Security Council to reach agreement has survived and constituted a key reason 
for the increase in the number of peacekeeping operations (TABLE IV). It has begun 
to function more effectively and therefore opened up the possibility of working out 
strategies for resolving protracted social conflicts and consequently has been able to 
put more peacekeepers into the field. 
A further reason for the expansion of peace operations has been the large 
number of minor armed conflicts. During the Cold War years, the competition 
between the two super powers contributed to regional stability. Each super power 
ensured the survival of its respective allies but at the same time prevented them from 
embarking on military adventures. The end of this strategic competition between the 
US and the Soviet Union created an environment much more amenable to minor 
armed conflicts breaking out between small states, most importantly, those in 
Cambodia, Central America, Angola and Mozambique (Ratner, 1995: 14). So these 
minor armed conflicts transformed the global context of peace operations and 
significantly broadened its potential as a technique of peaceful settlement (Fetherston, 
1995: 19).  
The next reason behind the expansion has been the settlement of conflicts. 
The end of the Cold War facilitated the settlement of conflicts. In many instances the 
collapse of the bipolar world and of the Cold War allowed peaceful initiatives in the 
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old conflicts caused by the spheres of influence inherent in the East-West rivalry. 
With the end of the Cold War, the factions were no longer propped up by outside 
states, and were ready to settle. The regional peace agreements in Afghanistan, 
Angola, Namibia, Central America and Cambodia are the examples of this approach. 
They created a demand for impartial international forces to assist in implementing 
their provisions, such as monitoring cease-fires, troop withdrawals, and elections 
(Roberts, 1994: 96). The UN became the instrument for concluding and overseeing 
these settlements (Ratner, 1995: 14).  
The fourth reason has been the breaking up of states. Since the super power 
support which suppressed internal divisions withdrew, the number of states falling 
victim to domestic violence, often ethnically based, has increased. Many of the 
divisions within states have become more serious than before. In extreme cases, this 
has led to the break up of states. In the decline and collapse of two large communist 
federal states - the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, the total number of such states has 
more than tripled. The breaking up of these large multinational states and empires has 
almost always caused severe dislocations, including the emergence or re-emergence 
of ethnic, religious, regional, and other animosities (Roberts, 1993: 9). The newly 
emerging regimes and frontiers were called into question. These crises forced the UN 
to contemplate new responses and called for action under UN auspices. 
A further reason has been a widespread mood of optimism. The UN’s 
contribution to the settlement of numerous regional conflicts in the Transition Period 
including the Iran-Iraq war, the South African presence in Namibia, and the Soviet 
presence in Afghanistan, raised expectations for quick solutions. The peoples of the 
world felt the UN could have a much more central role in international security and 
peace operation and could tackle these problems. As a result of this expectation, in 
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the post-Cold War era, the UN found itself overburdened by many new tasks and a 
very wide range of urgent problems.  
Another major reason has been an ongoing process of globalization. In a 
modern world the process of globalization, leading to the unprecedented movement 
of goods, people, ideas, challenges and threats, makes countries much more 
interdependent. Developed states have created unparalleled prosperity within their 
own borders. Those states have realized that in order to continue improving world 
living conditions they need security and stability. Therefore, developed countries are 
naturally extremely concerned about maintaining a stable and secure world by 
preventing conflicts or by at least containing them as fast as possible.  
Last but not least, another reason, which had a key role in the expansion of the 
peace operations has been the importance given to the multilateralism in international 
relations. States contemplating wheather to intervene in a violent conflict situation 
often have come to it in a multilateral, especially UN, context. The reason why states 
want to use the UN is that the multilateral approach helps neutralize domestic 
political opposition, increase the opportunities to acquire useful allies, reassure the 
international community that operations have limited and legitimate goals, and reduce 
the risk of large scale force being used by adversaries or rival powers (Roberts, 1993: 
10). The major powers are, therefore, more willing to see a response emerge from 
within a UN framework. 
 
2.2.2. Features of the New Peace Operation 
As pointed out above, the changing nature of peacekeeping derived from a permissive 
political context in which the five permanent members of the UN Security Council 
cooperated in the maintenance of international peace and security. There have been 
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dramatic changes in the nature as well as in the volume of UN activities in the field of 
peace and security. In addition to the increase in the application of peace operations, 
the types of missions which have been mandated have also altered. The objectives of 
peace operations have in fact, changed considerably from helping in the maintainance 
of cease-fires during the Cold War peacekeeping operations during the 1990s, to 
increasing involvement in peace-building missions. 
While most peace operations established during the Cold War had mainly 
traditional peacekeeping tasks of a military character (such as the supervision of 
cease-fires or the control of demilitarized buffer zones), many new peace operations 
were multi-dimensional and combined traditional peacekeeping tasks with various 
activities of a humanitarian and state building nature. We can draw similarities 
between conflict-management and peacekeeping on the one hand since conflict-
management measures are applied in later phases when a conflict is manifest, but 
before violence has occurred as happened in peacekeeping. On the other hand, 
conflict-resolution and peace enforcement are similar because conflict resolution 
could be applied in the de-escalation phase after a violent conflict has occurred. As 
peacekeeping had been designed to localize conflicts and tensions and prevent them 
from escalating to a great power confrontation, conflict-management focuses on the 
limitation, mitigation, and/or containment of a conflict without necessarily solving it. 
On the other hand, peacemaking or peace enforcement operations in the post-Cold 
War era were increasingly involved in internal conflicts within independent and 
sovereign states as happened in conflict-resolutions. They have the same purposes 
with conflict-resolution:  
•Organizing and supervising free and fair elections (Namibia, Mozambique); 
•Monitoring arms flows and demobilizing troops (Central America); 
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•Supervising government functions, rehabilitation of refugees and 
disarmament (Cambodia); 
•Monitoring human rights obligations (El Salvador, Cambodia); 
•Assisting in the delivery of humanitarian relief (former Yugoslavia, Somalia, 
and Mozambique). 
United Nations peace operations during the Cold War meant that 
peacekeeping forces and military observer missions were designed with an eye to the 
politics of territorial restraint and juridical sovereignty. The United Nations peace 
operations did not concern issues of human security, the protection of human rights 
or the goal of humanitarian intervention reflecting the general insistence of the newly 
emerging states that state sovereignty be duly protected. This was approved by an 
April 1999 report of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), 
which is titled “Multidisciplinary Peacekeeping: Lessons from Recent Experience.” 
The report pointed out “mandates should be conceptualized flexibly and could 
include elements of peace-building and emergency reconstruction of war-torn 
economies.” 
The changing objectives of peace operations have coincided with the changes 
in the structure of peace operations, the creation of new components, and the 
assignment of additional tasks. There have been qualitative changes even more 
significant than the quantitative ones. The following general distinctions should be 
noted. First, many of today’s conflicts are within states rather than between states. 
More often than not, the new operations are dealing with internal conflicts (Jockel, 
1994: 3). First generation peace operations were primarily deployed in situations of 
international conflict. During the Cold War, operations were generally deployed only 
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where two or more states were identified as the principal antagonists (the one 
exception being the Congo operation).  
The governments were reluctant to face the entry of the UN into their 
domestic disputes without a political settlement. The end of the Cold War removed 
constraints that had inhibited conflict in the former Soviet Union and elsewhere and 
contributed to the outbreak of wars within newly independent states. The UN had not 
encountered such conflicts since the Congo operation of the early 1960s. The 
conflicts take place not only between regular armies but also between militias and 
armed civilians. Civilians are the main victims and often the main targets in these 
guerrilla wars without clear front lines. Therefore a humanitarian aspect has come to 
the forefront. Humanitarian aid means all kinds of support and service provided to 
the people in the conflict areas in cases where either the competent authorities cannot 
provide or are unwilling to provide, protection to the people or in internal conflicts or 
civil wars where the basic rights and freedoms have been cancelled or gravely 
breached. This kind of operation minimizes the effects of disaster and protects 
human rights. 
Today, one of the major functions of new peace operations is tackling local 
human rights abuses. The Security Council links the security to human rights agendas 
of peace operations. On the ground, the UN often integrated human rights 
components into peace operations. In the early years of the past decade, the 
promotion and monitoring of human rights has become a significant part of peace 
operation strategies in countries like El Salvador, Guatemala, Cambodia, Haiti and 
Rwanda. In these cases, peacekeepers conducted observations and reported on human 
rights issues. The success of ONUSAL in El Salvador, which was tasked with the 
verification of the implementation of the Human Rights Agreement, was critical to 
  57 
the subsequent wider success of the peace agreement (Malone and Wermester, 2000: 
43). 
Another major matter of peace operations is the protection of civilians in war 
through which the Council has addressed the issue of human rights. The Council 
passed Resolution 1265 in September 1999, which introduced a broad range of 
measures to protect civilians in armed conflict, including a measure for peace 
operations to provide special protection and assistance for women and children in 
war (Malone and Wermester, 2000: 44). Authorization of UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone 
in early 2000 under Chapter VII of the Charter was a significant development to use 
force to protect civilians where resources and circumstances allowed.17 This 
represented not only a major shift in focus from states to individuals within states on 
the part of the Council, but an increasing willingness to use force to protect the 
human rights of individuals. 
Another feature of such conflicts is the collapse of state institutions, 
especially the police and judiciary, a breakdown of law and order, and general 
banditry and chaos. This is rarely the case in inter-state wars. Peace operation in such 
contexts is far more complex and more expensive than when its tasks were mainly to 
monitor cease-fires and control buffer zones with the consent of the states involved 
in the conflict (Ghali, 1992: 7-9). Thus, peace operations have a state-building 
function too. One of the important functions of new peace operations is monitoring 
elections and democratization. It can be argued that the fundamental success of the 
state building strategies culminates in the establishment of free elections. Sometimes, 
as in Nicaragua and Haiti, UN election verification has been conducted on its own 
and not as part of a peacekeeping mission. In other cases, as in Namibia, Angola and 
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 See, SC Res. 1270 of February 22, 2000 
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Cambodia, monitoring or helping to organize elections has been one of the tasks of a 
peacekeeping force (Roberts, 1993:98). In missions during the early 1990s, such as 
UNTAG in Namibia the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), the UN 
Operation in El Salvador (ONUSAL) and the UN Operation in Mozambique 
(ONUMOZ), the Security Council relied primarily on elections as a means of 
fostering stability and creating legitimacy for new governments. 
Election monitoring is particularly significant for two reasons. First, it 
associates the UN with multi-party democracy. Second, it enables peacekeeping 
forces to be involved in something more than the mere freezing of conflicts. In some 
countries UN forces can achieve more by assisting in ballots than by interposing 
themselves between belligerents (Roberts, 1993: 98). The election-monitoring task of 
peace operations was expanded in the 1990s, adopting a broader approach to 
elections and democratization. For instance, the UNMIK mandate in Kosovo 
included a subsection of the “institution-building component” described as 
“democratization and institution building,” as well as one on election.18 Furthermore, 
in East Timor, the mission included a “governance and public administration” 
component, in addition to an “electoral operations” component.19 In both cases, UN 
staffs have been given multiple short and medium-term electoral duties, from voter 
registration and creating electoral law to supporting capacity building for self 
government, in an effort to build institutions that can serve as local conflict 
management mechanisms. 
A second qualitative change is that second-generation operations are aimed 
primarily at assisting a state or group of states, in executing an agreed political 
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solution to a conflict. During the Cold War, the UN and its member states seized 
upon peace operations as a way to preserve a truce, while assuming that other 
mechanisms would be employed to settle the underlying issues. The second-
generation peace operation rejects this limitation. By working from the starting point 
of a political settlement, it seeks to end the underlying dispute, not simply avoid its 
aggravation. This change in the past decade has led the peacekeepers to become peace 
builders. Peace operations have been related to the creation of an operational and 
political environment in which international actors have come to undertake a series of 
peace-building activities which would consolidate, without a resort to violence, peace 
in the short term and decrease the likelihood of future conflicts.  
Thirdly, second generation peace operations contain substantial civilian 
elements and predominantly non-military mandate and composition. As Marrack 
Goulding points out the recent changes, “new operations usually have a large civilian 
component” (Jockel, 1994: 3). Since the end of the Cold War, the emphasis on the 
military has changed and the new missions in this era require substantial investment 
of civilian personnel with expertise in areas such as elections, human rights, public 
administration, and economics. Police (CIVPOL) and civilians from various 
professions became important partners of the military in increasing numbers. This is 
mainly because the UN is more often involved in internal conflicts than in interstate 
ones (Goulding, 1993: 456). 
Peace operations used to be mostly military operations and the goals and 
tasks were limited to military mandate during the Cold War era. As a result, they 
were generally placed under the supervision of a Force Commander, with political 
functions coming directly from UN Headquarters. However, considering the nature 
of the new peace operations and the need for rapid decision-making in areas of 
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considerable political sensitivity, these new missions were mostly placed under the 
overall supervision of a Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) to 
whom both military and civilian components reported. A number of these diplomats 
achieved widely recognized success in difficult environments. Prominent examples 
were Alvaro de Soto (ONUCA, Central America, September 1989-February 1992), 
Iqbal Riza (ONUSAL, El Salvador, July 1991- March 1993), Aldo Ajello 
(ONUMOZ, Mozambique, October 1992-December 1994), and Lakhdar Brahimi 
(several missions but perhaps most notably UNMIH, Haiti September 1994-March 
1996) (Malone and Wermester, 2000: 40). The increasing use of SRSGs endowed 
peace operations with a greater political mediation capacity in the field. They were 
able to spearhead the consolidation of peace at the local level. 
The role of civilian police is considered one of the most important 
components of peace operations in the post-Cold War. The role of UNCIVPOL has 
expanded dramatically in the previous decade in countries when local police have 
been unable or unwilling to fulfill their duties and functions. Despite the fact that 
police units were deployed in some previous missions such as ONUC in the Congo 
and the UN Temporary Authority (UNTEA) in West New Guinea, a formal UN civil 
police component was deployed for the first time in 1964 as part of the UN 
peacekeeping operation in Cyprus (UNFICYP). CIVPOL contingents fulfilled two 
main functions in the period of the Cold War; monitoring and supervising local law 
enforcement units and training local police forces (Oakley, Dziedze and Goldberg, 
1998:23). A third function, which signified far-reaching goals and significant 
implication for peacekeeping, emerged in the 1990s, the performance of law 
enforcement functions. 
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The Security Council sent a contingent of 1,500 police officers from 25 
countries to Namibia in March 1990 with the mandate of monitoring local police 
forces and assisting in establishing the conditions necessary for holding the 
oncoming elections. In El Salvador, CIVPOL monitored human rights abuses and 
helped recruit, screen, and train a completely new police force. In Angola, CIVPOL 
monitored the demobilization of UNITA forces and the disarmament of civilians. In 
Cambodia, they not only provided public security, but also arrested suspects for 
charges brought by a special UN Prosecutor. In Bosnia, CIVPOL monitored 
agreements to integrate ethnic minorities into the police (Call and Barnett, 1999: 49). 
A fourth qualitative change is that, “second generation” peace operations 
involve numerous types of actors. Besides including the participants of the first 
generation operations, it also includes guerrilla movements, domestic political parties, 
regional organizations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and civilian 
participants in the mission, international financial institutions, specialized and 
technical agencies of the United Nations, private foundations, foreign investors, and 
academic institutions (Ratner, 1995:  24). 
New tasks of peace operations of the post-Cold War era, ranging from 
election monitoring, human rights observation, training of civilian populations in 
areas such as public administration, policing and justice, to a variety of socio-
economic development activities, directed the organization and its member states to 
look for new partners in order to carry out more complex and multifaceted Security 
Council mandates. Some in the UN favored regional organizations but most of these 
also had limited resources and faced constraints quite similar to those confronting the 
UN. It is in this context that NGOs became especially useful as a result of their 
capacity to perform the type of additional tasks demanded by peacekeeping. They 
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have become significant players in all aspects of the second-generation peacekeeping 
exercises from early warning to peace-building operations (Abiew,1999:89). 
Consultations at headquarters with NGOs have been increased (Griffin, 1999: 1). 
The NGO’s participation in peace operations was very limited during the 
Cold War. For example, no NGOs were allowed to enter Congo without UN 
permission in the 1960s. The ONUC military commander closely supervised the four 
NGOs that operated in the country. But, an improvement has taken place in the 
relationship between NGOs and the UN concerning the field of humanitarian 
assistance in the post-Cold War era. The increasing role of NGOs has become one of 
the most remarkable developments in the peace operations. They have emerged to 
play an increasingly significant role alongside peace operations. During ‘Operation 
Provide Comfort’ in Northern Iraq in the early 1990s, the allied forces had to cope 
with about 500 NGOs. In Somalia, the number of NGOs was about two hundred. 
Approaximately the same number are now active in Kosovo. 
The proliferation of civil conflicts in impoverished parts of the globe, such as 
Haiti, Somalia, Sudan, and Afghanistan, has clearly demonstrated the 
interconnections between poverty, underdevelopment, and conflict. This has 
increasingly forced UN operations to communicate directly with established NGOs 
that were operating in the areas of social and economic development and emergency 
relief. Therefore, NGOs came to the front line of civil wars. Kofi Annan, the UN 
Secretary-General, approved the growing role and the neccessity of the NGOs in a 
major report on UN reform, “Renewing the United Nations,” issued in July 1997 
(Annan, 1997: paras 206-214). Under the heading ‘Civil Society’ he points to how 
NGOs are shaping national and international agendas in a post-Cold War world. He 
declares “...NGOs and other civil societies actors are perceived not only as 
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disseminators of information or providers of services but also shapers of policy, be it 
in peace and security matters, in development or humanitarian affairs” (Annan, 1997: 
59). 
It has been noted that NGOs possess certain comparative advantages in terms 
of their capacities. First of all, they are able to reach the poorest people and access 
remote areas. NGOs are more closely and directly involved in addressing the issues 
that are at the roots of the conflict and are thus viewed as being able to contribute 
effectively to a resolution of the conflict. They have usually been the first to enter a 
country and the last to leave. Other capacities have included their ability to promote 
local participation, to operate on low costs, to strengthen local institutions, and 
empower marginal groups (Abiew, 1999: 89). Added to these qualities, it can be 
noted that NGOs have been more flexible and pragmatic, and are less partial in the 
delivery of services in conflict situations. Experience and size for quick action, 
impartiality, experience in region, flexibility, speed of reaction, comparative lack of 
bureaucracy, operational, and implementation capacity are their advantages. In 
addition, the political independence of the NGOs, not bound by the rules of the UN 
Charter, gives them a strong comparative advantage in increasingly complex internal 
conflicts (Abiew, 1999: 94). NGOs have provided peace operations with the 
expertise required. The work that has been undertaken by these organizations in 
current conflicts cannot be properly fulfilled by governments and international 
organizations, as they are unable or unwilling to do so (Williams, 1998: 38). 
The fifth change is the use of United Nations forces to protect humanitarian 
operations in the second-generation operations. More often than not, the warring 
parties prevent the distribution of humanitarian aid provided to civilian victims by 
humanitarian agencies. This is sometimes because of the exigencies of war, but more 
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often because the relief of a particular population is contrary to the war aims of one 
or other of the parties. The combatants may divert relief supplies for their own 
purposes. Because so many of today’s conflicts are more likely to be intra-state 
rather than international conflicts, triggered by a range of factors, including social, 
ethnic or religious strife, the violation of human rights, poverty, inequitable 
distribution of resources, environmental degradation, large-scale migration, drug 
trafficking, organized crime and terrorism (Goldman, 2001: 43-76 and Parr, 2003: 
167-179), the humanitarian agencies have to undertake their tasks in chaotic 
conditions. This creates political pressure for the United Nations to deploy troops in 
order to facilitate and protect the humanitarian operations (Ghali, 1995: 11). 
It had become clear by the end of the last decade that the use of force to 
protect the delivery of humanitarian assistance had limited effectiveness. The 
Council accordingly followed a series of steps to tackle obstacles that were hindering 
the successful delivery of humanitarian assistance by incorporating, for the first time, 
humanitarian tasks under the rubric of a “humanitarian component” in Kosovo and 
East Timor. Rather than coordinating the actions of others and providing protection, 
humanitarian tasks were, for the first time, attributed to peacekeepers themselves. 
These tasks covered the delivery of humanitarian assistance, safeguarding the return 
of displaced persons and providing adequate needs upon their return, rehabilitating 
key infrastructure and promoting social well-being, and finally restoring civil society 
(Griffin and Jones, 2001:78). When MONUC was expanded in early 2000 in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, its mandate included expanded responsibilities in the 
field of humanitarian assistance.20 The development of humanitarian assistance 
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components and tasks entrusted to them created significant developments in peace 
operations practice. 
A sixth change has been in the nature of United Nations operations in the 
field. Although the first generation operations were usually deployed after a cease-
fire but before a settlement of the conflict in question had been negotiated, the 
second-generation operations are generally established after negotiations have 
succeeded. They help the parties implement the comprehensive settlement they have 
negotiated. When the parties to a conflict have agreed on a settlement, the UN may 
be asked to oversee its implementation. Such a task may involve a wide range of 
functions, such as monitoring a cease-fire, demobilizing military units, assisting with 
elections activities, demining, rebuilding the country’s infrastructure, temporarily 
taking over some of the functions of a national government, monitoring national 
civilian police and repatriating and rehabilitating refugees (UN doc, 1997:5). Such 
operations have been deployed in Namibia, Angola, El Salvador, Cambodia, and 
Mozambique (Ghali, 1992: 11).  
In addition to these qualitative changes mentioned above, another important 
change is that the implementation of Chapter VII, peace enforcement, has grown 
rapidly since the end of the Cold War. In the post-Cold War circumstances, 
governments and public opinion in many countries have increasingly questioned 
whether peacekeeping is enough. Traditional peacekeeping is all very well if the only 
crises confronting the UN are those which are ready for the peacekeeping treatment. 
Lightly armed UN peacekeepers have seemed incapable of taking the forceful action 
required in an increasing number of situations.  
In the past, peacekeepers were deployed to keep the peace, not to make war. 
They were only empowered to use force when directly threatened or when their 
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central activities were being openly opposed. Their major weapon was moral 
authority, not military strength (Annan, 1993:4). They seldom resorted to major uses 
of force. But with the end of the Cold War, there has become a need for a new 
strategy. Because the UN was incapable of dealing with the new challenges. Some 
attempts have been made to work out a new strategic role for the UN. Kofi Annan, 
UN under Secretary-General for peacekeeping operations, said in an article in late 
1993: 
The international community now wants the UN to demarcate 
boundaries, control and eliminate heavy weapons, quell anarchy 
and guarantee the delivery of humanitarian aid in war zones. 
These are clearly tasks that call for “teeth” and “muscle” in 
addition to the less tangible qualities that we have sought in the 
past. In other words, there are increasing demands that the UN 
now enforce the peace, as originally envisaged in the charter 
(Roberts, 1994: 104).  
 
The violence in cases like Somalia and Bosnia, forced additional change on 
peace operations. The signing of peace agreements or cease-fires no longer meant an 
end to violence. In Somalia and Bosnia dozens of cease-fire agreements were broken. 
The peacekeepers, as well as humanitarian organizations, were confronted with all 
kinds of violence. In Somalia, the Security Council therefore felt compelled to 
provide UNOSOM II with a mandate based on Chapter VII of the UN Charter, 
allowing for the limited use of force. UNPROFOR in the former Yugoslavia, 
UNMIH in Haiti, IFOR (The Peace Implementation Force) and SFOR in Bosnia, 
UNTAES in Eastern Slovenia, the French ‘Operation Turquoise’ in Rwanda, MNF in 
Haiti, and MISAB in the Central African Republic received similar authorization. 
New development in the concept of the peace operation has emerged in Bosnia and 
Somalia, namely in that operations that started as peacekeeping were later mixed 
with elements of peace enforcement (UNPROFOR) or transformed into peace 
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enforcement in support of humanitarian actions (UNOSOM II). Peace enforcement, 
the third generation of peacekeeping, had come into being. 
Peace enforcement operations involve using or threatening to use an armed 
force to compel combatants to cease-fire and seek peace. These operations include:  
• Carrying out international sanctions against opposing parties or against the 
party that is the driving force in the armed conflict.  
• Isolating the conflict zones as well as preventing arms deliveries to the area 
and penetration of the area by armed formations.  
• Delivering air or missile strikes against a belligerent refusing to halt its 
combat actions.  
• Rapidly deploying sufficient forces to the combat zones to carry out the 
assigned missions, including localizing the conflict and disarming or 
eradicating any armed formations that refuse to stop fighting.  
Dobbie (1994) likened the relation between peacekeeping and peace 
enforcement to the performance of a tight ropewalker at a circus. In peacekeeping 
there is a respectful silence in the crowd, which reflects the unquestioning consent of 
the parties to the conflict as the performer walks the tightrope with a balancing pole. 
In a second-generation peace operation, the performer walks the identical tightrope 
and carries the same balancing pole. But in addition, he has to balance a tray of 
teacups on his head. Although he also has the consent of the parties to the conflict, 
everyone does not approve of his performance. On this occasion, the circus audience 
is restive and noisy. Some of them are even throwing tomatoes at the tightrope 
walker. In peace enforcement the scene completely changes. The performer has 
fallen off his tightrope. His balancing pole and tray of teacups lie smashed on the 
ground and assisted by the remainder of the circus staff he is engaged in a full-scale 
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brawl with the spectators. Preserving and developing consent is no longer an easy 
task.  
As understood from the tightrope example, peacekeeping and peace 
enforcement require different conceptual approaches. Peacekeeping is characterized 
by impartiality and minimum force and a modicum of consent which will determine 
the manner, in which peace operations are planned, directed, and conducted at all 
levels. On the other hand, peace enforcement dispenses with consent (Dobie, 1994: 
124) and is conducted on the grounds of military principles as in a war situation. 
Peacekeeping and peace enforcement are thus separate and mutually exclusive 
activities that cannot be mixed. To blur the distinction between the two can 
undermine the viability of the peacekeeping operation and endanger its personnel 
(Ghali, 1992: 16).  
Resorting to the enforcement of Security Council decisions was not new. 
Council decisions were enforced in Korea in the 1950s and to a lesser extent in the 
Congo in the 1960s. Nevertheless, the extent to which the Council adopted decisions 
under Chapter VII during the 1990s was unprecedented. Enforcement actions under 
Chapter VII in the post-Cold War era took three forms: 1) the collective security 
operations aimed at combating aggression (peace enforcement in response to cross 
border aggression), 2) the peace enforcing forces that would support peacekeeping 
operations (peace enforcement in support of peacekeeping operations) and 3) the 
peace enforcing forces that would play a role in the domestic affairs of failed, 
troubled, and murderous states (peace enforcement in support of humanitarian 
objectives). 
The annexation of Kuwait in August 1990 was a clear- cut case of aggression 
of one member state against another. It was eventually followed by the authorizing of 
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an enforcement force against Iraq under Chapter VII of the Charter. SC Resolution 
678 (29 November 1990) authorized member states cooperating with Kuwait's 
legitimate government to use ‘all necessary means’ to expel Iraq from Kuwait. This 
was the first time that this had happened since the authorization of the Unified 
Command in Korea in 1950. It represented the first military enforcement action of 
the post-Cold War era.  
The concept of using force in support of peacekeeping operations was 
relatively new, the only instance being in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The growing demand 
to halt human rights abuses and Serbian atrocities spurred by the western media put 
pressure on the UN, the US, and the EU to increase the level of intervention 
(Holmes, 1993: 331). In response to growing international pressure to take action, the 
Security Council stretched UNPROFOR’s mandate with the SC Resolution 764 on 
13 July 1992 to cover security and delivery of humanitarian aid to Sarajevo and its 
environs. Eventually the Security Council expanded the mandate of UNPROFOR to 
assist the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in the delivery of large-
scale humanitarian relief efforts throughout Bosnia.21 The Security Council adopted a 
resolution under the enforcement provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter calling 
upon all states ‘to take all measures necessary’ to facilitate, in coordination with the 
UN, the delivery of humanitarian aid to Sarajevo and other parts of Bosnia.22  
Peace enforcement in support of humanitarian objectives was also a relatively 
new concept in the UN and attitudes to it are still evolving. UNPROFOR in Bosnia-
Herzegovina was the first time a peacekeeping operation was established for 
explicitly humanitarian reasons and was given some specific Chapter VII 
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enforcement authority to assist in the delivery of humanitarian relief and the 
protection of safe areas. But the most clear-cut example of a humanitarian rationale 
for peace enforcement remains Somalia.  
During the Cold War, UN peace forces deployed in internal conflicts were 
primarily mandated to keep warring parties apart and to restore order within states. 
No use of force had been authorized for humanitarian purposes. Despite 
authorizations that permitted enforcement operations in the Congo, Somalia, Bosnia, 
and Rwanda crises, the UN did not empower deployments under its direct command 
to forcible enforcement except in the second phase of UNOSOM.23 The UN 
Operation in the Congo (ONUC) had provided relief services for civilians but its 
mandate was to prevent a breakdown in the central governmental authority. The UN 
Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) and UNPROFOR were empowered to 
use force only in self-defense rather than pursuant to enforce rules.24 UNOSOM I 
began as a type of first generation mission. But after the US-led humanitarian relief 
mission handed the operation back to the UN in March 1993, UNOSOM II was 
permitted to use force to disarm the Somali factions and maintain law and order. 
Faced with a country where there were no local authorities, the UN decided to 
embark on its first experiment in forceful humanitarian intervention UNOSOM II.  
In the early 1990s there was a clear trend from peacekeeping to peace 
enforcement. But soon the UN became too cautious and selective with regard to 
collective action. Decision-making for enforcement operations proved more difficult 
than for most classic UN peace operations, given the risks for UN personnel. The 
trend was reserved from peace enforcement back to peacekeeping. The activism of 
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the early 1990s has given way to retrenchment, reform, and regionalization (Griffin, 
1999: 3). In his 1995 “Supplement to An Agenda for Peace,” then Secretary-General 
Boutros Ghali moved away from peace enforcement operations and reaffirmed the 
validity of the three basic principles of traditional UN peacekeeping, namely consent, 
impartiality and the non-use of force except in self defense. He also recommended 
that the UN should not itself seek to conduct large-scale enforcement activities and 
the implementation of enforcement mandates be delegated to coalitions of willing 
member states and regional organizations to assume a more active role in conflict 
management (Ghali, 1995: 33). Current UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan followed 
this approach and reaffirmed the importance of the coalitions of willing member 
states in his 16 July 1997 “Programme for Reform:”  
The United Nations does not have, at this point in its history, the 
institutional capacity to conduct military enforcement measures 
under Chapter VII. Under present conditions, ad hoc member 
states’ coalitions of the willing offer the most effective deterrent to 
aggression or to the escalation or spread of an ongoing conflict. As 
in the past, a mandate from the Security Council authorizing such a 
course of action is essential if the enforcement operation is to have 
broad international support and legitimacy (Annan, 1997: para 
107). 
 
This approach has largely been followed ever since, and consequently, in 
order to enforce its decisions the Security Council increasingly resorted to “coalitions 
of the willing,” such as Operation Uphold Democracy (in Haiti, 1994-95), the 
NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) and subsequent Stabilization Force 
(SFOR) (in Bosnia since 1995), the Inter-African Mission to Monitor the 
Implementation of the Bangui Agreements (MISAB) (in Central African Republic, 
1997), International Force (INTERFET) (in East Timor in 1999), and International 
Assistance Force (ISAF) (in Afghanistan in 2000). 
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To sum up, in practice, the operational range of the peace operations in the 
post-Cold War is characterized by five main tasks as described in the table below 
(British Army, 1994:1-2):  
Objectives Tasks 
Conflict prevention  Preventive deployment, interposition, early 
warning, surveillance  
Guarantee and denial of movement  No-fly zones, safe-havens, blockades, free 
passage 
Protection and delivery of 
humanitarian relief  
Protection and escort of humanitarian relief and 
agencies, or infrastructure support  
Supervision of a comprehensive 
peace settlement 
Demobilization, disarmament demining, election 
monitoring, reforming/training of security forces  
Military assistance to civil structures 
in a failed state  Peace enforcement, political trusteeship  
 
The peace operations undertaken during the Cold War era were conflict-
management activities whereas the operations undertaken during the post-Cold War 
era could be better classified as conflict-resolution activities. Unlike Cold War era, 
peace operations during the post-Cold War era have gradually become western 
security initiatives in the sense that they would contribute to western security through 
helping transform the conflict-laden areas in line with the West’s liberal-democratic 
norms (Bjorkdahl, 2006: 214-228 and Richmond and Woodhouse, 2005: 139-156). 
Just as the enlargement of the European Union and NATO to Central and Eastern 
European countries has helped stabilize these regions and has improved European 
security, growing peace operations in the Balkans and other geographies served 
similar functions (Smith and Timmins, 2000: 80-90).  
 
2.2.3. Case Studies 
Developing NATO’s crises management capabilities on the one hand and endowing 
the EU with peacekeeping/peacebuilding capabilities with crises-management and 
human security dimensions on the other should be interpreted in line with this 
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changing security understanding (Cornish and Edwards, 2001:587-603). These 
efforts are not only security oriented but also cover an ideational dimension in the 
sense that peace operations have enabled westerners to maintain the legitimacy of the 
core western values in the volatile international system. Peace operations have 
proved as effective tools through which the West could project its constitutive values 
to non-western areas. The Western undertakings in Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo and 
Afghanistan testify to this understanding.   
 
2.2.3.1. United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I and UNOSOM II)  
There was violent fragmentation in Somalia following the downfall of President Siad 
Barre in 1991. A civil war broke out between two factions - those supporting Interim 
President Ali Mahdi Mohamed and those supporting General Mohamed Farah 
Aidid.25 A single ethnic group sharing the same religion, history and language split 
into heavily armed clans. The fighting resulted in widespread death and destruction, 
forced hundreds of thousands of civilians to flee the city. Throughout the country, 
almost 4.5 million of the 6 million Somalis were estimated to be threatened by 
hunger and disease. Some 700,000 Somalis had sought refugee in neighbouring 
countries and another 300,000 were exiled elsewhere.26  
The deterioration of the incidents of violence in Somalia compelled the UN to 
intervene in Somalia for humanitarian purposes. The UN, in cooperation with the 
Organization of African Unity (OAU) and other organizations, sought to resolve the 
conflict. The UN became engaged in providing humanitarian aid, in cooperation with 
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relief organizations27. The Security Council in January 1992 concluded that the 
Somalia’s internal situation itself “…constitutes a threat to international peace and 
security”28 and imposed an arms embargo against Somalia. However, all of these 
efforts were unable to stop the conflicts and on 24 April 1992, the SC decided to 
establish the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I) by Resolution 
751.29 It took more than three months to establish UNOSOM I.. On 28 August 1992, 
the UN started UNOSOM I operation by Resolution 775 to deliver humanitarian aid 
and to control the distribution of food. 
UNOSOM I was an inadequate effort and ill-suited to tackle clan warfare and 
general violence.30 The relief effort was hampered by continued fighting and 
insecurity. In August 1992 the SC decided to deploy some 3,000 additional troops to 
protect humanitarian aid. But the situation continued to worsen, with aid workers 
under attack.31 It was kept from fulfilling its mission because of the inability or 
unwillingness of parties to honor agreements made with UNOSOM representatives. 
The UN succeeded in only delivering 9 percent of the food that arrived to the country 
(Bir, 1999: 88).   
On 3 December 1992, after the situation in Somalia had further deteriorated, 
the SC, by its resolution 794, determined that “…the magnitude of the human 
tragedy caused by the conflict in Somalia constitutes a threat to international peace 
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and security”.32 It authorized Member States to form a multinational operation, 
Restore Hope - called UNITAF (Unified Task Force) to establish a safe environment 
for the delivery of humanitarian assistance. It was a US-led, UN-sanctioned 
operation that included protection of humanitarian assistance and other peace-
enforcement operations. Eventually, Operation Restore Hope which was supported 
by 25,000 US troops and 10,500 troops from 23 other countries33 began its 
intervention in Somalia on 9 December 1992 (Holmes, 1993: 329). UNITAF quickly 
secured all major relief centers, and by year’s end humanitarian aid was flowing 
again. UNITAF worked in coordination with UNOSOM I to secure major population 
centers and to ensure that humanitarian assistance was delivered and distributed. 
UNOSOM remained responsible for protecting the delivery of assistance and for 
political efforts to end the war.34   
The Secretary-General recommended that the new UN operation in Somalia, 
which was under Chapter VII of the Charter, should be under UN command and 
control, though using elements from the headquarters which had already been 
established by the US led force in Somalia (Goulding, 1993:463). But incidents of 
violence against humanitarian operations and plundering of relief supplies continued 
and famine conditions continued to deteriorate. It subsequently became clear that the 
UNITAF would not succeed in establishing a secure environment. The UN 
Secretary-General therefore recommended an expansion in UNOSOM’s mandate 
“…to secure or maintain security at all ports, airports and lines of communication 
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required for the delivery of humanitarian assistance”.35 At the end of March, the SC 
had increased the authorization to 28,000 UN soldiers and replaced UNITAF with a 
UN peacekeeping force that was established under Chapter VII of the UN Charter 
with the mandate and armament necessary to enforce secure conditions for 
humanitarian operations. UNOSOM II was established in accordance with SC 
Resolution 814 of 26 March 1993, to take over the protection activities from the 
UNITAF.36  
The SC authorized UNOSOM II to use whatever force was necessary to 
disarm Somali warlords who might refuse to surrender their arms and to ensure 
access to suffering civilians. In subsequent months the security situation in the 
capital, Mogadishu, deteriorated. In June 1993 UN peace forces were involved in 
incidents in which they both suffered and inflicted severe casualties. On 3 October 
1993 some US rangers, deployed in Mogadishu in support of the UNOSOM II 
mandate came under concentrated fire and 18 were killed and 78 were injured (Hill 
and Malik, 1996:177). Shortly there after US President Bill Clinton announced that 
US forces would withdraw by 31 March 1994. The remaining contingents in 
UNOSOM II were nervous about both their security and their ability to bring an end 
to the conflict in Somalia. They finally withdrew from Somalia under US protection 
in early March 1995.37 The removal of national units from UNITAF and subsequent 
withdrawals from UNOSOM further reduced the capability of UNOSOM II to 
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undertake a military enforcement operation.38 In Somalia, the delivery protection of 
humanitarian relief supplies failed.  
The mandate of UNOSOM I was to monitor the ceasefire in Mogadishu, the 
capital of Somalia; to provide protection and security for UN personnel, equipment 
and supplies at the seaports and airports in Mogadishu and to escort deliveries of 
humanitarian supplies from there to distribution centers in the city and its immediate 
environs.39  On 28 August 1992, UNOSOM I’s mandate was expanded by SC 
Resolution 775 (1992), to enable it to protect humanitarian convoys and distribution 
centers throughout Somalia. The mandate of UNOSOM II was to take appropriate 
action, including enforcement measures, to establish a secure environment for 
humanitarian assistance throughout Somalia.40  
The main responsibilities of UNOSOM II included: monitoring that all 
factions continued to respect the cessation of hostilities and other agreements to 
which they had consented; preventing any resumption of violence and, if necessary, 
taking appropriate action; maintaining control of the heavy weapons of the organized 
factions which would have been brought under international control; seizing the 
small arms of all unauthorized armed elements; securing all ports, airports and lines 
of communications required for the delivery of humanitarian assistance; protecting 
the personnel, installations and equipment of the UN and its agencies ICRC as well 
as of NGOs providing humanitarian and reconstruction assistance, continuing 
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demining and; helping repatriate and resettle refugees and displaced people in 
Somalia; assisting the Somali parties in implementing the “Addis Ababa 
Agreements”, particularly in their cooperative disarmament and ceasefire efforts; 
protecting major ports, airports and essential infrastructure; providing humanitarian 
relief to all in need throughout the country; assisting in the reorganization of the 
Somali police and judicial system; assisting the political process in Somalia. 
UNOSOM II was also mandated to assist in the reconstruction of economic, social 
and political life. On 4 February 1994, the SC, by its Resolution 897 (1994) revised 
UNOSOM II’s mandate to exclude the use of coercive methods.41  
 
2.2.3.2. United Nations Operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina  
Bosnia-Herzegovina was one of the six republics of Yugoslavia ruled by Tito. Tito 
managed to control different nations and ethnic groups under its communist regime, 
but some nationalist Serbs started unequal treatments in the later years of its regime. 
When Tito died in May 1980, Slobodan Milosevic who was the leader of Serbia and 
an extreme nationalist was elected as the president of the Yugoslavia. When 
Milosevic came to power, Serbian nationalism increased dangerously and Serbians’ 
unequal treatments and pressure towards other nations and ethnic groups grew 
incredibly. After terminating the autonomous status of Kosovo, Milosevic declared 
that they revive the Historical Serbian Kingdom demolished 600 years ago in a 
speech at the ceremony of 600th year of historical Kosovo War. Upon these 
developments, other nations clearly understood the Serbs’ revisionist intentions and 
they decided to separate from Yugoslavia dominated by Serbs. 
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The first independence declaration came from Slovenia in 1991. After the 
developments in Slovenia, Croatia declared its independence. Serious fighting in 
Yugoslavia began in June 1991 when Croatia and its northern neighbor Slovenia 
declared themselves independent from Yugoslavia.42 Serbs living in Croatia, 
supported by the Yugoslavian National Army (JNA), opposed this move. Serbian 
response to Croatian independence put the country into civil war. Then, the Republic 
of Macedonia declared its independence.43 The European Community (EC) sought to 
resolve the Yugoslav crisis in the framework of the Conference on Yugoslavia, but 
its efforts proved unsuccessful. By September, fighting had escalated into an all-out 
war between Croatia and Serbia (Bosna -Hersek Dün-Bugün-Yarın, 1997:1).  
In 1991, Slobodan Milosevic proposed that Bosnia-Herzegovina and the 
Republic of Macedonia unite under the Republic of Federal Yugoslavia, but Bosnia-
Herzegovina did not accept this proposal since it was afraid of Serbian domination in 
such a federation. Finally, the 1992 referendum revealed the intention of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina as the declaration of the independence. Bosnian Serbs with the support 
of the Federal Army revealed their opposition to the declaration of the independence 
by declaring the Republic of Bosnia-Serbia and started organized attacks and violent 
actions against the Muslim population of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Thus, the conflict 
intensified and extended to Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosna-Hersek Gerçeği, 
1995:17). 
The SC chose not to take military sides in the conflict, but rather to use a 
peace operation as a means to alleviate the consequences of the conflict. This was 
significant in itself as Europe was not a region where the UN played a major peace 
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management role, due to the geo-political sensitivities of the Cold War. The SC did 
not take any formal action on the Yugoslav crisis to prevent intensification and 
extension of the conflict until September 1991. On 25 September 1991, to prevent 
intensification and extension of the conflict, the SC unanimously adopted resolution 
713 referring to imposing an embargo on the delivery of all arms and other military 
equipment to the area.44 On 21 February, the SC, by its resolution 743 (1992), 
approved the report and established the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) for an 
initial period of 12 months (Hill and Malik, 1996:106). On 7 April 1992, 
UNPROFOR was authorized for full deployment by resolution 749.45   
The mandate of UNPROFOR was to prevent the resumption of fighting and 
to facilitate movement toward settlement of the conflict. But fighting as well as 
reports of “ethnic cleansing” and other atrocities in Bosnia continued and posed an 
obvious threat to regional peace and security. Events in Bosnia and Croatia have 
indicated a situation where warring parties can stop the distribution of aid, prevent 
UN peacekeeping troop rotation, bombard cities, commit genocide and war crimes 
with UNPROFOR helpless to act (Roberts, 1994: 101). 
Absence of cooperation from all parties has made it increasingly difficult for 
UNPROFOR to fulfill its mandate of meeting pressing humanitarian needs and 
protecting threatened civilian populations. Peacekeepers have come under direct 
military attack. In light of these developments, the need for peace enforcement has 
been heard from various quarters but in practice this has been difficult. The growing 
demand to halt human rights abuses and Serbian atrocities spurred by the western 
media has put pressure on the UN, the US and the EC to increase the level of 
intervention (Holmes, 1993:331). Various concerned parties have blamed the 
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ineffectiveness of the EU and UN peace operation in Yugoslavia on the lack of the 
use of force to punish the aggressors because of the reasons explained below. 
Arguments defending the use of force state that UN and EU Resolutions, EU cease-
fires, economic sanctions and embargos are useless if they do not have some credible 
military backing. As noted by Christopher Greenwood “it is no longer tenable to 
assert that whenever a government massacres its own people or a state collapses into 
anarchy international law forbids military intervention altogether”(Greenwood, 1993: 
40). 
The flowing of refugees, asylum-seekers and internally displaced persons, 
pressured the EU to find ways to stop the flow. France had 50,000 refugees, while 
Germany had absorbed approximately 300,000 refugees.46 This had fueled fears of 
uncontrolled immigration and was a reason behind the right-wing extremism in 
France and Germany (Dewar, 1993:33). The use of force in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
would also relieve the tensions between Christian and Muslim states. Because of 
western reluctance to intervene in Bosnia, the view in Islamic countries that the West 
was anti-Muslim was reinforced (Sharp, 1993:31). The use of force would give 
credibility to UNPROFOR, even though it would increase its vulnerability (Roberts, 
1994:102). The cost of military inaction was also high. UNPROFOR was unable to 
protect the besieged communities, unable to prevent or punish ongoing atrocities and 
was often seen as being more concerned with their own safety, than the moral rights 
and wrongs of the war (Roberts, 1994:113). The arms embargo affected the Muslims 
heavily, depriving them of the right to self defense, when the UN itself could not 
provide them with protection. 
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In response to growing international pressure to take action, the SC stretched 
UNPROFOR’s mandate, with SC Resolution 764 on 13 July 1992 to cover security 
and delivery of humanitarian aid to Sarajevo and environs. Eventually SC expanded 
the mandate of UNPROFOR to assist the UN High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) in the delivery of a large scale humanitarian relief effort throughout 
Bosnia.47 The SC adopted a resolution under the enforcement provisions of Chapter 
VII of the Charter calling upon all states “to take all measures necessary” to 
facilitate, in coordination with the UN, the delivery of humanitarian aid to Sarajevo 
and other parts of Bosnia following which it took the unprecedented step of renewing 
UNPROFOR’s mandate under Chapter VII to “ensure the security of 
UNPROFOR”48 and to “ensure its freedom of movement for all its missions”.49 On 6 
May 1993 the SC proclaimed six towns (Sarajevo, Tuzla, Gorazde, Srebrenica, Zepa 
and Bosnia and Herzegovina) in Bosnia and Herzegovina “safe areas”.50 Continued 
noncompliance by Serb militias led the Council to pass a resolution under Chapter 
VII to “deter attacks against the safe areas” and  “acting in self defense to take the 
necessary measures, including the use of force, in reply to bombardments... or to 
armed incursion into (these areas) or in event of any deliberate obstruction” of 
humanitarian convoys.51 This also permitted NATO, in co-ordination with 
UNPROFOR, to use air power in and around safe areas. 
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UNPROFOR II was established as an extension of UNPROFOR I under the 
enforcement provisions of Chapter VII of the UN Charter. In the case of the latter, 
missions were to be conducted in the absence of a prearranged and sustained cease 
fire, and without the consent of the parties to the conflict. On February 1993, the SC 
specifically cited Chapter VII as a basis for UNPROFOR’s duties in Croatia and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina.52 By June 1993, the SC decided to convert part of 
UNPROFOR’s work in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina- such as the protection 
of “safe areas”- into peace enforcement that would not depend on the parties’ 
consent; in so doing, it invoked Chapter VII of the UN Charter, “implying the 
Council's willingness to at least consider peace enforcement”.53 
In March 1995, the Secretary-General recommended that UNPROFOR be 
replaced by three operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and the Republic of 
Macedonia, stating that such an agreement would respond to the wishes of the three 
countries. On 31 March 1995, the SC replaced UNPROFOR with three distinct but 
closely interlinked peace operations: UNPROFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the 
UN Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia (UNCRO), and the UN Preventive 
Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) in the Republic of Macedonia.54  
On 14 November 1995, the General Framework Agreement for Peace in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (the Dayton-Paris Agreement or the Peace Agreement) was 
concluded as a result of a United States-led peace initiative after three years of peace-
                                               
52
 SC Resolutions 807 of February 19, 1993 
 
53
 See, RAND Project Memorandum, May 1995 
 
54
 The mandate of UNCRO was terminated on 15 January, 1996. Effective 1 February 1996, following 
the termination of the mandates of UNCRO, UNPROFOR and UNPF-HQ (UN Peace Forces 
headquarters established in Zagreb), UNPREDEP became an independent mission, reporting directly 
to UN Headquarters in New York. Despite its new status, the operation has maintained basically the 
same mandate, strength and composition of troops. 
 
  84 
making efforts by the international community.55 Following the signing of the 
Bosnian Peace Agreement in Paris on 14 December 1995, the parties agreed to a 
cease-fire which had begun on 5 October 1995 and withdrawal of the UNPROFOR. 
The UNSC adopted resolution 1031 transferring authority for peace operations from 
the UN to NATO and giving NATO a mandate to implement the military aspects of 
the Dayton Peace Agreement. IFOR was established under the authority of NATO to 
implement this mandate. On 20 December 1995, IFOR took over from UNPROFOR, 
whose mandate was thus terminated (Berdal, 1995:228-230).  
The IFOR’s mission was to ensure compliance with the Agreement by all 
Parties and to implement its military aspects.56 NATO did not impose a settlement on 
the Parties, but did take the necessary action to ensure compliance. As spelled out in 
UNSC Resolution 1031, the 60,000 strong, well-armed IFOR operated under Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter. At the end of December 1996, IFOR handed over 
responsibility to the 30,000 strong, NATO-led multinational Stabilization Force 
(SFOR). At their Istanbul Summit in June 2004, NATO leaders decided to bring 
SFOR to a conclusion by the end of the year as a result of the improved security 
situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the wider region. The SFOR mission was 
officially ended on 2 December 2004. In its place, a European Union-led force 
deployed, known as Operation Althea, EUFOR. 
 
2.2.3.2.1. The United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) 
The crisis which has lasted in the former Yugoslavia for several years turned into all-
out war when Serbia began a campaign of armed aggression against Croatia in June 
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1991. The international community responded to this threat to European and world 
peace by launching the UNPROFOR peace operation in the beginning of 1992. The 
mandate of UNPROFOR was to prevent the resumption of fighting and to facilitate 
movement toward settlement of the conflict. The initial mandate of UNPROFOR was 
to ensure conditions for peace talks, and security in three demilitarized “safe-heaven” 
enclaves (“United Nations Protected Areas” UNPAs) located in the former Yugoslav 
republic of Croatia: Eastern Slovenia, Western Slovenia and Krajina.57 Upon the 
extending of conflict to Bosnia and Herzegovina, the mandate and strength of 
UNPROFOR was enlarged to provide security in that country. 
On April 7, 1992, UNSC Resolution 749, authorized the full deployment of 
UNPROFOR. On June 30, 1992, the mandate was extended to so-called “pink zones” 
controlling access to the UNPAs (Resolution 762, 30 June 1992), some border 
control and monitoring of civilian access to the Pink Zones (Resolution 769, 7 
August 1992), and control of the demilitarization of the Prevlaka Peninsula near 
Dubrovnik (Resolution 779, 6 October 1992).58 On August 7, 1992, UNSC 
Resolution 769 was passed which authorised the enlargement of UNPROFOR’s 
mandate and strength to enable it to perform immigration and customs functions on 
the international borders of Croatia. Other extensions of the mandate included the 
protection of the Sarajevo airport from June 1992 (Resolution 758, 8 June 1992), 
and, from September 1992, protection for humanitarian aid in the whole of Bosnia 
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and Herzegovina, and protection of civilian refugees when required by the ICRC 
(Resolution 770, 13 August 1992).59  
UNPROFOR’s task was to stop the fighting and to provide the conditions for 
a political settlement of the crisis through negotiations. Through several resolutions, 
the SC gave UNPROFOR a fourfold mandate in Bosnia: to implement the agreement 
of the parties to open Sarajevo Airport; to assist UNHCR in the delivery of a large 
scale humanitarian relief efforts throughout Bosnia; to enforce a no-fly zone; and to 
protect safe heavens or areas (Cervanek, 1995:47). UNPROFOR was to provide all 
appropriate support to humanitarian organisations and facilitate the return of 
displaced persons to their homes in the UNPAs, under conditions of full safety.  
UNPROFOR was also to supervise the withdrawal of the JNA from the whole of 
Croatia and support humanitarian agencies in the return of displaced persons.60 
 
2.2.3.2.2. The Peace Implementation Force (IFOR) 
The peaceful UN efforts to solve Bosnian crises did not provide any progress and 
failed to stop Bosnian Serbs attacks. Bosnian Serbs went on their attacks in particular 
artillery fire and violent actions towards Bosnian Muslims. When artillery fire killed 
37 civilians and wounded 85 civilians in a market place, NATO started to bomb the 
Serbian targets intensively. Serbs could not resist much and they withdrew their 
heavy weapons from the vicinity of Sarajevo. Then they accepted both a cease-fire 
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and negotiating for peace. After long meetings in the US (Dayton, Ohio), the Dayton 
Peace Agreement was signed in Paris on 14 December 1995.61  
To implement the military aspects of the Dayton Peace Agreement, a 60,000-
strong NATO-led multinational Implementation Force (IFOR) deployed in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina on 20 December 1995 with a one-year mandate under SC 
Resolution 1031.62 By adopting resolution 1031, the UNSC transferred authority for 
peace operations from the UN to NATO. IFOR was the Alliance’s first large-scale 
operational peacekeeping mission and first out of area operation.63 After the peaceful 
conduct of the September 1996 elections, IFOR successfully completed its mission.  
The IFOR’s primary mission was to monitor and enforce compliance with the 
military aspects (Annex 1A) of the Dayton Peace Agreement. IFOR’s main task was 
to guarantee the end of hostilities and separate the armed forces of the Federation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, on the one hand, and Republika Srpska, on the other. The 
military tasks included: to ensure self defense and freedom of movement, to 
supervise selective marking of boundaries and Zone of Separation (ZOS) between 
the parties, to monitor and, if needed, enforce, the withdrawal of forces to their 
respective territories, to assume control of the airspace over Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
of the movement of military traffic over key ground routes, to establish Joint Military 
Commissions, to serve as the central bodies for all Parties to the Peace Agreement, to 
assist with the withdrawal of UN forces not transferred to IFOR, to help to create 
secure conditions for the conduct by others of non-military tasks associated with the 
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Peace Agreement, including free and fair elections, to assist UN High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR) and other international organizations in their humanitarian 
missions and assist the movement of these organizations, to assist in the observation 
and prevention of interference with the movement of civilian populations, refugees 
and displaced persons, and respond appropriately to deliberate violence to life and 
person and to assist in the monitoring of the clearance of minefields and obstacles.64  
 
2.2.3.2.3. The Stabilization Force (SFOR) 
The IFOR had successfully achieved its goals by 20 December 1996. NAC decided 
to the deployment of SFOR on 20 December 1996.65 Under UNSC Resolution 1088 
of 12 December 1996, SFOR was authorized to implement the military aspects of the 
Dayton Peace Agreement as the legal successor to IFOR. Like IFOR, SFOR operated 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (peace enforcement). SFOR had the same 
robust rules of engagement for the use of force, should it be necessary to accomplish 
its mission and to protect itself. The role of IFOR (Operation Joint Endeavour) was 
to implement the peace. The role of SFOR (Operation Joint Guard / Operation Joint 
Forge) was to stabilise the peace. The difference between the tasks of IFOR and 
SFOR was reflected in their names.66 SFOR would conduct an operation including 
both military tasks and civilian missions. These developments led SFOR to be 
established as a successor of IFOR.  
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Between December 1996 and December 2004, SFOR helped to maintain a 
secure environment and facilitated the country’s reconstruction in the wake of the 
1992-1995 war. In light of the improved security situation in both Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and the wider region, the Alliance brought SFOR to a conclusion in 
December 2004. The Dayton Peace Agreement provided the political and legal 
framework for SFOR. Annex 1A contains the agreement on the Military Aspects of 
the Peace Settlement. The goals of the agreement were: to provide a safe and secure 
environment by providing a continued military presence in the Area of 
Responsibility (AOR), to establish a unified, democratic Bosnia and Herzegovina, to 
rebuild the economy, to allow the return of displaced persons and refugees to their 
prewar homes. 
SFOR’s primary task was to contribute to a safe and secure environment 
conducive to civil and political reconstruction. Its specific tasks were: to deter or 
prevent a resumption of hostilities or new threats to peace, to promote a climate in 
which the peace process could continue to move forward; and, to provide selective 
support within its means and capabilities to civilian and international organizations 
involved in this process to stabilize the peace, to target and coordinate SFOR support 
to key areas including primary civil implementation organisations, and progress 
towards a lasting consolidation of peace, without further need for NATO-led forces 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina.67 
SFOR’s activities ranged from patrolling and providing area security through 
supporting defense reform and supervising demining operations, confiscating and 
destroying unauthorized weapons, to arresting individuals indicted for war crimes 
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and assisting the return of refugees and displaced people to their homes.68 SFOR 
troops carried out regular patrols throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina to maintain a 
secure environment. Multinational specialized units were deployed to deal with 
instances of unrest. SFOR also collected and destroyed unregistered weapons and 
ordnance in private hands, in order to contribute to the overall safety of the 
population and to build confidence in the peace process. In 2003 alone, SFOR 
disposed of more than 11,000 weapons and 45,000 grenades. SFOR was also one of 
several organizations involved in demining in Bosnia and Herzegovina. NATO 
forces carried out some demining themselves and helped to set up demining schools 
in Banja Luka, Mostar and Travnik. They also helped to establish a sniffer dog 
training school in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
SFOR, which was completely military operation in the beginning, gave 
increasing importance to the CIMIC activities with the aim of maintaining peace in 
the region, and a new era had begun for SFOR. In addition to helping other 
organizations working on Bosnia and Herzegovina’s reconstruction, SFOR launched 
its own CIMIC projects in areas such as structural engineering and transportation. 
SFOR participated in the maintenance and repair of roads and railways in 
collaboration with the local authorities and other international agencies. This work 
was critical to providing freedom of movement throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
To fulfill CIMIC tasks such as conducting civil-military coordination 
between International organizations and local authorities to support implementation 
of the Dayton Peace Accord, supporting international organizations in providing 
humanitarian assistance to refugees and displaced people, coordinating the efforts of 
rebuilding the commerce and infrastructure, facilitating the democratization process 
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and supporting state institutions and the rule of law, SFOR had been reorganized 
according to the new organization which was put into effect on 1 April 2000 as self 
sufficient rapid reaction force which had high action capability and equipped with 
light arms rather than heavy arms. 
 
2.2.3.2.4. EU-led Force (EUFOR) 
At its Summit on 28 June 2004, NATO had decided to bring SFOR to a conclusion 
by the end of the year as a result of the improved security situation in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and the wider region. On 25 November, the EU Council adopted the 
decision to launch a military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina named as 
EUFOR-Operation ALTHEA. This decision followed the unanimous adoption on 22 
November 2004 of UNSC Resolution 1575 and enabled the EU to launch Operation 
Althea on 2 December 2004. It authorized the Member States acting through or in 
cooperation with the EU to establish a multinational stabilization force (EUFOR) as 
a legal successor to SFOR under unified command and control, which will fulfill its 
missions in relation to the implementation of Annex 1 and Annex 2 of the Dayton 
Peace Agreement.69  
This was the third military operation in the framework of the European 
Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) (following EU Military Operation Concordia70 
in the Republic of Macedonia and EU Military Operation Artemis71 in the 
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Democratic Republic of Congo) (European Union Factsheet, February 2005). 
Operation Althea, took on the main peace-stabilization role previously undertaken by 
NATO under the Dayton Peace Agreement. In accordance with agreements worked 
out between the two organizations, NATO is providing planning, logistic and 
command support for the EU-led operation in the framework of a package of 
agreements known as “Berlin Plus”.72  
 
2.2.3.3. United Nations Operations in Kosovo (KFOR)  
Kosovo obtained autonomous status in 1963 under the Tito regime. Until 1989, the 
region enjoyed a high degree of autonomy within the former Yugoslavia. Relations 
between Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo grew significantly tenser as Slobadan 
Milosevic was elected Serbia’s party leader in 1987 with the rise of Serbian 
nationalism following the fall of the Berlin Wall and Soviet communism (Simonsen, 
2004: 291). By 1989, Milosevic was firmly in control of the Serbian republic and 
embarked on a campaign to consolidate his power throughout Yugoslavia.73 As 
Slobodan Milosevic came to power, Serbian pressure and unequal treatment 
increased and the Serbian Assembly altered the autonomous status of Kosovo in 
1989, removing its autonomy and bringing it under the direct control of Belgrade, the 
Serbian capital.74  
The majority population of Kosovo was progressively denied the right to 
govern their own affairs, to earn a living for themselves, to have access to the legal 
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and judicial system, and to be able to educate their children in their own language 
and culture (Robertson, 2000:5). Kosovar Albanians were fired from their jobs, their 
schools were closed, they were denied access to state-run health care, and they lost 
administrative control of the province. After the revocation of Kosovo’s autonomy, 
the Serbian authorities closed schools in the Albanian language, massively dismissed 
Albanians from state-owned enterprises, and suspended Kosovo’s legal parliament 
and government. Serbia instituted a regime of systematic oppression of the Albanian 
population in Kosovo, and flagrant violations of the basic rights of Albanians 
occurred frequently.   
Initially the Albanians responded to the repression with peaceful and passive 
resistance. In 1992 the people of Kosovo held free elections in which they chose their 
leadership, expressed their determination for the independence of Kosovo in the 
1991 referendum, and in the same year the Kosovar parliament declared the 
independence of Kosovo. They formed a parallel government, found means of 
continuing Albanian language education outside of occupied premises and providing 
health care (most Albanian doctors were dismissed from state-owned hospitals by 
Serb installed authorities). 
In early 1998 the Serbian government began a crackdown against the Kosovo 
Liberation Army (KLA), a guerilla movement which emerged after it became 
apparent that the peaceful approach was ineffective in the face of the brutal regime of 
Milosevic. In February of 1998, conflicts broke out between Serbian military and 
police forces and Kosovar Albanian forces. During 1998, Serbian security forces 
conducted a scorched earth policy in Kosovo, raising villages to the ground, creating 
over one million refugees and internally displaced persons, committing horrific 
atrocities against unarmed civilians, including women and children, leaving over 
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300,000 people without shelter, and an estimated 10,000 dead, and mass graves 
containing bodies of up to one hundred civilians, including women and children, who 
have been summarily executed. The Kosovar Albanians strenuously opposed the 
move.75 KLA which was established in 1990 pioneered this move.76 The 
international community became gravely concerned about the escalating conflict, its 
humanitarian consequences, and the risk of it spreading to other countries. President 
Milosevic’s disregard for diplomatic efforts aimed at peacefully resolving the crisis 
and the destabilizing role of militant Kosovar Albanian forces was also of concern.77  
On 13 October 1998, following a deterioration of the situation, the NATO 
Council authorized Activation Orders for air strikes. This move was designed to 
support diplomatic efforts to make the Milosevic regime withdraw forces from 
Kosovo, cooperate in bringing an end to the violence and facilitate the return of 
refugees to their homes. At the last moment, following further diplomatic initiatives, 
Milosevic agreed to comply and the air strikes were called off. UNSC Resolution 
1199 (23 September 1998) expressed deep concern about the excessive use of force 
by Serbian security forces and the Yugoslav army, and called for a cease-fire by both 
parties to the conflict. It was agreed, in addition, that the OSCE would establish a 
Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) to observe compliance on the ground and that 
NATO would establish an aerial surveillance mission. The establishment of the two 
missions was endorsed by UNSC Resolution 1203 (24 October 1998).  
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From October 1998 to March 1999, the KVM, the largest and most 
challenging OSCE operation up to that date, was deployed to verify the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia’s compliance with UNSC Resolutions 1160 (31 March 
1998) and 1199 (23 September 1998). The purpose of the KVM was to verify the 
cease-fire, monitor movement of forces and promote human rights and democracy-
building. Following deterioration in the security situation, the KVM was withdrawn 
from Kosovo in March 1999. In support of the OSCE, the Alliance established a 
special military task force to assist with the emergency evacuation of members of the 
KVM, if renewed conflict should put them at risk. This task force was deployed in 
the Republic of Macedonia under the overall direction of NATO’s Supreme Allied 
Commander Europe.  
Despite these steps, the situation in Kosovo flared up again at the beginning 
of 1999, following a number of acts of provocation on both sides and the use of 
excessive and disproportionate force by the Serbian Army and Special Police. Some 
of these incidents were defused through the mediation efforts of the OSCE verifiers 
but in mid-January, the situation deteriorated further after escalation of the Serbian 
offensive against Kosovar Albanians.  
Renewed international efforts were made to give new political impetus to 
finding a peaceful solution to the conflict. The six-nation Contact Group78  
established by the 1992 London Conference on the Former Yugoslavia met on 29 
January. It was agreed to convene urgent negotiations between the parties to the 
conflict, under international mediation. NATO supported and reinforced the Contact 
Group efforts by agreeing on 30 January to the use of air strikes if required, and by 
issuing a warning to both sides in the conflict. These concerted initiatives culminated 
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in initial negotiations in Rambouillet near Paris, from 6 to 23 February, followed by 
a second round in Paris, from 15 to 18 March. At the end of the second round of 
talks, the Kosovar Albanian delegation signed the proposed peace agreement, but the 
talks broke up without a signature from the Serbian delegation.79 On 20 March, the 
OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission was withdrawn from the region, having faced 
obstruction from Serbian forces to the extent that they could no longer continue to 
fulfill their task.   
After Serbia’s refusal to sign a peace accord for the settlement of the conflict 
in Kosovo, and upon the failure of political pressures, NATO intervened militarily in 
Kosovo and commenced air strikes, Operation Allied Force, on 24 March 1999 to 
halt the humanitarian catastrophe that was then unfolding in Kosovo.80 On 10 June 
the UNSC passed a resolution (UNSC Res.1244)  welcoming the acceptance by the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of the principles on a political solution to the 
Kosovo crisis, including an immediate end to violence and a rapid withdrawal of its 
military, police and paramilitary forces.81 The UN established a United Nations 
civilian administration in Kosovo (known as the United Nations Interim 
Administration Mission in Kosovo; UNMIK82) and allowed a NATO-led 
peacekeeping force to enter Kosovo to ensure security.  
Upon achievement of the Peace Agreement, the Secretary General of NATO 
stated that NATO with the forces which had contributed to Operation Allied Force, 
and to the cohesion and  determination of all the Allies, was ready to undertake its 
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new mission to bring the people back to their homes and to build a lasting and just 
peace in Kosovo. Following the adoption of UNSCR 1244, General Jackson made 
immediate preparations for the rapid deployment of the security force. Operation 
Joint Guardian mandated by the UNSC. The first elements of KFOR and UN 
Transition Kosovo Administration entered Kosovo on 12 June 1999 (NATO 
Handbook, 2002). As agreed in the Military Technical Agreement, the deployment of 
the security force, KFOR, was synchronized with the departure of Serb security 
forces from Kosovo. By 20 June, the Serb withdrawal was complete and KFOR was 
well established in Kosovo and started its mission.83  
Since Kosovo’s status remains unresolved, the NATO mandate in the 
province- which is derived from UN Security Council Resolution 1244 and a 
Military-Technical Agreement between NATO and the Yugoslav Army - is greater 
than in any other Alliance-led mission. In accordance with UNSCR 1244 (10 June 
1999), the mandate of KFOR is: to deter renewed hostility and threats against 
Kosovo by Yugoslav and Serb forces; to establish and maintain a secure environment 
in Kosovo, including public safety and order. KFOR has the mandate to enforce law 
and order until the UN Mission in Kosovo can fully assume this responsibility; to 
demilitarize the KLA; to support the international humanitarian effort; to coordinate 
with and support the international civil presence; to monitor, verify and when 
necessary, enforce compliance with the conditions of the Military Technical 
Agreement and the UCK Undertaking; to provide assistance to the UN Mission in 
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Kosovo (UNMIK), including core civil functions until they are transferred to 
UNMIK.84 
 
2.2.3.4. International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan (ISAF) 
After the terrorist attacks occurred in the United States on 11 September 2001, the 
relationship between these attacks and the al Qaeda, which was operating in 
Afghanistan, had come to light. Because the Taliban Regime was in a relation with al 
Qaeda and because it was allowing Afghanistan to be used as a base for terrorism, a 
US-led multinational Operation Enduring Freedom was carried out against 
Afghanistan.85 During this operation, Taliban regime collapsed and al Qaeda was 
damaged heavily. When the US-led operation succeeded to eliminate mostly the 
terrorist command, control and training centers, the next phase of the operation 
began. On 14 November 2001, five weeks into U.S.-led operations in Afghanistan, 
the Security Council endorsed an urgent meeting of Afghan political leaders to form 
an interim, post-Taliban governing regime for the country and to strengthen domestic 
peace and stability in the transitional period and reconstruct the physical, economic 
and human infrastructure of Afghanistan. 
On December 5, 2001 the meeting, convened in Bonn, Germany, brought 
together U.N. officials, Afghan leaders, and members of the international community 
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to discuss the country’s future.  They decided to establish and train national security 
forces with international help and called an UN-mandated force to assist in the 
maintenance of security for Kabul and its surrounding areas at the Bonn Agreement. 
As a response to this request, on December 20, 2001, the UN Security Council 
Resolution of 1386 provided for the creation of ISAF and its deployment to Kabul 
and the surrounding area, for six months. The Security Council determined that the 
situation in Afghanistan constituted a threat to international peace and security. On 
22 December 2001, two days after the SCR of 1386, an Interim Afghan 
Administration comprising 30 members under the head of Hamid Karzai was 
established in Kabul on 22 December 2001 in accordance with the Bonn Agreement. 
On 12 January 2002, ISAF has begun to function and became fully operational on 18 
February 2002. 
Initially, individual nations volunteered to lead the ISAF mission every six 
months. The United Kingdom served as the first lead nation. On 23 May, the 
Security Council extended ISAF’s mandate for an additional six months until 
December 20, 2002, with the adoption of Resolution 1413 and welcomed Turkey 
taking the role of lead nation from Great Britain. When the British mandate was 
over, Turkey assumed the lead-nation role and took over the command of the ISAF 
on June 20, 2002 for a period of six months.  
Normally, Turkey would have handed over command on 20th of December 
2002. But, no country was ready to take over. So, the UN Security Council extended 
Turkey’s leadership until 10 February 2003 (Zorlu, 2003: 36). Upon the request of 
the Germany and the Netherlands, the SC adopted the Resolution 1444 on 27 November 
2002 and decided to give the leadership to the joint command of Germany and the 
Netherlands. Since Germany and the Netherlands could not complete some of the 
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necessary preparations to assume command of ISAF on December 20, 2002, as planned, 
Turkey turned over leadership to the joint command of Germany and the Netherlands 
two months later on 10 February 2003.  
ISAF III was led by Germany and the Netherlands with support from NATO 
from 10 February to 11 August 2003. Until this time, ISAF command rotated among 
above stated nations on a 6-month basis. However there was tremendous difficulty 
securing new lead nations. To solve the problem, command was turned over 
indefinitely to NATO on August 11, 2003. Since August 2003, NATO has held the 
command of ISAF. Turkey decided to lead ISAF-VII from February 2005 to August 
2005 and took over the command headquarters of the NATO-led International 
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan on 13 February 2005.  The 
command changed from Eurocorps, which is a NATO Rapid Deployable Force that 
has been in charge of ISAF headquarters since 2004 to the “Rapid Deployable Corps 
in İstanbul.”  
The primary role of ISAF is to support the Government of Afghanistan 
(GOA) in the provision and maintenance of  security in Kabul and its environs 
(within the ISAF Area of Responsibility (AOR)) so that the GOA, as well as the 
personnel of the UN, can operate in a secure environment in order to enable the GOA 
the build up of national institutions and security structures in Afghanistan in 
accordance with the Bonn Agreement and as agreed in the Military Technical 
Agreement (MTA) signed on 31st of December 2001.  
The responsibility for providing security and law and order throughout the 
country has been left to the Afghans themselves. ISAF’s mandate had been outlined 
in the UNSC Resolution 1386. In practice the missions of ISAF are: to assist the 
Afghan Interim Administration in providing security framework around political 
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institutions and other key sites in Kabul; to advise the Afghan Interim Administration 
on future security structures and assist in their development; to assist the Afghan 
Interim Administration in reconstruction; to identify and arrange training and 
assistance tasks for future Afghan security forces; to conduct protective patrols 
jointly with the Afghan police in Kabul; to assist in the operation of Kabul 
International Airport; to support to the humanitarian assistance and infrastructure 
development; to make the police accountable and effective; to maintain a safe and 
secure environment conducive to free and fair elections, the spread of the rule of law, 
and the reconstruction of Afghanistan.  
Beside the security issues, ISAF has been helping the Afghan authorities and 
international assistance organizations in the reconstruction of the country under the 
terms of civil-military cooperation. CIMIC teams have been constructed for this 
purpose under the command of ISAF. They also prepared several projects related 
with education, health, agriculture, and infrastructure, and they have been carrying 
out these projects as far as possible since the deployment of ISAF. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
TURKEY’S APPROACH TO PEACE OPERATIONS 
 
 
 
While Turkey’s involvement in UN-led peace operations has increased in the post-
Cold War era, Turkey shied away from such missions during the Cold War years. 
With the advent of the post-Cold War era, Turkey’s involvement in peace operations 
increased. This chapter aims at analyzing the motivations that lie at the root of 
Turkey’s involvement in peace operations, mostly organized under the leadership of 
the United Nations in the post-Cold War era. Having mentioned the cases involving 
the deployment of Turkish troops abroad, I will examine alternative sets of 
motivations behind Turkey’s active involvement in peace operations in the 1990s. 
Ideational, security-related and domestic factors will be compared and contrasted in 
light of Turkey’s experiences in various peace operations. 
Since 1923, Turkey has consistently pursued a foreign policy aimed at 
international peace based on the principle formulated by the founder of the Turkish 
Republic Atatürk: ‘Peace at home and peace in the world’.86 This is considered the 
keystone of Turkish foreign and security policy. Modernization, primarily 
understood and practiced as material westernization, was largely a state-imposed 
project during the last century of the Ottoman Empire and the first decades of the 
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Turkish Republic. The West was perceived as the only source of civilization to 
which Turkey tried to belong. Turkish foreign policy has been put into the service of 
this national goal of becoming a part of Europe. 
Ataturk’s main aim was to preserve the security which had been won and in 
the interim term, to restore relations with the former entente powers. In this way, 
Turkey could take its place among the respected community of western nations and 
avoid the risk of wars, which it had suffered between 1912 and 1922 (Hale, 1999:93). 
The aim of the modernizing elite was to be integrated within the European states 
system, being a part of European identity in social terms. The Kemalist project was 
fundamentally a modernization project. In this modernizing process, the ultimate 
model was Europe. Throughout the nation-building process of the Turkish Republic, 
Westernization/Europeanization has become a legitimizing factor of all other 
reforms.  
 
3.1. Cold War  
With the end of World War II, some significant changes occurred in the nature of the 
international system. It evolved from a ‘balance of power’ structure to a ‘bipolar’ 
structure. The transition from the ‘balance of power’ system to bipolar system has 
brought systemic changes in the world order. The UN is the institution of a particular 
historical structure and particular international system. The UN was created to “save 
succeeding generations from the scourge of war.” This is reinforced in Article 1:1 
which states that the purpose of the UN is “to maintain international peace and 
security.” When it was established, the most important values of the UN were the 
sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the states. Article 2:4 prohibits “the threat 
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.” 
Unless consent was given by the parties in question, intervention was forbidden. The 
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drafters of the UN Charter felt that the best way to ensure peaceful relations was to 
codify the principle of nonintervention. 
During the bipolar era, which is characterized by the dominance of 
superpowers of international politics, the attitude of the two superpowers had a 
crucial impact on the performance of the UN to maintain peace and security. To 
launch a peace operation, the United Nations had to secure not only the consent of 
the main parties directly concerned, but also the support of the two superpowers. The 
rivalry between the two superpowers often prevented the Security Council from 
taking effective action to contain and control conflicts. Although there had been 
about 150 conflicts, the United Nations undertook only 13 peace operations during 
the Cold War, 7 in the Middle East, 3 in Asia, 1 in Africa, 1 in Europe and 1 in Latin 
America.  
Even though Turkey’s participation in peace operations has increased in the 
post-Cold War era, Turkey did not contribute to such missions during the Cold War 
years. This was despite the fact that seven87 out of thirteen peace operations were 
deployed in the Middle East as mentioned above. Turkey first participated in the UN 
military operation in Korea in 1950 with a brigade. Between the years 1950-1953 a 
total of 15,000 Turks served in Korea on a rotational basis (Türkmen, 2002: 161-
180). This was the only case concerning the deployment of Turkish troops abroad as 
part of a peace operation in its broadest sense. 
In order to understand Turkey’s reluctance in this regard, it would be useful 
to underline the following points. First, international systemic change from a 
‘balance of power’ to a ‘bipolar’ system and the rivalry between the United States 
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and the Soviet Union with the onset of the Cold War dramatically curtailed the 
maneuvering capability of small and medium sized countries, leaving very little 
room to maneuver for these countries. This is essentially because the two 
superpowers dominated the politics within each bloc they led. Kirişçi argues that, it 
is not surprising to find that Turkish foreign policy did not seem to go ‘beyond the 
parameters set by the politics of the Cold War’ (Kirişçi, 1994:5). Turkey did not 
remain completely isolated from these developments but did not contribute actively 
to the United Nations peace operations established during the Cold War.  
In the bipolar international system, Turkish security policy was restricted to a 
few basic questions: how to defend the country against the Soviet threat, how to 
protect Turkish interests concerning Greece and Cyprus, and how to maintain and 
strengthen ties with the West and NATO and how to repel terrorism supported by 
neighbors like Syria, Iraq, and Iran. These fundamental questions restricted Turkey 
from deploying its troops outside the country. Turkish security concerns have been 
focused on the perceived threat from Soviet Union (Hale, 1992:680). Thus, Turkey 
sought to protect its national security by forging close military and political ties with 
the United States and the Western Europe through its membership in NATO (Sayarı, 
1992:9).  
As the Cold War geopolitical imagination was centred on two alternative 
models of political–economic organisation, the East and the West, Turkey located 
itself in the West by virtue of its pro-western orientation and membership of 
European institutions. In this context, membership in NATO was viewed by Turkish 
policy makers as not only ending Turkey’s anxieties caused by the Soviet Union’s 
post-war demands (on its eastern provinces and the control of the straits) but also 
bringing Turkey into the European security system as a ‘fully recognised European 
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state.’ The roles Turkey played in European institutions have served as occasions on 
which Turkish policy makers articulated and defined Turkey’s western and/or 
European identity as well as maintaining its security needs and interests (Bilgin, 
2004: 278).  
NATO membership became a central component in Turkish foreign and 
security policy in the Cold War era and solidified Turkey’s western orientation by 
establishing a long-lasting institutional and functional link with the West 
(Karaosmanoğlu, 2000:209). Huntington states that, ‘Mustafa Kemal’s country is of 
course the classical torn country which since the 1920s has been trying to modernize, 
to westernize, and to become part of the West (Huntington, 1998:138). Once Turkey 
joined NATO, Turkey’s foreign policy quickly slipped to the backwaters of 
international politics (Kirişçi, 1994:10). Turkish foreign and security policies were 
basically conducted in parallel with NATO’s strategies. NATO provided the national 
security guarantee and Turkey contributed to the policy of credible deterrence by its 
pivotal status in NATO’s southeastern flank (Kramer, 2000: 202). Hence, not much 
room was left for the Turkish political elites to worry about national security 
(Kibaroğlu, 1998:163). Therefore, it would not be an overestimation to argue that 
Turkey’s attitude towards peace operations during the Cold War era was determined 
by its membership in NATO.  
Membership in NATO had two particular effects on Turkey. The first was 
that Turkey had to streamline its peacekeeping policy with that of the alliance in 
general and the United States in particular. Given that the US/NATO was lukewarm 
to the idea of setting up peace operations for troubled conflicts, lest such 
contingencies might lead to dangerous confrontations between the US and the Soviet 
Union, Turkey had also hesitated to develop a strong interest in such operations. 
  107 
During the Cold War, the UN established 3 peace operations in Asia. UN 
peacekeepers were involved in the United Nations Military Observer Group in India 
and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), the United Nations Security Force in West New Guinea 
(UNSF), the United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission (UNIPOM) in Asia. 
Turkey did not contribute to any of these operations in Asia. Second, the security 
guarantee offered by NATO membership mainly satisfied Turkey’s security interests. 
Hence, there was no need to construct a linkage between security and internal affairs 
of states and to develop special capabilities for peace operations (Kramer, 2001).   
Second, the most important goal for Turkey during the Cold War was to 
ensure the territorial integrity and security of Turkey. Turkey focused its energy on 
internal development and sought to avoid foreign tensions that could divert it from 
that goal. Instead of projecting power and contributing to peace operations, Turkey 
focused strictly on protecting borders and maintaining internal order (Makovski, 
1999: 93). This was in full harmony with the prevailing security understanding of the 
time period under consideration according to which the main threat was external and 
used to stem from the Soviet Union’s goal to extend its territorial influence.  
Third, most of the regions which peace operations had been established were 
not a priority area in Turkish security calculations. During the Cold War period, as 
retired general Şadi Ergüvenç (1995:1), noted, the Middle East was not a priority 
area in Turkish security calculations. As Philip Robins suggests, the main features of 
Turkey’s foreign and security policy in the Middle East were strict adherence to the 
principles of non-interference and non-involvement in the domestic politics and 
interstate conflicts of all countries in the region, and to the development of bilateral 
political and commercial relations with as many states in the region as possible 
(Robins, 1991:65-67).  
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Another important reason was that Turkey was not invited to contribute to 
peace operations in the region. Mainly because Turkey’s western orientation, which 
led Turkey to adopt political, social, cultural, and economic ideas from the West, had 
a significant impact on Turco-Arab relations. In its Middle Eastern relations, the 
Arabs looked upon Turkey as a servant of the West in the region (Deringil, 1992:4). 
Turkey feared that the Soviet Union was enlarging its influence over Middle Eastern 
countries, and Turkey could be soon contained by pro-Soviet and hostile Arab states. 
Therefore, the Soviet threat indirectly influenced Turkey’s further distancing from 
the Middle East. Consequently, Turkey established its security policy within the 
framework of alignment with the West by staying out of the regional conflicts of its 
Middle Eastern neighbors (Arı, 2001:415). 
During the Cold War, the UN established only 1 peace operation in Latin 
America: Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican 
Republic (DOMREP). In the Dominican Republic, it was necessary to set up a minor 
peace keeping body (DOMREP) in 1965, because there was an ideological and class 
struggle between the left wing forces and the US. The leftists were trying to regain 
control of the government, which had been seized by a right wing military junta. 
Turkey did not contribute to this peace operation. Firstly, Dominican Republic was 
not a priority area for Turkey and DOMREP was in the spheres of influence of the 
US and it was set up as a face-saving operation. Second, it was a minor peace 
operation. There were only three persons who contributed to this operation. The 
military adviser to the Representative of the Secretary-General was provided with a 
staff of 2 military observers. 
The UN established its eighth peacekeeping operation of the Cold War in 
Cyprus. The United Kingdom applied to the UN Security Council on 15 February 
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1964 upon the continuation of communal conflicts in Cyprus (Oran, 2001:725). The 
UN established UNFICYP (United Nations Force in Cyprus) with the consent of the 
‘Government of Cyprus’ in 1964 noting that the situation was likely to threaten 
international peace and security. The Secretary-General in consultation with the 
governments of Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom decided on the 
composition and size of the UNFICYP. Since Turkey was part of the problem in 
Cyprus, it could not contribute to this peace operation. 
Another peace operation in the Cold War period was the United Nations 
Operation in the Congo (ONUC). The UN established this operation initially to 
ensure the withdrawal of Belgian forces, to assist the Government in maintaining law 
and order and to provide technical assistance. The function of ONUC was 
subsequently modified to include maintaining the territorial integrity and political 
independence of the Congo. Turkey also did not contribute to this operation for 
several reasons. First of all, the Congo was in geographically not in a priority area in 
Turkish security calculations. Secondly, to the Third World, Turkey was a member 
of the western bloc and in their eyes Turkey served western interests. Therefore, 
Turkey was not invited to participate in this operation.  
Fourth, it can be argued that throughout the Cold War period Turkey lived 
with a “Korean Syndrome” similar in a sense to the negative impact seen among US 
soldiers abroad following the US experience in Vietnam War (Bağcı and Kardaş: 
2004). Last but not least, Turkey’s regional environment displayed far more stability 
than it has done in the post-Cold War era. Turkey was not exposed to spillover risks 
since these conflicts did not involve Turkic and other Muslim peoples with whom 
Turkey had historic ties.  
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3.2. Post-Cold War  
With the advent of the post-Cold War era Turkey’s involvement in peace operations 
increased. Since 1988, the Turkish Armed Forces have joined actively in various 
peace operations with various observation functions and peace operations with 
military contingents. Since that time, UN peace operations have been a distinctive 
aspect of Turkey’s security and foreign policy. Turkish commitment to peace 
operations is reaffirmed in the Ministry of National Defense White Paper 2000 
which states that “Turkey provides support to the Peace Operations carried out under 
the sanctions or control of the UN, NATO or the OSCE for world and regional peace, 
in the direction of the principle of Peace at home, Peace in the World”.88 
In the Balkans, Turkey participated in the UN Protection Force in Bosnia-
Herzegovina (UNPROFOR) from 1993 to 1995, Implementation Force (IFOR) and 
Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina (1996-present), Combined Police 
Force in Bosnia Herzegovina (1995), UN Preventive Deployment Force in 
Macedonia (1995-present), International Police Task Force in Bosnia Herzegovina 
(1997-present), Operation Alba in Albania (1997), Kosovo Verification Force (1998-
1999), and Kosovo Force (2001-present). The Turkish land forces participated in UN 
peacekeeping operations in Bosnia with a brigade. The navy participated in 
Operation Sharp Guard in the Adriatic, whose mission was to monitor and impose 
the arms embargo on former Yugoslavia. The air force joined NATO's Operation 
Deny Flight in Bosnia and Operation Allied Force in Kosovo with a squadron of F-
16s. 
In the Middle East, Turkey showed great concern for the prevention of local 
conflicts, which could escalate to a confrontation into which Turkey would 
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inevitably be drawn. Turkey was concerned about the local sources of regional 
instability, the dangers of religious and nationalist radicalization, and the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. Therefore, Turkey had a great interest in peace and stability in the region. 
Within this framework, Turkey contributed to the UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer 
Group (1988-1991), the UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (1991-2003), 
Operation Provide Comfort/ Northern Watch after the Gulf War of 1990-1991 (1991-
2003). Turkey was also included in the international observer mission, Temporary 
International Presence in Hebron (TIPH) (1997-2003), established for the purpose of 
monitoring and reporting the evacuation of the city of EI-Halil (Hebron) on the West 
Bank by the Israeli forces and its transfer to the Palestine National Administration.  
In Caucasus, Turkey has contributed to the UN Observer Mission in Georgia 
(1993- present) with 5 officers serving since 21 October 1994 within the framework 
of the OSCE. In addition to these initiatives and efforts for the promotion of peace 
and security and stability in its environment, Turkey also participated in the 
UNMISET (United Nations Mission in Support East Timor) with 2 officers and 20 
polices. Turkey had already declared it could contribute with a battalion power force 
to the ‘United Nations Standby Arrangements System,’ which envisaged the rapid 
deployment of UN peace forces in the case of a threat against world peace. Turkey 
authorized its special representative to sign peacekeeping agreements with the United 
Nations.  
Turkey contributed to two basic levels of activities within peace operations; 
deployment of military observers, and deployment of military contingents. In this 
section, I will discuss peace operations that Turkey participated in the post-Cold War 
era by the deployment of its military contingents; UNOSOM II (United Nations 
Operation in Somalia), UNPROFOR (the United Nations Protection Force), IFOR 
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(The Peace Implementation Force), SFOR (The Stabilization Force), EUFOR (EU-
led Force), KFOR (Kosovo Force), and ISAF (International Security Assistance 
Force in Afghanistan). Turkey’s contribution to peace operations by the deployment 
of military observers will be beyond this study since it does not offer insight into the 
main focus of this dissertation.   
Furthermore, in the Balkans, Turkey actively initiated and/or was involved in 
the formation of a number of bilateral and multilateral political, economic, military 
and social projects such as the Black Sea Maritime Task Group (BLACKSEAFOR) 
in April 2001, the South East European Co-operation Process (SEECP) in February 
2000, the Multinational Peace Force South East Europe (MPFSEE), the Southeastern 
European Brigade (SEEBRIG), in September 1999 and the Southeast European Co-
operation Initiative in 1996. 
 
3.2.1. United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II)  
A new phase of Turkey’s involvement in international peace operations was initiated 
with its contribution to United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II). The UN 
sent an invitation letter and asked Turkey to contribute to UNITAF. Turkey actively 
participated in the UNITAF from then on. It was decided to send a mechanized 
company sized contingent to UNOSOM after obtaining ratification from 
Parliament.89 Firstly, it was decided by the Council of Ministers to send a 
preliminary committee comprised of 9 people from the Chief of Turkish General 
Staff and Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Somalia to assess if conditions were suitable 
for the Turkish contingent. This committee moved to Mogadishu on 15 December 
1992 and carried out a pre-deployment reconnaissance visit to Somalia (Bir, 
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1999:14). The mission of the preliminary committee was to meet the requirements of 
the Turkish contingent related to its site and area of responsibility (AOR) and to 
understand the situation on the ground in order to better prepare its troops. This 
initiative led to very good results in terms of the preparation of contingents prior to 
deployment.   
 The Turkish contingent set off from Mersin harbour with the TCG (Ship of 
the Turkish Republic. Turkish: Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Gemisi) Ertuğrul landing ship 
and the TCG Derya logistics support ship accompanied by the TCG Fatih frigate on 
19 December 1992. They arrived after the 15-day trip, in Somalia on 2 January 1993 
(Bir, 1999:14). After the arrival of the Turkish contingent in Somalia, the preliminary 
committee returned to Turkey in mid January 1993. Turkey participated in the 
operation UNOSOM II in Somalia with a 300-strong mechanized company between 
2 January 1993 and 22 February 1994 (Turkish General Staff, 2001:5). The main task 
of the Turkish military contingent in Somalia was the protection of Mogadishu 
airport (Bir, 1999:46). Somalia had almost no transportation facilities, no railroads 
and few paved roads. Major airports are at Mogadishu, in the south, and at Hargeysa, 
in the north. The Turkish contingent was tasked with the vital responsibility of 
protecting the Mogadishu airport which provides unit connection to world. The other 
tasks of the Turkish military contingent were to protect UNOSOM II Headquarters, 
to provide escorts for convoys, to facilitate security and to ensure delivery of food to 
the starving Somalis.  
Following the developments in Somalia, the Belgian contingent (950 all 
ranks) and the French contingent (1,100 all ranks) were withdrawn from Somalia in 
December 1993. The United States announced, in October 1993, that it would 
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withdraw its troops from Somalia by the end of March 1994.90 Turkey also decided 
to withdraw in February 1994. While these countries were withdrawing, there was 
not a necessity for Turkey to stay in Somalia. The Turkish contingent returned to 
Turkey on 22 February 1994 as instructed through the decision of the Turkish 
government. It returned in two groups; as the first group comprising of 225 soldiers 
and PTT (Turkish Post Office) personnel returned by air, the second group 
comprising of 86 personnel and vehicles returned by sea.91 This operation was 
important in two respects for Turkey. First, Turkey was requested for the first time to 
provide an operational company to UN peace operation. Second, it is worth noting 
that the command of UNOSOM II was assumed by a Turkish Lieutenant General, 
Çevik Bir, for a period. General Bir commanded UNOSOM II from April 1993 to 
January 1994. The assignment of General Çevik Bir as commander to UNOSOM II 
was important for Turkey for its security producing image would be more reinforced 
in the international arena. 
 
3.2.2. United Nations Operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina  
Since the outbreak of hostilities in the former Yugoslavia, Turkey has insistently 
called on the international community for the prevention of further atrocities and 
tragedies, urged the finding of a just and lasting solution to the problem and pursued 
an active policy and supported a peaceful solution that would maintain the 
independence, unity and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
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3.2.2.1. The United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) 
Within the framework of efforts that Turkey made since the beginning of the crisis to 
contribute actively to the international community’s efforts and activities aimed at 
finding peaceful solutions to the Bosnian crisis, Turkey contributed to the decision of 
the formation of UNPROFOR and applied to the UN to make available its armed 
forces for UNPROFOR. However, Turkey’s request for participation in the 
UNPROFOR was not approved by the UNSC and in particular by Secretary-General 
Boutros Ghali in the beginning with reference to its traditional principal decision 
which impedes contribution of countries which have close historical ties with the 
region (Bosna-Hersek Gerçeği, 1995:50). Countries which did not approve Turkey’s 
contribution alleged that Turks are Muslims and the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
is taking place among Muslim Bosnians, Ortodox Serbians and Catholic Croatians. 
Therefore, it is difficult for Turkey not to take sides in this conflict. Another 
objection which had been raised by these countries against Turkey’s contribution was 
that Turkey had been a sovereign power in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the past 
(Akgönenç, 1997: 41, 44).  
Turkey exerted every effort to contribute to UNPROFOR. It sent both 
representatives and observers to the London Peace Conference held between 26-28 
August 1992.92 It also sent representatives to the second Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Peace Talks held in Geneva on 3 September 1992 (Bosna-Hersek Gerçeği, 1995:46). 
The new situation resulting from the massacre in Sarajevo and the ultimatum of 
the North Atlantic Council (NAC) on 9 February 1994 put the necessity of 
additional troops for UNPROFOR on the agenda (Bosna-Hersek Gerçeği, 
1995:50). In addition, Serbians stipulated that Russian troops should form a 
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buffer zone between them and the Bosnians in order to lift the siege around 
Sarejevo. Since Bosnian Muslims wanted to see Turkish soldiers in 
UNPROFOR, the approval of this stipulation put the contribution of Turkey to 
UNPROFOR on the agenda, in a way.  
Finally, on 22 March 1994, the UN sent a note to the Turkish permanent 
representative and invited Turkey to contribute to UNPROFOR in the direction of 
the common wills of the Bosnian and Croatian Governments and UNSC members. 
For urgent necessity that UNPROFOR force commander determined, the UN 
Secretary-General requested from Turkey a 2,700 man-sized contingent including a 
1,000 man-sized logistical battalion, a 500 man-sized engineering battalion and 1,200 
man-sized mechanized infantry battalion. Turkey declared its readiness to comply 
with the request, negotiated details of deployment and sent a committee to co-
ordinate with UNPROFOR officials (Bosna-Hersek Gerçeği, 1995:50). Later the 
UNSC adopted Resolution 908 (31 March 1994) referring to reinforcement of 
UNPROFOR with 3,500 troops because of the opposition of the US on the budget. 
The SC Resolution 908 (31 March 1994) provided that the number of Turkish troops 
would be “1,000 plus.” However, the SC adopted Resolution 914 on 27 April 1994 
referring to reinforcement of UNPROFOR with another 6,550 troops in addition to 
3,500 troops already committed. 
Within this framework, after Turkey’s efforts to contribute peacekeeping 
troops to UNPROFOR concluded positively, the first part of the Turkish contingent 
(mechanized infantry battalion reinforced with engineering and logistical units) 
arrived in Split, Croatia on 27 May 1994, and the greater part of the Turkish unit 
arrived in Split on 27 June 1994. The Turkish unit situated itself in Zenica and on 4 
August 1994, it took over its responsibility in the section of a US division as a 
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subunit of Multinational Division North (MND,N) (Akgönenç, 1997:42). Turkey 
contributed a regiment size Mechanized Task Force comprising of 1,450 personnel 
supported with sufficient combat service support and combat support units for 
UNPROFOR from 4 August 1994 to 31 December 1995. Since the beginning of its 
deployment, the Turkish contingent underwent six different organizational structures 
as mentioned below.93  
- Turkish Task Force                                           27 June 1994 
- Turkish Brigade                                                20 December 1995 
- Turkish Battalion Task Force                             1 April 2000 
- Turkish Battalion Task Force Reduction           6 September 2003 
- Turkish Battalion                                               8 June 2004 
- Multinational Maneuver Battalion                    2 December 2004 
Turkey believed that peace and security could be maintained in Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Kosovo only by means of the full implementation of the General 
Framework Agreement.94 In addition, it also believed that stability in the region 
could be established by taking substantial measures to return normality to social life. 
Therefore, Turkey also performed Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) activities in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the composition of Turkish Unit, there was a CIMIC unit 
and three mechanized infantry companies, which were supplied with different 
equipment than a standard mechanized infantry company and an additional 
mechanized infantry company (as a security company assigned to protect SFOR 
Headquarters). The combat units had a signal platoon, a signal intelligence team, a 
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tactical air control section and an engineering company. The combat service support 
units had a logistics support unit.  
The Turkish AOR was located at the intersection of the three Multinational 
Divisions of US, France and Canada and consisted of an area of 1,698 km. square. In 
the Turkish unit AOR, the population of Bosnia is Bosnian 78 percent, Croatian 10 
percent, Serbian 4 percent, and others including Albanians, Kosovar, Montenegrins, 
Gypsies and Sanjac citizens.95 The main part of the Unit was situated in Zenica while 
the Commander of the Turkish Regimental Task Force and guard company were 
positioned in Sarajevo. The national support unit was located in Split and the force 
protection team and liaison officers were at the US base in Tuzla. The tasks of the 
Turkish Unit were to monitor and enforce compliance with the cease-fire of the 
parties, to assume control of the situation for protecting its AOR from new conflicts, 
to protect their area of responsibility in the Zenica region from fear of armed attacks, 
to help create secure conditions for developing peace and to ensure and help the 
delivery of humanitarian assistance.96 
 
3.2.2.2. The Peace Implementation Force (IFOR) 
The Turkish unit to fulfill these tasks in its AOR was reinforced to the brigade size 
and assigned it to IFOR (Turkish General Staff, 2001:8). At the end of January in 
1996, a tank company, an artillery company and a mechanized infantry company to 
provide security for IFOR Headquarter joined the Turkish Regimental Task Force 
and it reorganized as a brigade. These developments did not affect the previous 
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deployment of the Turkish unit and it fulfilled its tasks without any change in its 
deployment. Since IFOR provided considerable developments in the peace process, 
SFOR, with reduced military presence, had a more ambitious mandate. The mandate 
that the UN gave not only included maintaining peace, but also enforcing it. Upon 
these developments, Turkey assigned its brigade in IFOR to SFOR, which took over 
the mission of IFOR. 
 
3.2.2.3. The Stabilization Force (SFOR) 
The Bosnia-Herzegovina Turkish Battalion Task Force (TBTF), which had been 
under the command of Turkish General Staff, joined the 28th Mechanized Infantry 
Brigade Command located in Mamak/Ankara at 13 September 1999. The TBTF 
served under the operational control97 of the US division. The other units of the US 
division were two US Battalion task forces, a US land-air brigade, NORDPOL 
(Norway, Denmark and Poland) combat group and a Russian brigade. In the 
beginning, there was a headquarter company, a mechanized infantry battalion, SFOR 
guard company, a tank company, an artillery company and logistics support battalion 
in the composition of the Turkish Unit.98 After the reorganization of SFOR, the 
Turkish brigade assigned to SFOR reduced to battalion size unit in this period 
(Turkish General Staff, 2001:8). The number of military personnel decreased from 
1,333 to 833 persons.  
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The Turkish unit fulfilled its tasks without any change in its deployment. The 
TBTF, comprised of two Mechanized infantry companies as maneuver units and a 
guard company, connected directly to SFOR headquarters. However, the guard 
company was commissioned to handle the security of barracks (Sokollu Mehmet 
Pasha and Butmir in Sarajevo) particularly where the SFOR headquarters had been 
located and it had no mission within the framework of peace operation activities. The 
national support unit had been located in Split/Divulje camp, the force protection 
team (with liaison officers) in Tuzla US base and the other units of TBTF had been 
located in Zenica Fatih Sultan Mehmet camp. Since the importance of the civilian 
military cooperation was increased and it played an important role for maintaining 
peace and stability, a unit of CIMIC was required and joined the TBTF composition. 
The tasks of the Turkish unit were99 to conduct a peace operation in its AOR 
by securing the protection of the force, to ensure military compliance in accordance 
with the General Framework Agreement for Peace; to ensure a safe and secure 
environment for the civil implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement by 
securing the protection of the force; to provide support to the activities of other 
international organizations and agencies; to stabilize and secure the environment in 
which local and national authorities and other international organizations worked, to 
patrol in the ZOS (day and night); to establish check points, to monitor and escort 
military activities of various groups; to carry out joint missions with the International 
Police Organization and to carry out joint patrolling with neighboring units. Within 
the framework of CIMIC activities, the tasks of the Turkish Unit were: to provide 
humanitarian assistance to refugees and displaced people who live in camps; to 
restore state infrastructure; to provide medical support to the thousands of people 
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who live suffering in war; to support in education and training, the thousands of 
Bosnian youth who are the future of the country; to facilitate the democratization 
process and to support state institutions and the rule of law.      
NATO ships belonging to the Alliance’s Standing Naval Force Mediterranean 
(STANAVFORMED) began monitoring operations in the Adriatic in July 1992. 
These operations were undertaken in support of the UN arms embargo against all 
republics of the former Yugoslavia (according to UNSC Resolution 713) and the 
sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) 
according to UNSC Resolution 757 (Hava Harp Akademisi Komutanlığı, 2004:7). 
The joint NATO/WEU Operation Sharp Guard began on 15 June 1993 replacing the 
separate NATO and WEU operations.100 Sharp Guard was performed by NATO 
STANAVFORMED in the Adriatic Sea in parallel with the operations of 
UNPROFOR and IFOR. To monitor and enforce compliance with UN sanctions in 
accordance with UNSC Resolutions, the Turkish Navy assigned 2 Frigates: one as a 
duty ship and the other as a support vessel (TCG Kocatepe a destroyer and a mine 
ship), and a Tanker and a Mine Sweeper to operation Sharp Guard. In total, 18 
frigates, 2 submarines, 4 tanker vessels and about 5,000 personnel participated in the 
operation from 13 July 1992 to 2 October 1996 when the operation ended (Turkish 
General Staff, 2001:9). 
Turkey participated in aerial monitoring and the implementation of the flight 
ban operations in the airspace of Bosnia-Herzegovina with 1 F-16 Squadron from 25 
April 1993 to 20 December 1995. In order to supervise the flight ban enforced by the 
UN on Bosnia-Herzegovina airspace, Turkey contributed to Operation Deny Flight 
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with a F16 Squadron consisting of 18 airplanes.  They were based at the Ghedi Air 
Base in Italy to support SFOR operations. First, this squadron was assigned to 
Operation Deny Flight and the Turkish aircraft flew more than 2,820 hours in this 
operation. From 14 October 1995, the number of aircraft has been gradually reduced 
to the current strength of 5 aircraft. In addition, 13 F-16s are assigned a 72 hours on-
call status in Turkey. In total, 12 F-16 fighter squadrons and 2,500 personnel 
participated in the operation from the beginning to the present.101 
Operation Active Endeavour evolved out of NATO’s immediate response to 
the terrorist attacks against the United States of 11 September 2001. Turkey, a 
longtime NATO ally and one of the strongest naval powers in the eastern 
Mediterranean, contributed to Operation Active Endeavour which began on 26 
October 2001 with a frigate and an oil tanker.  
 
3.2.2.4. EU-led Force (EUFOR)  
At its Summit on 28 June 2004, NATO had decided to bring SFOR to a conclusion 
by the end of the year as a result of the improved security situation in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and in the wider region. On 25 November, the EU Council adopted the 
decision to launch a military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina named EUFOR-
Operation Althea. This decision followed the unanimous adoption on 22 November 
2004 of UNSC Resolution 1575 and enabled the EU to launch Operation Althea on 2 
December 2004.102 
Under the EUFOR badge, Turkish troops are serving in three locations: as 
field troops, in the EUFOR headquarter and in the Integrated Police Unit (IPU) 
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regiment. Out of the 6,270 troops contributed to EUFOR, Turkey has some 350 
troops commited to EUFOR.103  The majority of the Turkish troops are deployed in 
Zenica, working in the Multinational Task Force North (MNTF (N)) which is 
commanded by Finnish officers, where they carry out the normal framework 
operations. In addition to this, there are some 40 military personnel located in 6 
different Liaison Observation Teams (LOT) providing the Commander of MNTF (N) 
with valuable situational awareness about the local communities. In both EUFOR 
and NATO headquarters there are 18 Turkish officers and NCO’s working in 
different positions. Twenty three Turkish Gendarmerie officers and NCO’s are part 
of the Integrated Police Unit. 
 
3.2.3. Kosovo Force (KFOR) 
Turkey also contributed to peace operations in Kosovo in the Balkans. The Kosovo 
Turkish Force was established in 1998. The Kosovo Turkish Battalion Task Force 
(Kosovo TBTF) Command was organized with the formation of other components 
under the joint command of the second Mechanized Infantry Battalion of the 28th 
Mechanized Infantry Brigade on 21 March 1999. The 987-troop TBTF, comprised of 
two Mechanized Infantry Companies, one Tank Company and elements of Combat 
Support Units, was equipped with the most modern arms, vehicles and equipment 
and was subjected to orientation military training aimed at carrying out peace 
operation missions.   
After completing its preparations, Kosovo TBTF set off to Kosovo from its 
camp in Mamak, Ankara on 1 July 1999 by air, railway and highway. It completed 
its transition on 4 July 1999 in Prizren and took over responsibility of its area, which 
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had a with large Turkish population (Prizren, Dragas and Mamusa regions), in 
Kosovo on 13 July 1999. Upon bilateral agreements, Azerbaijan and Georgian 
platoons joined the TBTF on 28 September 1999.104 Since 1999, the TBTF, including 
platoons from Azerbaijan and Georgia, have been conducting peace operations in its 
area of responsibility and exerting intensive efforts by mobilizing all its sources, to 
the people of Kosovo with no discrimination, in order to meet their urgent 
humanitarian requirements. The Kosovo TBTF is conducting its mission with 
Tactical Control given to the Multinational Brigade Southwest-MNB (SW) which is 
responsible for the Southwest sector. The MNB (SW) is comprised of task forces 
from 13 nations (Argentina, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Germany, 
Hungary, Italy, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland and Turkey).105  
The Turkish Battalion area of responsibility (AOR) covers downtown Dragash 
and 22 villages, the Mamusha area including 5 villages, and a district of downtown 
Prizren together with 6 surrounding villages.106 The length of the TBTF AOR border 
is 81 km. The AOR of the Turkish unit is 540 km2. The TBTF is unique KFOR unit 
because it has in its AOR, two neighboring countries. Although TBTF is officially 
called the “Dragash Battalion” among KFOR units, Turkey refers to it as the 
“Turkish Battalion”.107 The TBTF is deployed in five different camps. The majority 
of the TBTF is located in Sultan Murat Camp in Prizren, while one Mechanized 
Infantry Company is in the Dragash Area and another Mechanized Infantry Company 
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is in the Mamusha Area. Some units are deployed in Pristina at KFOR headquarter. 
Finally, the Maintenance platoon is in Skopje at KFOR headquarters Rear.  
Presently, the TBTF is composed of a Battalion Headquarters Company, two 
motorized infantry companies and one mechanized infantry company as a combat 
force. It also has one logistical support unit, Liaison and Observation Teams 
(LOT)108 and a National support unit. In addition, both Georgian and Azerbaijan 
platoons contribute to KFOR as a subunit of the TBTF in its AOR. One of the 
motorized infantry companies is deployed in Mamusa province, 13 km. north of 
Prizren, while the other motorized company is deployed in Dragas, 25 km. south of 
Prizren. The National support unit is situated in Pristine and the other units of the 
TBTF are situated in the Printex Factory in the Prizren region (Sultan Ahmet Camp). 
A team of the TBTF has also served for a month under the command of the French 
Brigade in Mitroviça region between September-October 2002. 
In parallel with the reduction of the policies of NATO units, the Kosovo TBTF 
reduced its size to 300 troops on 15 June 2002. The Tank Company and Combat 
Support Company in the formation of the TBTF were abolished and replaced by the 
6th Mechanized Infantry Company. The TBTF is currently comprised of 384 
personnel. In addition, 10 officers and 2 NCOs serve in critical and active positions 
at KFOR headquarter for a 6-month period. Turkey is tenth among the contributing 
countries of KFOR in terms of resources allocated.  
The mission of the TBTF was to ensure establishment and maintenance of 
peace and security within its area of responsibility and to take necessary measures in 
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order to remove every kind of factor which may hinder its mission in future.109 The 
main task of the Kosovo TBTF is to ensure and supervise the implementation of 
Resolution 1244 and the Military-Technical Agreement signed by NATO and the 
Republic of Federal Yugoslavia, and the responsibilities accepted by Serbian Forces 
and Kosovo Liberation Army with the aim of carrying out peace operation in its 
AOR. 
The tasks of the Turkish Contingent / MNB (SW) are two fold; Operational 
and Humanitarian as follows: Operationally: to deter Serbia from attacking Kosovo 
and to defend Kosovo in case of any aggression as a subunit of KFOR; to maintain 
peace and security within its area of responsibility, to provide a safe and secure 
environment for all citizens living in Kosovo; to ensure the region and border 
security of Kosovo; to conduct patrol and maintain checkpoint; to monitor, 
reconnaissance and patrol within its area of responsibility and on the zone of 
separation; to conduct point and area operations; to conduct search operations; to 
monitor the DRAGAS and TUZSUZ quarter in Prizren; to continue force protection 
and military training; to win and reinforce the confidence of the population in its 
AOR for Turkish Republic, Turkish Armed Forces and KFOR, and; to perform 
military exercises for  improving and maintaining sufficient combat force.110  
In humanitarian terms the main task was to work in cooperation with 
international organizations such as UNICEF, UNMIK, OSCE and NGOs within its 
area of responsibility. Others were limited to medical care by military doctors, 
distribution of the humanitarian aid or food, firewood, educational materials, 
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educational programs, infrastructure construction, school repair work, medical care 
by military doctors.111   
As for the Operation Allied Force, Turkey contributed to this force through 
two means. It assigned one F-16 Fighter Squadrons consisting of 10 F-16 aircraft.112  
They were based in Ghedi Air base in Italy and then NATO asked Turkey to 
contribute additional aircraft and air bases. Upon these requests, Turkey assigned its 
second F-16 Fighter Squadron including 8 air craft and three tanker crafts as “on-
call” status in Bandırma air base and it opened its air bases including Bandırma, 
Balıkesir and Çorlu air bases as a second means. NATO planned to deploy 36 F-16 
aircraft to Bandırma, 62 F-15 to Balıkesir and 9 tanker aircraft to Çorlu airbases. As 
12 F-16 aircraft were being deployed to Bandırma Airbase the peace agreement was 
signed, the deployment plan was cancelled, and the allied aircraft redeployed. Turkey 
also assigned frigates, destroyers, and tanker and minesweeper vessels to support 
these operations (Turkish General Staff, 2001:10-12).  
For the Essential Harvest Operation in Macedonia, a multinational force was 
established to disarm the armed militants in Macedonia. Turkey assigned a company 
to this force and this force became a subunit of the TBTF. The Turkish company 
served under the tactical control of the Italian Battalion from 11 to 23 September in 
2001. After fulfilling its task successfully, the Turkish company returned to Turkey 
on 27 September 2001. Turkey also participated in Operation Amber Fox with staff 
elements (4 persons) between 27 September 2001 and 14 December 2002.  
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3.2.4. International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan (ISAF) 
When it became clear that the September 11 attacks had originated from 
Afghanistan, the United States invoked Article V of NATO’s Charter and launched a 
military operation, Operation Enduring Freedom, against the Taliban and the al-
Qaeda. When Taliban rule in Afghanistan came to an end, it became possible to 
launch international initiatives to rebuild the country, and to send a multinational 
peacekeeping force to Afghanistan. Turkey showed its willingness to participate, 
even to lead, in the multinational peacekeeping force for the reconstruction of 
Afghanistan. Turkey was among the first countries to announce its wish to 
participate. Turkish soldiers serving in Afghanistan received enthusiastic support 
among the public.  
Turkish officials have argued that in the present unstable international 
environment peacekeeping is an inadequate form of ensuring security against 
aggression. They preferred peacemaking or peace enforcement mechanisms (Kirişçi, 
1994:34). The Turkish government was quick to obtain parliamentary authorization 
in October 2001 to contribute troops to the U.S. campaign. The bill, which was met 
with public opposition (Turkish Daily News, 4 October 2001), also authorized the 
government to allow the stationing of foreign troops on Turkish territory and permit 
the use of Turkish airspace and airbases.113 Turkey emerged as one of the leading 
actors in the fight against terrorism; hence, it rigorously supported the international 
coalition. The Turkish government decided to contribute to the campaign by sending 
a unit of Special Forces to work with U.S. troops in humanitarian operations and 
train Northern Alliance fighters.   
                                               
113
  Turkey had already provided the U.S. with overflight rights in September shortly after the attacks: 
"Turkey opens airspace to US," BBC News Online, 22 September, 2001. 
  129 
Within this framework, Turkey assumed the lead-nation role and took over 
the command of the ISAF II on June 20, 2002 for a period of six months in 
accordance with the decision of the Turkish government on 29 April 2002 and the 
adoption of the SCR 1413 of the UN on 23 May 2002. Personnel joined to the 28th 
Mechanized Brigade in Mamak/Ankara on 13 May 2002. The Turkish Battalion Task 
Force completed the preparations with its 624 personnel within the 28th Mechanized 
Brigade. Personnel were trained and informed about the organization, mission and 
mandates of ISAF and UN resolutions on ISAF for a three-week period. During this 
period of time, all personnel underwent medical testing and were vaccinated. The 
TBTF set off to Afghanistan from Mamak in Ankara on 4 June 2002 and took over 
responsibility of its area in Afghanistan on 30 June 2002. Since then, the TBTF has 
been conducting peace operation in its area of responsibility.   
Turkish Battalion Task Force units were deployed in 10 camps; ISAF 
Headquarter camp, Kabul MNB camp, Kabul Airport Command camp, Turkish 
Battalion Task Force camp, 1st Turkish Company camp, 2nd Turkish Company camp, 
3rd Turkish Company camp, Multinational Engineering Group camp and TV Height 
camp. A Turkish mechanized infantry brigade was deployed in Kabul. Turkish troops 
also have relieved forces from Iceland that have been responsible for security at 
ISAF's main logistical hub at Kabul Airport. In addition, both Albanian and 
Azerbaijan platoons contribute to ISAF as a subunit of the TBTF in its area of 
responsibility. During Turkey’s tenure, ISAF VII troops were also deployed for the 
first time into parts of western Afghanistan, where rival militias have clashed 
repeatedly during the past three years. 
The contribution of Turkey to ISAF began with a company sized unit 
comprised of approaximately 300 soldiers and staff officers commisioned to the 
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ISAF and KMNB Headquarters on 19 February 2002. It also consisted of Azerbaijan 
and Albanian teams serving under the command of Turkish companies and 2 
Macedonian officers serving in the Turkish Battalion Command. Furthermore, 
Turkey contributed nearly 270 troops to ISAF for the first six months and boosted its 
troops by 1000 after Turkey accepted command of the force.  
Turkey initially deployed about 300 Special Forces troops in and around 
Kabul. In June 2002, Turkey assumed command of the NATO-led International 
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, a multinational UN-mandated 
force for six months, to assist the Afghan government and the international 
community in maintaining security. After taking command of ISAF II, Turkey 
increased the number of its soldiers to 1,400 making it the largest contingent in the 
peacekeeping force. This number consisted of the TBTF reinforced with combat 
support and service, officers commissioned in the ISAF and KMNB Headquarters 
and Kabul Airport. Normally, Turkey should have handed over command of ISAF on 
20 December 2002, but no country was ready to make this commitment. So, the 
UNSC extended Turkish leadership until 10 February 2003 (Zorlu, 2003:36). On 10 
February 2003, Turkey turned over leadership to the joint command of Germany and 
the Netherlands. After turning over command, Turkey has continued to support ISAF 
with a 180-man military unit. In May 2004, Turkey sent three helicopters and 56 
flight and maintenance personnel to work in ISAF. After taking command of ISAF 
VII on 13 February 2005, Turkey increased the number of its soldiers from 240 to 
1,600 in Kabul.114  
Currently, Turkey participates in the NATO-led ISAF operation in 
Afghanistan with 180 officers and NCOs and 555 troops, including 3 utility 
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helicopters (UH-60) and support personnel. In addition, 9 Turkish civilians are 
deployed to help man the Kabul International Airport. Moreover, since January 2004, 
Mr. Hikmet Çetin, ex-Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, has served as the Senior 
Civilian Representative of NATO in Kabul, thus making use of the privileges of a 
long-lasting Turkish-Afghan friendship with the aim of furthering the Alliance’s goal 
of establishing peace and stability in Afghanistan. On August 2005, Turkey turned 
over leadership to Italy.   
The task of the contingent in Afghanistan was to contribute to peace and 
security of the Afghan people and the stability and welfare of Afghanistan. Turkish 
command gave first priority, during the course of its term of duty, to help the Afghan 
Transitional Government to ensure security and stability in Kabul and its environs 
(Yeğenoğlu, 2005). In practice the tasks of the TBTF are; providing security for its 
own units, establishing check points, monitoring and patrolling within its area of 
responsibility and on the zone of seperation, conducting point and area operations, 
carrying out info operation, contributing to CIMIC activities, advising military and 
police training and running the military part of the Kabul airport.115 Patrolling teams 
of the TBTF carried out the tasks as follows: representing the Turkish Republic and 
Turkish Armed Forces in the best way, providing full control in the AOR, assisting 
in providing a secure environment in coordination and cooperation with local 
security forces, gathering information, establishing communication between ISAF 
and local people and determining the reaction of the local people to the existing 
applications. 
The push toward the transformation of Turkish armed forces in a 
peacekeeping friendly manner and the decision to send Turkish troops abroad has 
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mainly come from the military. Before his appointment as Chief of the General Staff 
in 1998, then Land Forces Commander General, Hüseyin Kıvrıkoğlu argued that the 
military must become a “force primarily used against external and internal threats 
that target Turkey’s territorial integrity and the republic regime.” Kıvrıkoğlu moved 
beyond a mission of deterrence and strategic defense to say that the “rapid 
deployment of the military in distant places is of vital importance in view of the 
threats we face and the risks and responsibilities that we may assume.” He outlined a 
modernization program to provide strategic mobility for joint operations to strike 
beyond Turkey’s borders.116  
Kıvrıkoğlu stated that Turkey needed to develop operational capabilities for 
‘forward engagement’ and ‘forward defense’ in addition to deterrence and collective 
security.117 The White Paper 2000 of the Ministry of National Defense demonstrates 
the changes in the Turkish military and in Turkey’s foreign policy. According to this 
book, Turkey’s military strategy rests on four distinct points; deterrence, collective 
security, forward defense and military contribution to crisis management and 
intervention in crises. The last two points reflect a departure from previous 
strategies.118 In 2000, then Foreign Minister İsmail Cem argued that “being well 
aware of our global and regional role in the pursuit of peace, prosperity and stability, 
our policy in this regard has been to help reduce tensions and contain conflicts, to 
encourage the propagation of democracy and the rule of law, with a view to creating 
                                               
116
 “KKK ve Kuvvet 2000, Söyleşi,” Savunma Ve Havacılık, Mönch Publishing Group, 12(3):10-18 
 
117
 Ulusal Strateji, March-April 1999, 68-73 
 
118
 White Paper, 2000:36 
http://www.msb.gov.tr/Birimler/GnPPD/GnPPDBeyazKitap.htm#WHITE%20PAPER 
  133 
a peaceful and stable environment around us.” For this reason Turkey has been 
actively involved in peace operations and multinational efforts.119 
 
3.3. Explaining Turkey’s Participation in Peace Operations 
Having examined the cases involving the deployment of Turkish troops abroad, this 
section will analyze different sets of motivations behind Turkey’s participation in 
peace operations. Turkey’s approach to peace operations has been, to a significant 
degree, informed by the ideational concern of being recognized as a member of the 
western international community. Participation in such operations has been an 
identity-constructing activity in the sense that Turkey has tried to reinforce its 
eroding western identity through participating in peace operations. Despite this 
ideational motivation, alternative explanations can also be offered as to why Turkey 
has been increasingly involved in peace operations. Theoretically speaking, security-
related considerations in a neo-realist vein may offer a rival account. Another 
explanation might prioritize the efforts of pressure groups and domestic factors 
inside the country as the main motivating factor. 
 
3.3.1. Security-related Factors  
This explanation is based on the assumption that Turkey’s participation in peace 
operations has been a function of its security needs. These factors may be discussed 
under the subheadings: Political-Strategic; Turkey’s Security Challenges and 
Security Culture; Importance of the Balkans; Organizational Factor and Operational 
Factor. 
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3.3.1.1. Political-Strategic 
The post-Cold War era marked the downfall of the bipolar system that had governed 
the understanding and conduct of international relations since the end of the Second 
World War (Mawlawi, 1993: 391-413). With the end of the Cold War, the 
international system changed from a rigid bipolar’ system to a fluid, interim, 
transforming and globalizing international society. The two superpowers of the Cold 
War, the United States and the Soviet Union, agreed to undertake joint efforts to 
contain regional conflicts rather than preventing the UN from taking effective action. 
This led to the revitalization of the Security Council and the revival of the UN to 
maintain peace and security.  
The UN has two main purposes. The first is to establish and maintain 
international peace and security. The second is to improve the political, economic, 
and social justice of the world’s peoples. During the Cold War, the first purpose was 
more important than the second for the UN because of the conditions of the 
international system. The most important values of the UN were the sovereignty and 
the territorial integrity of the states as elaborated above. Because of the nature of the 
bipolar system, the UN could not concentrate on the second purpose and was not 
concerned with issues such as human security, the protection of human rights, the 
internal aspects of self-determination and social and economic development.   
International systemic changes of the post-Cold War have put the UN in a 
significantly different situation from the Cold War. Nations that have been oppressed 
during the Cold War discovered an opportunity for independence in the post-Cold 
War era. Thus, values such as human rights, self-determination, the rule of law, and 
fostering social and economic cooperation became more important than the values of 
sovereignty and territorial integrity. The interpretation of the principle of self-
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determination went beyond decolonization. Pursuing objectives like respect for 
human rights and the rule of law required greater intrusion into the domestic affairs 
of states than does the maintenance of peace. The UN Security Council interpreted 
the UN Charter in a more flexible way. Thus, humanitarian intervention came to the 
forefront. 
The end of the Cold War affected the states as well. Developed states have 
realized that in order to continue improving world living conditions they need 
security and stability. Therefore, developed countries are naturally extremely 
concerned about maintaining a stable and secure world, by preventing conflicts or at 
least containing them as fast as possible. Since the power configuration is not so rigid 
as in the Cold War era, states can easily maneuver in the post-Cold War. In order to 
show their respect for the values of the United Nations, developed nations actively 
participated in peace operations. Turkey is one of the countries that were most deeply 
affected by the changes in the international system and new values of the post-Cold 
War. 
When the systemic changes following the dissolution of the Soviet Union 
increased Turkey’s vulnerability to regional security concerns, Ankara growingly 
saw involvement in peace operations, as well as developing its peace keeping 
capabilities, as an effective security strategy. In this view, the disintegration of the 
Soviet Union, the transformation of the political and strategic landscape of Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia and the eruption of violent ethno-national conflicts in the 
Balkans and the Caucasus affected Turkey negatively (Sayarı, 2000:169-182). 
Turkey found itself at the very center of crises areas, where ultra-nationalist, 
aggressive and irredentist tendencies were vibrant. Unlike the Cold War era, Turkey 
geopolitically has become a unique country bordering several regions very different 
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from each other (Kirişçi, 1997:1). The new security environment created a range of 
opportunities on the one hand, but posed new risks and different kinds of security 
challenges for Turkish security policy on the other hand. In contrast with the Cold 
War era, Turkey’s security concerns increased, its security burden became 
overloaded, and the new security issues influenced Turkey’s security understanding. 
 
3.3.1.2. Turkey’s Security Challenges and Security Culture 
The post-Cold War era confronts Turkish security with a series of potential risks and 
threats not common to the Cold War era (Sezer, 1995:169). Turkey’s security 
challenges have changed in fundamental ways in the post-Cold War era. Turkey’s 
security horizons are now much wider than they were during the Cold War. First of 
all, challenges to Turkey’s security and foreign policy have been multidirectional. 
The changes in the post-Cold War era steered Turkey’s attention toward the Balkans, 
the Middle East, the Black Sea, Caucasus and Central Asia (Kirişçi, 1997:16). In 
parallel to such tectonic changes in Turkey’s neighbourhood, not only have 
traditional threats to Turkey’s security increased, but Turkey has also become 
increasingly exposed to the side effects of intra-state conflicts in all of these regions. 
As a result, since the end of the Cold War, the new risks and challenges that could 
affect the western world have fundamentally transformed Turkey from ‘flank’ to a 
‘front state.’ Turkey is one of the few western countries whose importance has 
increased in the post-Cold War period (Bir, 1998). Turkey suddenly appears to have 
been propelled to the forefront of international politics (Kirişçi, 1994:1). 
There are sixteen potential crisis areas as determined by NATO experts: 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Sandjak, Kosova, Albania, Macedonia, Nagorno-Karabagh in 
Azerbaijan, Chechnya, Abkhazia in Georgia, Georgia-South Ossetia, Northern Iraq, 
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Iran, Syria, Cyprus, Vojvodina, Privlaka and Belarus (Bağcı, 2001:596). Indeed, 13 
of the 16 conflict scenarios are said to involve regions in the immediate periphery of 
Turkey. The Balkans, the Caucasus and the Middle East are regions around Turkey 
and any possible future international intervention in one of these areas would have 
direct implications for Turkey’s national security interests (Öymen, 2001:56). 
Kibaroğlu (2002) argues that six of these scenarios require direct involvement by 
Turkey. It has come under the impact of the some of these crises and wars in the 
region during the 1990s such as the 1990-1991 Gulf War, the Bosnia-Serbia war of 
1992-1995, the Kosovo problem, the Armenian invasion of Azerbaijani territory, the 
Abkhazian problem in Georgia, the Russian involvement in the Caucasus problems 
and the Chechnya uprising. In addition, its unresolved dispute with Greece over 
Cyprus and the Aegean pose serious security risks. 
The Gulf War created some serious dangers for Turkey. This war created a 
power vacuum in the region. The breakdown of regional order and stability that 
began with the Bosnian crisis and continued with the Kosovo conflict placed the 
Balkans high on the agenda of Turkey’s regional security concerns. Turkey is 
exposed to spillover risks associated with instability in the Russian near-abroad since 
the ethnic fighting took place close to its borders and involved Turkic and other 
Muslim peoples with whom Turkey has historic ties.  
During the Cold War, Turkey was concerned by the existence of a direct 
military attack by an enemy. In the post-Cold War era, not only hard-security 
concerns remained relevant but also soft-security issues have increasingly occupied 
Turkey’s security agenda. Soft security issues such as, ethnic nationalism, religious 
fundamentalism, ethnic or religious terrorism, social and economic instabilities, 
illicit trafficking of arms and drugs, refugees and illegal migration became issues of 
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concern. These issues occupy Turkey’s security agenda more than ever before. For 
the first time since the Second World War, Ankara faced sudden mass movements of 
refugees into the country (Kirişçi, 1994:20). 
The proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) that is strongly 
believed to exist in the Middle East is another concern to Turkey (Kibaroğlu, 
1998:173). Turkey is within range of all sorts of WMD that could be launched from 
Iran, Iraq, and Syria and this exposure is likely to grow in the future as more 
countries in the region acquire ballistic missile technology and the capability to 
deploy WMD (Egeli, 1993:8). The absence of Turkish anti-missile capability makes 
Turkey vulnerable to its three Middle Eastern neighbors amply equipped with WMD 
(Kirişçi, 1998:22). Ankara sees various kinds of terrorism as one of the greatest 
threats to its national and global security interests. Moreover, Turkey has faced 
domestic challenges from Kurdish separatists. The emergence of a power vacuum in 
northern Iraq following the first Gulf War increased Turkey’s exposure to PKK 
terrorist attacks. Finally, its security has been challenged by the multi-
institutionalization of the international security architecture in Europe. During the 
Cold War years, NATO was the only security framework to protect Turkey’s 
security. In the new era, although NATO is still the most important one, there 
emerged new organizations with security agendas in addition to NATO.  
These challenges to Turkey’s foreign and security policy led to fundamental 
changes in Turkey’s national security culture and have made it possible for Turkey to 
consider more flexible regional policies (Karaosmanoğlu, 2000:210) and to pay more 
attention to regional cooperative security and multilateralism in foreign affairs. 
Turkey modified some of its traditional foreign policy principles and undertook new 
initiatives to meet the challenges of the post-Cold War era (Sayarı, 2000:169). In the 
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aftermath of the Cold War, Turkish foreign policy gradually lost its reactive 
characteristics and became increasingly active and assertive in international politics 
(Kirişçi, 1994:10). Minister of Defence Hikmet Sami Türk concurs: Geographic 
destiny placed Turkey in the virtual epicentre of a ‘Bermuda Triangle’ of post-Cold 
War volatility and uncertainty, with the Balkans, the Caucasus, and the Middle East 
encircling us. Rather than isolating ourselves from the pressing conflicts at our 
doorstep, Turkey decided to assume a pivotal role in promoting regional peace, 
stability and cooperation in contributing to vital efforts to end human suffering and 
conflict.120 
After the Cold War, since the changing circumstances have bestowed upon 
Turkey a special responsibility to actively contribute to the preservation of regional 
and global peace and stability, Turkey began to pay particular attention to joint 
action and cooperation in regional problems and incidents that occur in different 
areas of the world, military partnership agreements (Udum, 2002:73), regional 
cooperative security and multilateralism in foreign affairs. Turkey’s interest in 
cooperative security and multilateralism extended from its willing involvement in the 
Gulf War and participation in peace operations to the initiation of regional 
arrangements such as the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (Karaosmanoğlu, 
2000:210).  
 
3.3.1.3. Importance of the Balkans 
It is in such a context that the Balkans became the first area where Turkey played an 
influential role in peacekeeping diplomacy. Following the fragmentation of 
Yugoslavia, regional stability was seriously undermined. Violent ethno nationalist 
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conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo increased the possibility that a major conflict could 
spill over into Turkey. To prevent the escalation of the conflicts in the Balkans, 
Turkey embarked on an activist diplomacy (Çalış, 2001:135-146). Turkey advocated 
strong measures against Serbia and Serbian militias. The Turkish government had 
been very active in raising the issue in variety of forums ranging from the Islamic 
Conference Organization (ICO) to the Conference on Security and Cooperation 
(CSCE). At these forums the Turkish government expressed its readiness to 
contribute troops to any peacekeeping force that would be established. This was the 
first time that Turkey declared its willingness to join an international force since 
1950 (Kirişçi, 1994:1-43). 
The Balkans has been a fertile ground for conflicts that have characterized the 
fundamental change in the political and security environment in the region during the 
post-Cold War era. Turkey attached importance to the creation of an atmosphere of 
understanding and peaceful co-habitation through closer ties among the Balkan 
countries, which would lead to the preservation of peace and stability in the region. 
Thus, Turkey’s approach to the conflicts in the Balkans has not been confined to 
merely the cessation of hostilities, but has also pursued a policy aimed at creating a 
durable climate of understanding conducive to cooperation across the region. In this 
respect, Turkey has been at the forefront of international efforts to settle the Bosnian 
and Kosovo conflicts.121 Since the outbreak of conflicts in Kosovo, Turkey has 
insistently called on the international community for the prevention of further 
atrocities and tragedies and urged the finding of a just and lasting solution to the 
problem. It pursued an active policy and supported a peaceful solution that would 
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maintain the independence, unity and territorial integrity of Kosovo.122 The Balkans, 
as a region, has played a significant role in European and world history. This 
strategically sensitive region is Turkey’s gateway to continental Europe. 
The Balkan Peninsula is of great importance to Turkey, due to its links with 
Europe. It is an important bridge to Europe for Turkey. Ankara has legitimate 
interests in the arrangements that are being worked out in the area. It has a 
benevolent, real and important influence in serving the interests of peace and stability 
in this part of the world. Turkey has major interests in terms of its security in 
maintaining peace and security in the Balkans (Hava Harp Akademisi Komutanlığı, 
2004: 9). If a lasting peace had not been established and the peace process comes to a 
dead end, the fighting may spread to Muslim areas of Sandzak on the Serbian 
Montenegro border and from there to Kosovo. Albania may also intervene to protect 
the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. As the Republic of Macedonia has a 30 per cent 
Albanian population, it might join in. Greece might then assist Serbia while Turkey 
and Bulgaria may enter to assist Bosnia (Sharp, 1993:31). So events may progress in 
a direction that Turkey does not wish and thus pose a threat to Turkey’s security. 
Turkey’s efforts to pursue a more assertive role in the Balkans, particularly by 
joining the peace operations, also reflected the impact of Turkish-Greek strategic 
rivalry on Ankara’s decisions. Greece was the only country that could compete with 
Turkey regarding political and economic influence in the region (Oğuzlu, 2003: 45-
62). Turkey’s present approach to peace operations in the Balkans has been 
influenced to an extent, by its past experiences with Greece. Greece pursued 
irredentist Pan-hellenic policies or the Megali Idea which aimed at unifying all 
Greeks. Implications of Balkan nationalism left its imprint on current Turkish-Greek 
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relations, creating a mutual distrust between the two nations. Given that one of the 
pillars of Turkey’s security culture consists of the continuation of the strategic 
balance with Greece in and around the Balkans, the Aegean Sea and Cyprus, 
Turkey’s participation in peace operations in these regions would result in the gain of 
its relative strategic advantages vis-à-vis Greece. 
Turkey pursued peace and stability in its region and contributed to peace 
operations in Kosovo in order to help the settlement of the refugees and to heal the 
wounds caused by humanitarian disaster. It perceived that developments in Kosovo 
were products of a revisionist policy and this policy has provided crimes against 
humanity. Therefore, Kosovo problem should be prevented from escalating more.123 
From this perspective, Turkey’s participation in peace operations in the Balkans and 
the Caucaus can also be seen as a strategic action aiming at helping bolster Turkey’s 
regional standings vis-a-vis other regional actors, namely Greece in the Balkans and 
Russia in Caucasus. The rise of the new Turkic republics in Central Asia and the 
Caucasus after the disintegration of the former Soviet Union provided Turkey with 
another important opportunity to expand its regional influence through an activist 
foreign policy (Sayarı, 2000:172). Throughout the Cold War period, Turkey’s 
relations with Central Asia and the Caucasus were almost nonexistent despite 
common ethnic and cultural ties. Turkey wants to keep good relations with these 
countries and help them resolve disputes through peaceful means in the post-Cold 
War era. The eruption of ethnic and secessionist conflicts in Georgia, Nagorno-
Karabakh and Chechnya raised Turkish concerns about their impact on stability and 
energy security in the Caucasus (Sayarı, 2000:173).  
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3.3.1.4. Organizational Factor 
In response to Turkey’s growing exposure to a constellation of hard and soft security 
threats, Turkey’s security policy makers should have increasingly found it necessary 
to improve the operational capabilities of the TAF. Turkey’s attainment of soft and 
hard military security capabilities would make it a more credible and influencial 
power in the region. In parallel to the concept of forward defense, Turkish security 
policy makers should have found it necessary to transform the TAF from a conscript 
based conventional army into a professionalizing army consisting of highly mobile 
and technologically equipped military units (Hickok, 2000: 105-120).  
However, the critical point here is that the transformation of the Turkish 
Armed Forces with a view to dealing with new type of security threats would be seen 
more legitimate were this transformation process carried out as part of Turkey’s 
efforts to join peacekeeping operations organized under the leadership of the western 
international community. This is an instrumentalist approach to peacekeeping. The 
goal is to help legitimize Turkey’s efforts to modernize its army, not to eliminate 
possible sources of insecurity.    
Turkey’s participation in peace operations could be mainly attributed to the 
patterns of the Turkish post-Cold War security culture that in Karaosmanoğlu’s 
(2000) terms could be characterized as “defensive realpolitic” aiming at the 
preservation of the balance of power and status quo. Turkey’s security culture has 
been a facilitator factor in this regard. If a peacekeeping is envisaged to contribute to 
the smooth functioning of the balance of power system (regional or global), then it 
should not impair the validity of the rights, claims, or position of the parties 
concerned. It should essentially defend the status quo (Karaosmanoğlu, 2002:91).  
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Turkey has a large standing army with accumulated experience in 
peacekeeping and as such it could spare its troops for such a mission (Makovsky, 
2002: 42, 44). The presence of Turkish soldiers in peace operations wouldn’t be only 
a success but also for prestige. The TAF could show its military capabilities to the 
other countries contributing troops and to the world for deterrence. By contributing 
to peace operations, Turkey wants to increase the respect of its armed forces much 
more among the other countries’ armed forces. The contribution to UNOSOM II 
would gain prestige for Turkey in the international arena. The Turkish Republics in 
Central Asia, which share historic, cultural, religious and language links with 
Turkey, were about to gain their independence from the USSR. In the international 
arena, the positive situation, which resulted from the close links of Turkey with the 
Turkish Republics, would be more reinforced by contributing to UNOSOM and the 
assignment of General Çevik Bir as commander to UNOSOM II.   
The operation in Afghanistan shows that Turkey is a significant component of 
not only its region, but also world security environment. Turkey’s taking over the 
command of ISAF VII is the result of NATO’s commitments. By making the 
strategic decision to take part in the Bosnian crisis actively by contributing to the UN 
and NATO forces also in the military realm, Turkey wants to have a say politically 
as well in the future political landscape of not only Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also 
the Balkans (Hava Harp Akademisi Komutanlığı, 2004:9). The active participation of 
Turkey in IFOR, SFOR EUFOR, KFOR and ISAF was in line with its policy on 
peace operations, as it evolved in the post-Cold War era with its participation in 
UNOSOM II. This was in full harmony with the prevailing security understanding of 
the time period under consideration. This time, through participating in the peace 
operations aforementioned, it could show its military capabilities and ability to 
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project power abroad, and thus expand the Turkish sphere of influence (Bağcı and 
Kardaş, 2003:5). Earlier, Turkey focused strictly on protecting borders and 
maintaining internal order during the Cold War era instead of projecting power and 
contributing to peace operations.  
Apart from Turkey’s limited participation in Somalia, Turkey’s role in the 
ISAF II can be considered as the first example of Turkey’s command of a 
multinational peacekeeping force. The Turkish Army wanted to have the chance to 
prove that it could be successful as a regional power in order to assume greater 
responsibilities. By making this strategic decision and taking an active role in the 
military realm, Turkey sought to have a say in the future political landscape of not 
only Afghanistan, but also Central Asia. As in the cases of Somalia, Bosnia, Kosova 
and Afghanistan, Turkey wants to improve the capabilities of its armed forces 
through carrying out operations in different geographical areas and climatic 
conditions by participating actively in peace operations in these regions. Because 
peace operations demand special expertise, Turkey’s involvement in peace 
operations in Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan was hoped to increase the 
professionalization of the Turkish Armed Forces. 
Through participating actively in the peace operation in Somalia, the Turkish 
Army would gain international experience in peace operations, which it could not 
gain during the Cold War era. It could also share its capabilities with other troop 
contributing countries and benefit from their experiences in peace operations. 
Turkish army personnel would gain international experience and improve their 
English language skills, to enhance the international experience of the Turkish Army 
related to peace operations, to increase the prestige of Turkish Army among other 
countries’ armies. Operations in the Balkans and Afghanistan show that Turkey is an 
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important element not only for the security environment of its region but also the 
security environment of the world. 
 
3.3.1.5. Operational Factor 
Turkey wants to show that the Turkish Army has accumulated experience, 
knowledge and the ability to make plans at the operational and strategic level and 
carry out these plans in multinational operations and conflictual situations. 
Contributing to ISAF would increase the Turkish Army’s experience in peace 
operations carried out in an international environment. Most of all, Turkey would 
rise to be in a position of a “planning country” rather than a “supporting country.” As 
Turkey is a country located in the middle of current and potential conflicts, the TAF 
has become familiar with many kinds of threats, especially in the context of terrorism 
for many years. The TAF is the one military force who gained the most training, 
experience and success in the struggle against terrorism in the world.124 Turkey 
succeeded in beating the terrorists inside and ensured peace at home. The success 
would boost its respect in the international arena, particularly in its region, and it 
might play bigger roles in peace operations in the future. It would find an opportunity 
to share its experiences with terrorism with the other countries’ armies and to benefit 
from their experiences.  
Turkey wanted to contribute to peace operations in Afghanistan to share its 
expertise and experiences about terrorism with other countries and to benefit from 
the experiences of other countries, as well. Additionally, contributing to ISAF would 
provide an important deterrent for similar terrorist activities which might happen in 
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Turkey. Through participating in peace operations in Afghanistan, Turkey had the 
chance to contribute its concrete support to the war against terrorism. It suffered 
from terrorism for more than 30 years and lost thousands of its citizens. The decision 
to assume command of ISAF demonstrated Turkey’s willingness to assume a 
leadership role in the war against terrorism and its resolve to combat terrorism.  
This dissertation argues that even though Turkey’s security has come under 
serious challenges because of regional developments, this cannot convincingly 
explain Turkey’s participation in peace operations. Stated somewhat differently, such 
regional security threats are not compelling enough as the primary factor for Turkey 
to seek its security through peace operations. Ankara has not behaved as such in 
order to increase its security. Due to its well-established security culture, members of 
the Turkish military and foreign policy elites have tended to think that their country’s 
participation in peace operations was the result of close strategic security relations 
with the European powers within NATO (Aydın, 2003a:163-184 and Aydın, 2003b: 
306-331).  
Turkey did not join peace operations because it felt itself threatened by the 
developments in those nearly crisis situations. Neither the crisis in the Balkans nor in 
Caucasus seriously threatened Turkey’s vital security interests. Besides, Turkey’s 
own conventional military capabilities would likely deter possible aggressors. 
Moreover, how could the neo-realist logic explain Turkey’s active involvement in 
the US led peace operations in Somalia or in Afghanistan where Turkey did not have 
clear security interests, but probably only some indirect concerns? This remains a 
puzzle.  
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3.3.2. Domestic Factors  
This explanation is based on the assumption that Turkey’s participation in peace 
operations has been a function of its domestic factors. These factors may be 
discussed under the subheadings as: Public Opinion and Pressure Groups; Historical 
and Cultural Factors; Religion; Refugees and Economics. 
 
3.3.2.1. Public Opinion and Pressure Groups 
Another set of factors accounting for Turkey’s involvement in peace operations in 
the post-Cold War era has been the role of public opinion combined with the 
evolving concerns of security elites. These factors suggest that ethnic conflicts in its 
neighborhood generated extensive concern in Turkey due to the presence of large 
numbers of Turks who had immigrated from nearby regions, particularly the 
Balkans, over the years (Çelikpala, 2006:423-446). Indeed, in Turkey, civil society 
institutions are not only relatively weak, but have not been interested in security 
issues for most of the Republic’s history. Although in recent years there has been an 
upsurge of interest in foreign policy issues, due to ‘lobbies drawn from communities 
within Turkey that trace their origins to such place as Bosnia or Azerbaijan’ (Lesser 
2000: 184) and a coalition of civil society actors pushing for EU membership, a 
similar dynamism is not observed in issues  involving security and defence. Ankara’s 
security concerns regarding the Balkans have two dimensions. One is related to the 
traditional rivalries between the Balkan states, such as, for example, the Turkish-
Greek conflict. The other dimension is concerned with the security of 
Turkish/Muslim minorities. These dimensions seem to be related to Turkey’s 
participation in Balkans peace operations. 
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Some people in the Balkans have been drawn to Turkey for national, 
historical, cultural and religious reasons. In particular, Bosnians and Kosovars have 
always been closer to Turkey than other countries in the region and expected support 
from Turkey. Turks themselves are also an important ethnic minority in the region. 
Today, according to the 1994 census, about 77,000 Turks live in the Republic of 
Macedonia. In Kosovo, their number is estimated to be around 60,000, although the 
1981 census put their number at around 11,000 (Kut, 2000:51).125 According to this 
census in Kosovo, the Turkish population is centered in Prizren and its village 
Mamusa. The Turkish migration from Prizren to Turkey began in 1912. The largest 
migration from Prizren occurred between 1953 and 1964. Migration continued before 
and after the Kosovo war as well. According to a census in 1992, only 4,461 people 
had been recorded as Turkish. However, it is a reality that many more Turkish people 
live in Prizren today compared with 1992. Students in 5 primary schools in Prizren 
have been educated in Turkish. Today 70 percent of Prizren inhabitants speak 
Turkish. Some Albanians living in Prizren speak Turkish as well. Although the 
Turkish population has decreased in the region due to many factors, Prizren still 
maintains its peculiar Turkish character.126  
       Turkey has had a domestic agenda as well. There are Turkish populations 
living in the Pristine, Gilan, Mitrovica and İpek regions. Many Bosnians, Kosovars 
and Albanians in the region have relatives in Turkey (mostly in Bursa, İstanbul and 
İzmir). From 1923 to 1990, more than 1.6 million people immigrated to Turkey, 
mostly from the Balkan countries. Turkey also experienced mass influxes of 
Albanians, Bosnian Muslims and Turks between 1992 and 1995 (Kirişçi, 2004:6). 
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They often come to Turkey to visit their relatives and for shopping. Moreover 
Turkey has linguistic and ethnic ties with Bosnians who live in the Balkans. Turkey 
feels responsible for other minorities and peoples that were also victims of the 
Bosnian conflict. Turkish soldiers contributed to UNPROFOR in order to provide 
and maintain peace and security not only for Turks but also other minorities living in 
this region. Turkey wants to solve its problems concerning Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
There is a close link between security and states’ legitimacy, which is thought 
to emanate from states’ ability to meet the demands of their citizens. Unless states 
contribute to the welfare of their citizens, they may be regarded as illegitimate and 
possible sources of international instability and insecurity. States now increasingly 
feel themselves responsible for what happens in other states (Etzioni, 2006: 363-
379). States are now held accountable for what happens within their territories. 
Similarly, the Turkish decision makers were of the opinion that unless Turkey 
contributed to the happiness and well-being of its citizens, it would be regarded as a 
possible source of international instability and insecurity. In other words, by reaching 
out to the Bosnians, Turkey would keep Turkish citizens happy and therefore not 
cause any domestic disturbance, which would affect international stability. 
Therefore, Turkey felt responsible for what happened in the Balkans and wanted to 
contribute to the peace operations in that region. 
       Turkish foreign policy has been affected to some extent by the emergence of 
pressure groups inside the country in recent years. These interest groups have been 
quite active in relation to Balkan crises, especially those in Bosnia, Azerbaijan, 
Chechnya, and of course, Cyprus. But the effectiveness of these pressure groups 
varies and is often limited. For example, it was suggested that if the Chechen lobby 
were significant, actions like hostage takings on ferries and in hotels would be 
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unnecessary. Bosnia, however, offered a quite different example, with a well-placed 
Bosnian “lobby” augmented by the strong support of Turkish public opinion. 
      The impact of pressure groups on Ankara’s decisions to send troops to 
international peacekeeping operations in the Balkans and Caucaus is noteworthy. 
Events in the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Middle East rapidly entered the Turkish 
security debate and strongly affected public opinion (Lesser, 2000: 183-199), for 
they captured the attention of groups with strong cultural, ethnic or religious ties to 
Turkey. However, it is difficult to demonstrate such an impact. First, no academic 
study has demonstrated such an impact. Second, it would be difficult to explain the 
presence of Turkish troops in more geographically and ethnically distant places like 
Somalia, Afghanistan, and Lebanon from this perspective. Moreover, the impact of 
public opinion on the foreign policy making process has traditionally been very 
limited in Turkey. Finally, participation in peace operations might have badly 
affected the already weak economy of the country. Therefore, Turkish people would 
most likely have rejected sending Turkish troops abroad.  
 
3.3.2.2. Historical and Cultural Factors  
Despite having lost many parts of its Balkan territory during the Balkan Wars at the 
beginning of the 20th century, Turkey has always closely followed developments in 
this region. Turkey recognized the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
Following its declaration of independence, Macedonia was recognized only by 
Bulgaria and Turkey. Turkey, as a Balkan country, has close historical, cultural, 
linguistic,127 sociological and geographical ties with the Balkans. Turkey, which had 
been involved in the Balkans since the 14th century until the 1920s, has kept its 
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historical ties and relationships with Balkan countries up to the present time 
(Koloğlu, 1993:88). Similarly, Turkey, as the successor to the Ottoman Empire, 
perceives ‘Kosovo… as a debt it owes to its own history’128 and the Balkans as an 
‘inseparable part of history, and culture’ (Çeviköz, 1998:181). Since peaceful efforts 
did not provide any progress, Turkey fully supported Operation Allied Force and 
KFOR to prevent Serbian atrocities. Turkey contributed to peace operations in the 
Balkans to protect the historical and cultural heritage of the Ottomans (for example, 
mosques, bridges and so on). It wanted to contribute to the social and economic 
restructuring of the country and to the rebuilding of those landmark monuments 
reflecting the historical presence of Ottoman influence.129 
       Turkey has linguistic and ethnic ties with Uzbeks, Turkmen, and Hazaras, 
who live in Afghanistan. Turks are the second largest ethnic minority in the country. 
Turkish soldiers contributed to ISAF to provide and maintain peace and security for 
Turks, Hazaras, Turqomans and other Afghan people as well. Turkey wants to 
conclude its policies concerning Afghanistan. Turkey has had a good reputation 
among all groups in Afghanistan for a long time. It had to show its presence in the 
area for its future interests. A peace mission is the best way to do it. Turkey wanted 
to sow similar seeds of friendship in Afghanistan, as it had sown and was rewarded 
with the concrete results in Korea in 1950, and consolidate Turkish friendships. The 
geographic distance between two countries did not form a barrier for the relations to 
be improved. On the contrary, the Turkish and Afghan nations improved mutual 
relations by challenging conditions. Turkey wanted to display the significance which 
it accorded to Afghanistan by helping it to be a powerful and prosperous country. 
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       Bringing peace to these lands was perceived to be a responsibility for the 
TAF, on behalf of the Turkish people. As Atatürk, founder of modern Turkey, 
announced in 1937, “...we must not lose contact with the people who are our 
brothers.” The most important characteristic that makes a nation respectable is the 
willingness not to evade responsibilities which history brings on it and to realize its 
mission at any cost. This was something that Turkey felt very deeply about and 
aspired to bring into effect. In the public opinion and among the elites, the deep 
historical ties between the two countries are periodically revived to underline the 
‘necessity’ of Turkey’s support for the Afghan people: Turkey has had close ties with 
Afghanistan since King Amanullah invited the Turks during the 1920s to help his 
army. Afghanistan was the first country to recognize the new Turkish Republic. 
Turkey helped Afghanistan in its modernization efforts; Enver Pasha and Cemal 
Pasha played a significant role in enhancing friendly relations between the two 
countries. Cemal Pasha succeeded in making European countries recognize 
Afghanistan. In the 1920s and 1930s, under Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the founder of 
the Turkish republic, Turkey trained Afghan military officers and helped Afghanistan 
in its state-building efforts. As a result, much of the military terminology used in 
Afghanistan is in Turkish.  
       Another factor has been Ankara’s close relationship with General Rashid 
Dostum. Turkey has long had contacts with Afghan opposition groups, especially the 
forces of General Dostum, and it helped build them into an effective fighting force. 
Dostum’s fighters were largely Uzbeks, a group that has close ethnic links with 
Turks. The Taliban, fighting against General Dostum, are mostly ethnic Pashtun. 
That a war against Afghanistan offered the possibility to replace the fundamentalist 
Taliban regime, which Turkey had consistently opposed, was an important reason 
  154 
behind Turkey's support for peace operations. For Turkey, it also could alleviate 
tension at home, where many oppose U.S. attacks against a Muslim country and most 
are against sending Turkish troops to other peace operations. The participation of 
Islamic countries, especially Turkey, would prevent the Afghanistan war from being 
seen as a clash between Christianity and Islam.  
 
3.3.2.3. Religion  
One could argue that religious motives played a role in Turkey’s contribution to 
peace operations in Somalia. Turkey, which was unable to prevent ethnic cleansing 
in Bosnia, much of it directed at Muslims, wanted to help other Muslims in Somalia. 
The participation of Islamic countries in the peace operation in Somalia, such as 
Turkey, might have prevented the clash between troop-contributing countries and 
factions in Somalia, which were Muslim. Thought of in this way, religion also 
represented an important factor in Turkey’s contribution to peace operations in 
Bosnia. According to a 1992 census in the former Yugoslavia, 43 percent of the 
population was Muslim Bosnians, 32 percent were Orthodox Serbians, 17 percent 
were Catholic Croatians and 8 percent were other religions (Özdil, 1993:7). Turkey 
also had a religious motive in Kosovo. Eighty-seven percent of Kosovo’s population 
is Muslim, ten percent is Orthodox Christian and three percent is Catholic. 
 
3.3.2.4. Refugees  
The flow of refugees, asylum-seekers and internally displaced persons also 
compelled Turkey to find ways to stop the flow and contribute to peace operations. 
With the outbreak of the war in the Former Yugoslavia, hundreds of thousands of 
people became refugees (Kümbetoğlu, 1997:227-259). Turkey provided shelter, 
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protection and rehabilitation for these people with the help of several state 
institutions and some associations related to the Balkans, and supported every effort 
to provide humanitarian assistance to the Kosovar deportees (Bosna-Hersek Gerçeği, 
1995:47). Turkey wanted to gain international attention for Bosnia. There was a 
human tragedy in Bosnia and Turkey considered its participation in UNOSOM II as a 
good opportunity to help rally the international community around the idea that a 
multinational peacekeeping force should be deployed in Bosnia. Turkey thought that 
it could succeed in alerting the international community to the tragedy in Bosnia if it 
served in peace operations in Somalia.  
 
3.3.2.5. Economics  
The presence of a Turkish contingent in the region of crisis might have allowed 
Turkish businessmen to make business contracts. Deploying troops to Bosnia, 
Kosovo and Afghanistan might have brought investment as well. Turkish capital 
investment was low in the region since there is a high risk (related to the absence of a 
market economy and commercial laws, an undeveloped insurance and banking 
sector, etc.) in Kosovo for businessmen. Some Turkish businessmen initially 
accepted this risk, but later withdrew from Kosovo leaving problems behind. This led 
local people to distrust Turkish businessmen. 
In ISAF operations, Turkey sought compensation for its military support in 
the economic field.130 The Turkish economy, which had undergone a severe crisis 
and was under the supervision of an IMF program, was badly hit again by the 
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September 11th, 2001 shock. Then Turkish Economy Minister Kemal Derviş, after 
claiming that Turkey must support the international fight against terrorism in 
Afghanistan and elsewhere because Turkey had suffered from similar threats.  
Turkey’s support for the Afghan people: Turkey has had close ties with 
Afghanistan since King Amanullah invited the Turks during the 1920s to help his 
army. Afghanistan was the first country to recognize the new Turkish Republic. 
Turkey helped Afghanistan in its modernization efforts; Enver Pasha and Cemal 
Pasha played a significant role in enhancing friendly relations between the two 
countries. Cemal Pasha worked hard to make European countries recognize 
Afghanistan and he succeeded.  
 
3.3.3. The Ideational Factors 
Without denying the relevance of the above-mentioned factors which have one way 
or other influenced governmental decisions in Ankara, I argue that Turkey’s 
involvement in peace operations during the post-Cold War era can better be 
explained by the dynamics of its relations with the West. In Turkey’s wanting to 
participate in peace operations, the main concern has been ideational. What 
motivates Ankara to join the western community of nations by contributing to peace 
operations is neither the structural necessity to survive (as expected by neo-realists) 
nor the materially formulated cost–benefit analysis (as foreseen by neo-liberals), but 
the ideational concerns to legitimize/justify its western identity (Hurd, 1999: 379-
409).  
The meaning that Turkey has attached to participation in peace operations 
differs from those of the European Union and the United States. For example, while 
peace operations for the EU have been the basic justification for the existence of 
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European armed services, they have been of relatively minor importance for the 
United States and Russia. In contrast to European and American approaches, Turkey 
has put a great ideational importance in peace operations. They have been important 
for the re-construction of its western identity as well as the maintenance of its 
number one security interest, being a part of the West. Ankara seems to believe that 
its western identity will be best enhanced if it cooperates with the EU and its member 
states in peace operations. 
Ideational Factors may be discussed under the subheadings as: Relations with 
Europe/West; Turkey’s Image as Security Producer; EU Membership; Security 
Understanding of the West; Turkey’s Western/European Image; and Relations with 
the US. 
 
3.3.3.1. Relations with Europe/West 
Even though some difficulties were experienced, the relationship between Turkey 
and Europe had not been questioned deeply during much part of the Cold War era 
and questions of identity were ignored. The ideological concerns of the East/West 
distinction of the era basically colored the relationship. Turkey was attributed as an 
important strategic partner for the containment of the Soviet Union in security terms. 
Security priorities had masked the identity differences between Turkey and Europe in 
that era. Especially, after the collapse of the bipolar world system in the beginning of 
the nineties, the difference between the Turkish way of modernization and European 
civilization itself had been clearly exposed. The question of identity remains critical 
for Ankara in its relationship with Europe and the West. 
Turkey, since Ottoman times, has had common issues with Europe. As Aydın 
points out (1999: 160), in the course of the history, “the Turks have been connected 
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to the West, first as a conquering superior and enemy, then as a component part, later 
as an admirer and unsuccessful imitator, and in the end as a follower and ally.” The 
Ottoman Empire gradually lost its dominant status in Europe and began to perceive 
Europe as the source of modernization. Turkey has historically displayed a relatively 
consistent security culture of realpolitik which has evolved from a dominant 
offensive to a dominant defensive one. Moreover, the process of westernization since 
18th century has left its imprint on the national security culture. It has motivated 
Turkey’s western-oriented policies and introduced liberal and internationalist 
elements into foreign policy.  
Turkey’s contribution to western security interests have, in the past, 
constituted the most important link tying Turkey to the West, and therefore making it 
easy for Turkey to be recognized as western. The main rationale behind the 
Westernization/Europeanization reforms of the late Ottoman and early republican 
eras was to secure the survival of the Turkish state against internal and external 
threats. Europeanization was therefore conceived as a security strategy (Oğuzlu, 
2005: 87). With the end of Second World War, Ankara’s concern of being 
recognized as western was met by its membership in NATO and close cooperation 
with the West against the common Soviet threat. More, its security identity and 
interests were in accordance with those of the western international community. 
While the West itself defined its security identity/interest in opposition to the Soviet 
Union and prioritised the preservation of the western style of living as the most 
important security goal, Turkey did not find it difficult to become socialized into this 
understanding (Aybet and Müftüler Baç, 2000: 567-582).  
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3.3.3.2. Turkey’s Image as a Security Producing Country 
This situation has completely changed in the 1990s with the end of the Cold War. 
For the first time in the republican era of Turkey-Europe relations, both sides began 
to feel suspicious of the ‘security provider’ role of the other. For Ankara, its 
perception of the EU as a global security actor has not been matched by the post-
Cold War international identity of the European Union. As Turkey’s accession 
process unfolded, both sides became aware of a growing difference in their concepts 
of security. This, in turn, has played a significant role in the unwillingness of the EU 
to offer Turkey credible membership prospects. Karaosmanoğlu has argued that, 
whereas the EU turned inside, trying to build up a security community in Europe per 
se, Turkey has turned outside, trying to improve its security in Eurasia.131 When the 
West started to see peace operations through a new perspective, Ankara’s interest in 
peace operations also developed. 
Turkey would not have remained outside such a western project, while the 
credentials of its western identity have come under strong challenges following the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union and growing criticisms regarding its contributiuons to 
the western security. As the Soviet threat to Eastern Europe lost its imminence, and 
the European Community transformed itself to a ‘security community’ (Bilgin, 2004: 
278), Turkey’s contribution to security building in Europe became less significant in 
the eyes of EU policy makers. In his article, Samuel Huntington identifies Turkey as 
one of a number of countries where questions of national identity were actively 
debated during the 1990s. Few countries in the post-Cold War era have had their 
identity contested as bitterly and interpreted as variously as Turkey. Huntington 
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classifies Turkey as a “torn country…whose leaders typically wish to pursue a 
bandwagoning strategy and to make their countries members of the West” 
(Huntington, 1993:433-435), but whose history, culture and traditions are non-
western. 
The intergovernmental nature of NATO membership, the existence of the 
common external enemy and Turkey’s contribution to the realization of Europe’s 
strategic security interests prevented the Europeans from perceiving Ankara as an 
‘other’ throughout the Cold War years. Turkey was considered to be a part of 
Europe’s ‘self’ (Aybet and Müftüler Baç, 2000: 567-582). However, this cooperative 
togetherness started to change with the advent of the post-Cold War era, as the 
contours of European-ness began to be defined by membership in the European 
Union (Diez and Whitman, 2002: 43-67).  
NATO, as the most experienced and capable organisation in the field of 
military security has transformed itself and gained a new structure and role. In light 
of the critical developments in the post-Cold War era, NATO adapted and 
transformed itself in order to cope with new security challenges. While NATO has 
gradually lost its European and western character following the transformation of the 
Alliance from being a western collective defense organziation into a semi military-
semi political collective security organization, the EU increasingly emphasized 
liberal-democratic transformation of state-society relations as the most important 
criterion for membership (Cornish, 2004:63-74; Kurth, 2001:5-16; Webber, and et 
al., 2004: 3-26). The Cold War era security identity of the EU allowed the EU 
members to co-exist with Turkey within NATO in such a way that both sides 
perceived each other as ‘security providers.’ This situation started to change in the 
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1990s as the EU began to define its security identity on the basis of its deepening and 
widening processes (Aybet and Müftüler-Baç, 2000:567-582). 
The EU and Turkey diverged on the definition of the nature of conventional 
threats to security. Ankara continued to regard developments in Russia and the 
Middle East, particularly attempts by the latter to develop weapons of mass 
destruction and the ballistic missiles to deliver them, as possible sources of 
conventional threats to its security (Sezer, 1992:227-237). EU members on the other 
hand, shared the view that today’s world posed no conventional threat to Europe's 
security. To them, the sources of new threats and risks to European security lie in the 
unstable regions along the peripheries of Europe (Oğuzlu, 2003:4). Therefore, a great 
many European security analysts believed that Turkey’s inclusion in the EU might 
increase ‘conventional threats’ to European security because it lies at the epicenter of 
so many zones of instability, and its hard-security mentality might risk bringing the 
EU into open conflict with any one of Turkey’s Middle Eastern neighbors (Buzan 
and Diez, 1999: 41-57). The strategic horizons of the EU have also fixated on the 
European continent. In the absence of conventional security threats, to many EU 
members, the particular geography of Turkey has increased anxieties among 
Europeans as to whether it would be a good idea to offer Turkey a credible prospect 
of membership. Rather than an asset, Turkey’s political geography may become a 
burden on Europe (Buzan and Diez, 1999: 41-57).  
Throught the Cold War years Turkey was significantly important for 
European security. This was indubitable in those years and Ankara used this 
advantage to its favor to gain economic and military support from the West. 
However, the end of the Cold War shifted the former balance of security. With the 
removal of the Soviet threat, Turkey’s relative importance for the defense of Europe 
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decreased. In 1991, Ankara committed to the Gulf War on the side of the western 
alliance to show its strategic importance to the West although it lost a great deal of 
its economic interests in the region. However, this does not mean that Turkey 
became an unimportant state in security terms. The emergence of the new geopolitics 
put Turkey into an important position. On the other side, the end of the Cold War 
decreased the importance of geopolitical issues, at least for Europeans, as issues 
related to democracy and human rights gained prominence. Ankara, on the other 
hand, seemed to face geopolitical opportunities in the post-Cold War era. These 
differentiating perspectives have become the crux of the problematic relationship 
between Turkey and Europe. 
 
3.3.3.3. EU Membership 
In order to prove its Western/European identity, Ankara wanted to accentuate its 
centuries-old European orientation by integrating with the European Union, which 
claims to be the institutional representation of the European identity. However, 
Turkey has neither become a constituent part of the EU’s integration process nor 
fully embraced the norms of the emerging European identity. Though the Turkish 
elites knew that the process of Europeanization would have two main dimensions - a 
domestic reform process aimed at internalizing the constitutive norms of the 
European international society and participation in the European state system - they 
preferred to give primacy to the second (Karaosmanoğlu, 2002). Faced with the 
European refusal of its membership to the EU, participating in peace operations has 
seemed to be the only way for Turkey to register its Western/European identity.  
Ankara sees with distrust, its membership delay in the EU while it is an 
accepted part of Europe via its membership in NATO. Under such considerations, in 
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a quest to accentuate its western vocation, Turkey felt obliged to participate in peace 
operations led by NATO and the EU. Ankara’s main motivation has been to 
consolidate its European identity in the eyes of the EU members by participating in 
peace operations. On the other hand, strengthening western belonging is an important 
feature not only of Turkey’s quest for identity but part of its security policy and 
culture (Karaosmanoğlu, 2000: 199-216) as well.  
However, there are some problems in Ankara’s European Union option. One 
hesitation of Europe about the integration of Turkey with the Union is precisely the 
security issues that would arise upon integration. Turkey’s inclusion in the Union 
would shift the borders of the European Union towards the East making the Middle 
East and Caucasus neighbors of the Union. This also means that the security issues of 
the aforementioned regions such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
in the Middle East, the Middle East peace process and unstable Iranian and Iraqi 
regimes would be part of the European agenda. Since Europe was reluctant to 
become involved in these issues, Turkey has been viewed by the Europeans as a 
“security burden”.132 Since the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union, it has become rather commonplace among EU policymakers to present 
Turkey as a consumer and not a producer of security in Europe.133 By “security 
consumer,” it is meant that Ankara is overburdened by a number of hard security 
problems in and around Turkey and this creates new problems for the EU security 
community. 
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Turkey’s over-emphasis on military security (hard security), and under-
emphasis on socio-economic and cultural-political aspects of security (soft security) 
could have negative implications for its being recognized as Western/European in the 
post-Cold War era. Given such prevalent representations of Turkey as a burden, and 
not an asset for building security in Europe, Turkish policymakers spent the 1990s 
trying to find Ankara a niche in the evolving post-Cold War environment.134 With 
Turkey’s participation in peace operations, they seem to have finally found that 
niche. That is why Ankara’s interest in peace operations has developed. Its 
participation in the peace operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo could be 
viewed as an instance of Turkey’s contribution as a producer of security in both 
narrow and broad senses of the term.  
The EU critized Ankara in its 2005 Progress Report on the following issues; 
violation of human rights, religious freedom, civil-military relations and so on. One 
of the issues in dispute between Turkey and the EU concerns the modalities of 
Turkey’s participation in European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). The 
establishment of a European defense and security system independent of NATO is 
leading to friction between Turkey and the EU. Ankara wants to have a vote about 
the issues related with the ESDP. However, the EU members are against the 
participation of Turkey in the decision-making processes of ESDP until it becomes a 
full member of the Union. Ankara is also against the use of NATO’s facilities within 
the framework of ESDP, where it has no vote for the decisions. Its exclusion from 
the security architecture of Europe raises hesitations about the Union. Since the Nice 
summit in December 2000 the EU has been arguing that Turkey has no legitimate 
right to fully participate in the decision-making process of EU military operations 
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even if these would rely on NATO resources because Turkey is not an EU member 
(Oğuzlu, 2002:65). 
As far as Ankara is concerned, the significance of the EU’s attempts at 
developing the ESDP lies in the possibility that this European initiative might be the 
harbinger of an emerging EU strategic culture independent of NATO. In such a case 
Turkey’s European identity in security issues might face serious challenges. The 
Turkish logic has been that if the EU member states were to become less eager to 
establish their security and international identity independent of NATO, they would 
become less discriminatory towards Turkey’s inclusion within European security 
structures (Oğuzlu, 2002:64). Since ESDP is not simply a security and defense 
project, but a planned construction of the European identity, the unwillingness of the 
EU to offer Ankara a membership status in the decision-making apparatus of the 
emerging ESDP initiative has added strain to Turkey’s aspirations of being 
considered European (Baykan, 2005: 335-359).  
Turkey’s chances of EU membership are strongly bound to its performance in 
successfully adopting distinctive EU values and norms, which are less about security 
than they are about democracy, human rights, the rule of law, and transparent and 
impartial procedures. Allegations of torture and the question of human rights in 
Turkey were perhaps the most critical issues over which it has been most heavily 
criticized in the post-Cold War environment, and which has helped to make “the 
state of Turkey synonymous with the notion of human rights abuses” (Robins, 2003: 
34). 
In such a negative atmosphere participation in peace operations appears to 
have offered Ankara a window of opportunity to help register its diminishing 
Western/European identity. The majority of the Turkish elites have believed that to 
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solidify Turkey’s European/western/modern identity, participation in peace 
operations is an important tool that will provide effective functioning of its relations 
with the western international community. Many of them regard participation in 
peace operations as a legitimate globalization strategy, and many believe it will bring 
Ankara closer to the sources of its Western/European identity. Appearing to 
contribute to western security interests was hoped to re-establish the most important 
link tying Turkey to the West. The more useful Turkey became for western security, 
the more western it would be recognized by the West. 
Turkey participated in the maintenance of security in Europe during the Cold 
War by virtue of its strategically significant geographical location, the size of its 
army and the pro-western orientation of the Turkish regime that helped bolster the 
identity of the West.135 Given that many locations where Turkey sent peacekeeping 
units did not directly affect its security in the traditional neo-realist sense, 
participation in peace operations might have been seen as a policy instrument to help 
bolster its Western/European identity. Regarding the economic, cultural, social and 
political factors that make it difficult for the EU to admit Turkey as a member, one 
needs to make it clear that these concerns are mainly shaped by the EU’s post-Cold 
War era security identity, for the post-Cold War era security understanding of the EU 
has widened in such a way so as to include as great a variety of dimensions as 
possible (Oğuzlu, 2002:61). The EU’s move to transform itself from a purely civilian 
power to a military power and its growing interest in the constitution of a European 
military crisis management capability in a wider geographical area from the Balkans 
to the Caucasus and from the Middle East to North Africa where Turkey is at the 
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crossroads of regions (Hürsoy, 2005:419) has created an opportunity for it to prove 
itself useful as a producer of security in Europe.  
Turkey, as a country with significant military capabilities and a growing 
civilian sector that is active in humanitarian efforts, has been a net contributor to 
international peace and security in key international organizations such as the UN, 
NATO and the OSCE. The important point here is that Turkey’s development of 
peacekeeping capabilities and potential contribution to the European military force in 
peace operations would not only enhance its bargaining power vis-à-vis the EU, in 
the sense that the EU would benefit from Turkey’s military capabilities in an 
instrumental manner, but also suggest that Turkey is transforming its security 
identity into that of the European Union around the principles of crises management 
and human security (Oğuzlu, 2006:83-104).  
 
3.3.3.4. Security Understanding of the West 
The post-Cold War era security understanding priorities are as follows: ‘human 
security,’136 ‘the global, interdependent and trans-regionalized nature of security’ and 
the ‘closer linkage between internal and external developments.’ Developments in 
security since the end of the Cold War suggest a process that has been chipping away 
at the foundations of international politics based on self- and collective defence. 
More analytical attention is being paid to concepts of human security. The number of 
inter-state wars has decreased significantly since the end of the Cold War, but intra-
state threats to human security have gained greater prominence.  
 Sources of threat to human security are numerous, from political repression 
and violations of human rights to hunger, disease, illicit drugs and organized crime. 
                                               
136
 for a discussion, see Pınar Bilgin, “Individual and Societal Dimensions of Security,” International 
Studies Review (2003) 5, 203-222 
 
  168 
Two military methods for promoting human security are humanitarian intervention 
and peacekeeping.137 Intra-state UN peacekeeping can also promote human security 
in helping to control and resolve conflicts between hostile domestic parties 
(Goulding, 1993: 451-465; Adekanye, 1997: 359-366). Turkey has played a growing 
role in promoting the personal security of individuals. It wanted to contribute to 
peace operations in situations where human beings suffer from violent conflict, civil 
disorder and repression. Therefore, it participated in peace operations on the need to 
end widespread starvation (Somalia in 1992), to restore democracy (Afghanistan, 
ISAF), to end civil war (Bosnia in 1995) or to stop ‘ethnic cleansing’ (Kosovo in 
1999).  
For the first time in history, the Turkish Armed Forces sent a military force to 
an area –Somalia- without a strategic interest in a strictly humanitarian mission. The 
operation in Somalia was a historical mission and gave responsibility to all 
participating countries, including Turkey, as well as the UN. An important reason for 
Ankara to send a military force, however, was to prevent the death of thousands from 
starvation. Before UN intervention, 300,000 people died from famine, one million 
people became refugees and 1.5 million people were threatened by hunger while half 
of the country’s population were threatened by disease.  
As the situation in Kosovo deteriorated, Ankara became increasingly 
concerned about the human rights situation and its potential to spread instability to 
neighboring countries in the region. By contributing to peace operations, Turkey tried 
to persuade international community that Serbian aggression to Kosovo was a direct 
threat to stability in the Balkans and a violation of human rights of Kosovars. Turkey, 
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which had been accused of violating human rights by European states for years, might 
have wanted to show its sensitivity for human rights by contributing to these peace 
operations.  
The more Turkey contributes to peace operations, the more secure it would 
feel, with regard to both hard (conventional) and soft (non-conventional) threats. 
Turkey’s increasing participation in peace operations during the post-Cold War era 
can be seen as a particular effort to demonstrate that it has successfully been adapting 
its security conceptualization/identity/culture/understanding to that of the West. 
Turkey’s participation in peace operations would also accelerate the process of its 
successful socialization into the idea that “during the Cold War era the armies of the 
western states were deployed on the ground to simply prevent the armies of the 
totalitarian states from doing “bad things” outside their borders whereas during the 
post-Cold War era the armies of the western states are deployed to urge weak or 
failed states to do “good things” inside their borders.” 
A European Union which is interested in developing its own military crisis 
management capability would need Turkey because Turkey has become a large, 
effective and modern military power both in its own region and in NATO. 
Furthermore, it has a well-trained army experienced in low-intensity warfare. This 
factor is particularly important for contributing to Petersberg type operations (Bilgin, 
2001:34-51). 
In the post-Cold War era in which the old security order collapsed, the 
European continent and its surrounding regions have been passing through a critical 
period from the end of the Cold War towards a new system in which security, 
politics, economics, and society are becoming increasingly interrelated. The concept 
of security, which is one of the most basic issues for human beings, has gained new 
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definitions, understandings and applications (Sperling and Kishner, 1997; Buzan, 
1991). There is now an overwhelming consensus on the notion that the term security 
has been broadened and multiplied in conceptual, geographical, and functional 
senses in Europe and in the world as a whole. Conceptually, the term security now 
implies not only the so-called “hard security,” i.e. feeling secure/safe from foreign 
military attacks, from the invasion of the foreign armies, and from the danger of 
strategic or tactical missiles, weapons of mass destruction, and brutal aggressions, as 
was the case during the Cold War. It also includes the so-called “soft security,” i.e. 
feeling secure/safe from political oppression, hunger, environmental pollution, social 
fragmentation, human tragedy, and immigration, unexpected effects of weapons of 
mass destruction (nuclear, chemical and biological) and so on (McInees, 1993). 
Thus, functionally, the concept of security now includes social, economic and 
cultural issues. Not only the state security but also societies and individuals are 
“threatened” by ethnic nationalism and separatism, terrorism, refugee movements, 
religious and ideological fanaticism, fatal illnesses (e.g. AIDS), and so on. All of 
these security concerns and developments are not limited to certain countries or 
regions, but most of the world is equally affected by such developments outside their 
borders. In other words, security risks are now interdependent in the global arena. No 
country is totally immune from these security risks, be they “soft security” problems 
or “the hard security” problems.  
The EU does not offer any role for non-EU allies in non-military aspects of 
crisis management. Turkey is very active and keen on this field as was evidenced by 
Turkey’s contribution to the Bosnia and Kosovo cases and to the re-construction of 
Afghanistan after September 11th. Turkey would like to contribute to conflict 
prevention and crisis management in political, military and non-military terms to 
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enhance its western identity. For example, Turkey’s participation in the ISAF and 
signing on to the security logic in the post-9/11 era might have contributed to the 
EU’s decision to start the accession talks with Turkey on the 3rd of October 2005. 
Similarly, Turkey’s eagerness to join the EU-led peacekeeping force in the Congo 
should be seen as a strategic action on the part of Ankara that would help bolster its 
European identity.138 Turkey does not have any strategic interest in the Congo. Thus, 
participation there would suggest that Turkey helps the West project its constitutive 
values onto problem areas.  
 
3.3.3.5. Turkey’s Western/European Image 
The task of peace operations, which once seemed to belong exclusively to the United 
Nations, has become a growing area of interest for NATO, the EU and OSCE in the 
1990s. Ankara also hopes that stronger links with the UN, NATO, the EU and OSCE 
within the framework of peace operations will strengthen its western orientation and 
bolster its European identity. Turkey has adopted a stance directed at Afghanistan’s 
developing its national institutions, ensuring its stability and integrating with the 
international community. By Turkey assuming command of ISAF, it has achieved 
this aim and has also accomplished its task as a member of the UN. 
Turkey wants to be seen much more in the activities of the UN and wants to 
play a much more active role in the international arena after the end of the Cold War. 
Due to the rise of Turkey’s security responsibilities in the EU’s neighborhood, as a 
European country but not, as yet, a EU member, it announced its candidature for one 
of the UN Security Council’s non-permanent seats allocated to the Western 
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Europeans and Other States Group (WEOG) for the 2009-10 term (Hürsoy, 
2005:425). Turkey’s motive is to be elected as a non-permanent member of the UN 
Security Council in this term.  
Participation in peace operations helps Ankara give the signal that it is a 
responsible member of the western international community. Ambassador Sergio 
Balanzino underlined Turkey’s position very well: 
I cannot imagine a scenario for EU-led crisis management operations that 
does not involve Turkey in one way or another. Simply put: if the crisis is 
very serious, NATO will be involved including Turkey [in which the ESDP 
will not have a role]. If the crisis is less prone to escalation, but still requires a 
significant amount of force, then the EU may lead, but only with the help of 
NATO- again Turkey will be involved. If the crisis is at the lower end of the 
spectrum, the EU may act autonomously, but if it is an operation that affects 
Turkey’s security or Turkey’s vital security interests, it will obviously be in 
the interest of the EU to at least solicit Turkey’s views and most importantly 
to seek its active contribution in resolving the crisis.139 
 
The decision to help intiate the BLACKSEAFOR and the Southeast European 
Brigade should be interpreted in this vein. These initiatives have only an indirect 
effect on Turkey’s security, they undoubtedly contribute to regional security. 
Primarily, however, decisions are undertaken with the motivation of suggesting to 
the western allies that Turkey is a security producing country in the region and has 
always been a part of the solutions, rather than the problems (Karaosmanoğlu, 
2000:199-216). 
At the multilateral level, Ankara launched two initiatives in the Balkans to 
create a web of regional cooperation mechanisms. The first initiative is a process 
called the South-East European Cooperation Process (SEECP). Another initiative is 
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the Multinational Peace Force South-East Europe (MPFSEE).140 MPFSEE is an 
initiative to improve regional states’ capabilities to contribute to possible 
multinational conflict prevention measures and peace support operations. MPFSEE 
forms part of a series of political, economic and defense initiatives implemented in 
the late 1990s, between the end of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the restart 
of war in Kosovo.141 The initial force is a Brigade, named the South-Eastern 
European Brigade (SEEBRIG). The MPFSEE is to carry out Petersberg-type tasks142 
(humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks; and tasks of combat forces in 
crisis management including peacemaking) in the service of the UN, NATO, the EU 
and the OSCE. Its activities are consistent with the purposes and the principles of the 
United Nations Charter.  
This initiative is neither directed against any third state nor intended to form a 
military alliance of any form against any country or group of countries. It is in line 
with and supports Partnership for Peace (PfP) programs and allows essential 
cooperation within the framework of the UN, NATO, OSCE and WEU. During 
peacetime, Turkey contributes to this force with one mechanized infantry battalion, 
one reconnaissance company, one artillery battery, one engineer company and some 
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of its combat service support elements. Additionally, one Signal Company and one 
brigade Headquarter (HQ) Company will be assigned when the brigade HQ is 
located in Turkey (White Paper, 2000:52 and Turkish General Staff, 2001:21). 
Ankara has from its very beginning, initiated two separate processes in contributing 
to peace and stability in the Black Sea region. One was the implementation of 
confidence and security building measures (CSBMs) in the Black Sea, which include 
arms talks, and the other was the establishment of the force in the spirit of PfP known 
as BLACKSEAFOR.  
The BLACKSEAFOR initiative aims at the enhancement of peace and 
stability and promoting regional co-operation among the Black Sea littoral states. 
The idea of establishing a multinational on-call naval force in the Black Sea region 
with the participation of all littoral states to further develop regional co-operation 
among the naval forces of the littoral countries for the purpose of contributing to 
regional security and stability, and strengthening good neighboring relations was 
spearheaded by Turkey. The project was proposed by former Navy Forces 
Commander Salim Dervisoglu in 1998 and welcomed and endorsed by the other 
littoral states. It is a tangible outcome of Turkey’s vision of bringing together the 
naval forces of the littoral states for the realization of certain tasks at sea (Ulusoy, 
2002: 97). This was in fact, the manifestation of the guiding principle of the Turkish 
foreign policy that is based on fostering and maintaining regional co-operation and 
friendship, as reflected in the words of ATATÜRK, “Peace at Home, Peace in the 
World.” BLACKSEAFOR is the reflection of Ankara’s active foreign policy in the 
post-Cold War era in the Black Sea region (Savunma ve Havacılık, 2002: 16). 
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The Black Sea Naval Co-operation Task Group (BLACKSEAFOR)143 has been 
initiated at the Second Chiefs of the Black Sea Navies (CBSN) Meeting, which was 
held in Varna, Bulgaria on 11 April 1998 (Journal of Turkish Naval Forces, 
2001:14). Efforts to establish the BLACKSEAFOR have continued since then with 
the meetings of experts under the chairmanship of a Turkish Admiral and with the 
participation of many diplomats, naval officers and legal authorities of the Black Sea 
littoral 144  (Journal of Turkish Naval Forces, 2001: 2). The underlying philosophy of 
this initiative is to strengthen peace and stability within the Black Sea area as well as 
to promote regional cooperation among the Black Sea littoral states through the 
enhancement of cooperation and interoperability among their maritime forces 
(Turkish General Staff, 2001:25). 
 
3.3.3.6. Relations with the US 
A similar logic can also be applied to Turkey’s relations with the United States. The 
relationship with the US has been a key aspect of Turkey’s foreign and security 
policy for nearly six decades. Throughout the Cold War, Washington and Ankara 
have shared a similar approach to international affairs. Turkey’s internal and 
geopolitical positions, coupled with the influence of its military, led to a security-
conscious approach to policy-making. The two countries also have similar elements 
in their strategic culture (Kirişçi, 2002: 200-228). During the Cold War, Turkey 
regarded its alliance relationship with the United States within NATO as the most 
important link in terms of shoring up its western identity and national security. The 
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security culture of the Turkish Republic made it possible to cooperate with the 
United States in Eurasia, Central Asia and the Middle East. Both countries are used 
to operating in the international arena in accordance with the principles of realpolitik. 
The post-Cold War era had initially shaken the fundamentals of the Turkish-
American alliance type relationship. The absence of the common Soviet threat in the 
north, the growing policy differences in the Middle Eastern region- particularly over 
Iraq, Iran and Israeli-Palestinian issues, the gradual weakening of NATO as the 
prime channel linking Turkey to the United States, the gradual transformation of the 
Alliance from being a pure Western/European collective defense organization into a 
global semi-political/semi-military security organization and the bilateralization 
outpacing the multilateral character of relations, have combined to shake Turkish-
American relations (Oğuzlu, 2004: 98-105; Lewis, 2006: 1-8; Gordon and Taşpınar, 
2006:57-70).  
The 1990s saw that alliance type relationships of the Cold War years first 
evolve into ‘strategic partnership’ relationships and lately into ‘cooperation on some 
issues’ relationships (Güney, 2005:341-359). This process has further continued in 
the post 9/11 era, despite the initial expectation that Turkey’s Muslim/democratic 
identity would elevate its status in Washington (Oğuzlu, 2004: 98-105). Now Ankara 
appears to have come to the conclusion that the United States is a global super power 
having vital interests across the globe, rather than only being the leader of the 
western international community. Another conclusion Ankara appears to have drawn 
from the latest US approach towards the global war on terror is that Washington 
views international law and organizations, including NATO, from an instrumental 
perspective.  
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Under such conditions, Turkish elites have increasingly considered 
participation in peace operations as an effective strategy to help re-establish Turkey’s 
western (and pro-American) identity. That is why Turkey led the peace force in 
Somalia, sent a substantial number of military troops to Bosnia and Kosova, and 
recently joined the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. The 
dynamics of Turkey’s security relations with the western international community 
constituted an important reason in explaining its decisions to join the peace operation 
in Somalia. Turkey wanted to display what it could do in the international arena to 
both Somalians and the rest of the world. Its decision to join UNOSOM II had been 
motivated by the ideational concern of being included in the international 
community. Ankara decided to be part of such an operation in a troubled part of 
Africa because of its relations with the United States and western countries and 
wanted to register its western identity in the eyes of its western partners through its 
participiation in UNOSOM II. 
Co-operative relationship with the United States in the fight against global 
terrorism has offered the state elite in Turkey a valuable opportunity to underline 
once again its western identity and its indispensable place within the western 
international community (Turan, 2002:10-18). By assuming command of NATO 
forces in Afghanistan, Ankara wanted to improve the bilateral relations with the US 
and demonstrate the solidarity of the US-Turkey strategic partnership and its resolve 
to combat terrorism. ISAF experience is also revealing for another reason. It 
demonstrates that in the post 9/11 world Ankara has signed onto the logic that 
international security and internal affairs of states are closely related to each other. 
The international community defines the greatest threats to international security and 
stability as those threats that stem from polities where domestic instability and 
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economic underdevelopment prevail. In case of any domestic turbulence, the dangers 
would spill over to other places because in today’s world, security concerns are 
transregionalised in nature (Oğuzlu, 2003:51-83). 
Today, important considerations are: whether a state is governed by 
democracy or not, whether leaders are held publicaly accountable in terms of their 
promises to help improve the social and economic quality of life and whether helping 
promote democracy and helping failed states should be seen as a security strategy. 
Turkey’s participation in the ISAF suggests that it sides with the western 
international commutity on all of these questions. Moreover, Turkey’s leading role in 
the ISAF also implies that the West can successfully deal with the security 
challenges of the post-September 11 era only in close colloboration with the Muslim 
world. Turkey, a secular and western oriented state with an overwhelming Muslim 
population, would certainly add to the legitimacy of the western-led international 
peace operations in the eyes of the Muslim communities all around the globe. 
Turkey, as a Muslim country, could become a model for Afghanistan, for example.  
If the ideational boundaries of western civilization, of which the EU 
constitutes an important part, were defined by the struggle against global terrorism, 
then Turkey’s case for EU membership would likely gain strenght. This is because 
Turkey has been in struggle with separatist and fundamentalist terrorism for decades 
(Oğuzlu, 2002:75). Turkey’s participation in peace operations in Afghanistan against 
global terrorism would bolster the claims of those who argue that the war on 
terrorism should not be continued on the basis of a clash of civilizations between the 
developed Christian North and the undeveloped Muslim South. The participation of 
Islamic countries such as Turkey especially, will prevent the Afghanistan war from 
being seen as a clash between Christians and Muslims. Since Turkey is NATO’s only 
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majority Muslim member, it is assured of a “very strong role” in postwar 
Afghanistan. Turkey’s position in the region and close ties with Central Asian 
nations will make it an important player in the process of building a new government 
in Afghanistan that represents all of its ethnic groups.145  
A similar ideational logic can be observed in Ankara’s approach to nuclear 
weapons in Turkey. Despite many counter arguments, Turkey’s security elites appear 
to be content with the deployment of approximately 90 nuclear warheads in Incirlik 
and Murted. They see their presence as a guarantee of American commitment to 
Turkey’s security as well as, Turkey’s western identity in the eyes of Washington 
(Kibaroğlu, 2005: 443-457).  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
THE IMPACT OF PARTICIPATION IN PEACE OPERATIONS 
 
ON TURKEY 
 
 
 
The main goal of this chapter is to examine the impact of participation in peace 
operations on Turkey. In doing so, we will examine the ideational, security and 
domestic impact, in that order. This chapter will also shed light on the compatibility 
between the theoretical expectations of different motivating factors, as described in 
the previous chapter, and achievements on the ground. The goal is to help single out 
which theoretical explanation better explains Turkey’s participation in peace 
operations. 
 
4.1. Security-related Impact 
Turkey’s participation in peace operations has had a significant security-related 
impact on Turkey. These impact may be mentioned under the subheadings: Political-
Strategic; Organizational and Educational (Training); Tactical; Operational and 
Planning; Logistic and CIMIC. 
 
4.1.1. Political-Strategic 
Turkey’s national security and defense policy has been affected by participation in 
peace operations. Ankara now holds that defense starts outside territorial borders and 
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what happens in other countries impacts Turkey’s security interests. It is without a 
doubt that Turkey’s experiences in peace operations abroad have helped transform its 
security understanding in this way. This can best be seen in Turkey’s new military 
doctrine, which has moved from ‘territorial defense’ to ‘forward defense.’ One of the 
most important components of the doctrine is the ‘forward deployment of Turkish 
troops in a pre-emptive manner’(Hickok, 2000:105-120).146  
The Turkish Army has proved its success internationally and has gained 
higher responsibilities. As revealed by the Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan 
cases, Turkey has improved the capabilities of its armed forces through carrying out 
operations in different geographical areas and climatic conditions by participating 
actively in peace operations in these regions. Because peace operations demand 
special expertise, Turkey’s involvement in peace operations in Somalia, Bosnia, 
Kosovo and Afghanistan has increased the professionalization of the Turkish Armed 
Forces. It helped legitimize Turkey’s efforts to modernize its army, not to eliminate 
possible sources of insecurity.    
One of the most important problems of Turkey faces is terrorism. 
Participating in the peace operations has created opportunities for cooperation in 
terms of terrorism. The TAF has also gained the operational capability of dealing 
with the PKK- KONGRA GEL terrorism through the experiences it gained abroad. 
This is important because PKK- KONGRA GEL offers a non-traditional security 
threat and coping with it requires expertise in low intensity conflicts and operations 
other than war (OOTW). The Turkish military has gained such expertise through 
joining peace operations.  
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Turkey has shared its capability and experience with terrorism with other 
countries and benefited from the experiences of other countries as well by 
contributing to peace operations in Afghanistan. As Turkey is a country located in 
the middle of current and potential conflicts, the Turkish Army has been familiar 
with many kinds of these threats, especially in the context of terrorism, for many 
years. The Turkish Army is one which has gained the most training, experience and 
success in the struggle against terrorism in the world to date. Turkey succeeded in 
defeating the terrorists inside and ensured peace at home. The success has boosted 
respect for Turkey in the international arena, particularly in its region, and as a result 
Turkey may play bigger roles in the future. The Turkish Armed Forces have had the 
opportunity to share the expertise gained against terror with the armed forces of other 
countries, to transfer its experiences to them and at the same time, to benefit from the 
experiences of other armed forces.  
In weak states that have failed, or are on the verge of failing, Turkey’s 
presence in peace operations discouraged some countries from aggressive activities. 
This served as deterrence for other countries that might have hostile plans towards 
Turkey in the future. The deterrence of the TAF and the level it has reached in low, 
medium and high density conflicts has been displayed. Turkey has displayed what it 
is capable of doing in the international arena to the western community. Participating 
in peace operations contributed to Turkey’s growing presence in key nations and 
regions. Turkey’s opportunities and abilities have been shown to the world in the 
peace operations that it has participated in under the umbrella of the UN or NATO. 
Turkey, having a constructive role in the region, has proved to the international 
community that it has the ability to be helpful in the establishment of peace and stability 
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in the Balkans, within the international framework of the support and efforts in terms of 
finding a fair and permanent solution to the problems of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
Turkey’s participation in peace operations has also contributed to good public 
relations and to the promotion of the dignity of Turkey. Participating in peace 
operations has made its Armed Forces known (Kocatepe, 2001:619). The training 
level, discipline, effectiveness, equipment and materials and command structure have 
been shown to the international community. Turkish soldiers have taken the 
opportunity to show their traditional characteristics such as discipline, sense of duty 
and humanitarian characteristics to the international community and other countries 
contributing troops.   
The success of the Turkish brigade that participated in the Korean War and 
the bravery that was presented are praised by all countries, especially South Korea 
and the USA. The sympathy, objective approach and activities of the 300 Turkish 
troops who served in “Operation Restore Hope” organized in Somalia by UN were 
admired by citizens of Somalia, and its modern equipment and tools were admired by 
other countries. Hamid Karzai, Afghan Head of State, in his speech in the ceremony 
held for transfer of the ISAF command, said that Turkey and Afghanistan had lived 
as friends for years and now Turkey would continue its help by taking over the 
command and that he was very happy because of this fact. The dignity of the Turkish 
Armed Forces among other armed forces has increased even more. The Afghanistan 
operation showed that Turkey is not only important for its region but also is an 
indispensable part for the world security environment.  
In today’s world, participating in peace operations has helped Turkey respond 
effectively to the risks and challenges of globalization. The more Turkey contributed 
to peace operations, the more secure it felt, in regard to both hard (conventional) and 
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soft (non-conventional) threats. The post-Cold War era security understanding 
prioritizes ‘human security,’ ‘the global, interdependent and trans-regionalized 
nature of security’ and the ‘closer linkage between internal and external 
developments.’ The number of inter-state wars has decreased significantly since the 
end of the Cold War, but intra-state threats to human security have gained 
prominence. Turkey’s participation in peace operations has demonstrated that it has 
paid attention to human security and has become increasingly concerned about the 
human rights situation and its potential to spread instability to neighbouring countries 
in the region. By contributing to peace operations, Turkey has tried to persuade the 
international community that Serbian aggression was a direct threat to the 
sovereignty of Kosovo and violation of human rights of its citizens. Ankara, which 
had been accused of violating human rights by European states for years, has shown 
its sensitivity for human rights by contributing to these peace operations.  
Turkey’s participation in peace operations has demonstrated that the Turkish 
Army has accumulated experience, knowledge and ability to make plans at operative 
and strategic levels and carry out these plans in the multinational environment as a 
leading country. Contributing to ISAF as a leading country has elevated Turkey to 
the position of “planning country” from “supporting country.” Ankara has found the 
chance to prove that it is successful as a regional power and ready to assume more 
responsibilities.  
Wearing a blue helmet has also promoted Turkey’s reputation as a concerned, 
responsible regional power. Taking into consideration the contribution of Georgian 
and Azerbaijan platoons to SFOR and KFOR on the one hand, and the contribution 
of Albanian and Azerbaijan platoons to ISAF on the other hand (as subunits of 
Turkish Battalion Task Force), Turkey’s participation in peace operations has 
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demonstrated that Turkey is a ‘power producer’ country rather than a ‘security 
consumer’ (Bağcı and Kardaş: 2004). By contributing to peace operations, Turkey 
has increased the respect of its armed forces much more among the other countries’ 
armed forces.  
The importance of lobbying is undeniable as a strategy for having a voice in 
the international arena. Nowadays, Ankara has gained more effectiveness in lobbying 
by contributing to peace operations. Participating in peace operations gave Turkey 
the opportunity to send many civil technical staff both to UN decision-making bodies 
and to the establishment of civil headquarters in the force headquarters of the 
operation and this might influence the decisions that will be made to be in line with 
the interests of Turkey. 
Its participation in peace operations in the Balkans, Caucasus and the Middle 
East has made Turkey effective in preventing the adverse effects that occur in its 
neighborhood by participating in peace operations. Participation in peace operations 
in the Balkans and Caucasus has helped Ankara preserve regional and global peace 
and stability, reduce tensions and contain conflicts, resolve disputes through peaceful 
means, encourage the propagation of democracy and the rule of law, prevent ethnic 
conflicts from spilling over into its territory, create a peaceful and stable environment 
around it, and finally, improve relations with the countries in these regions.  
Another political-strategic related set of impacts of Turkey’s participation in 
peace operations is that it has provided Turkey with some important lessons 
learned.147 The TAF has learned that in contributing to a peace operation, it is 
necessary to study and analyse the background to the conflict carefully before 
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sending any troops to such a mission. Turkey’s contribution to peace operations 
based on unambiguous resolutions will likely enhance its success. Weighing 
conditions carefully will enable operations more successful. Lack of consent on the 
part of the various factions could prolong peace operations, leading to a stalemate in 
certain cases. A lead nation with adequate resources and political will, as well as the 
capacity to deploy well-equipped and prepared military forces quickly and 
convincingly, can be crucial for the credibility of a peace process.  
Evaluation of the political environment after the conflict will highly probably 
prevent that Ankara stays outside the table in the new political environment. The 
TAF has gained beneficial experiences for the reshaping of its force structure by 
participating in peace operations. Peace operations defined new criteria in the 
determination of priorities and precautions to be taken in the modernization of the 
armed forces. If it is established that it will be nearly impossible to win future wars 
by land occupation, the need for reshaping the force structure in this direction has 
been seen clearly. It has been understood that the execution of a more active foreign 
policy is required in order to protect Turkey’s far and near benefits. It has been 
witnessed that it is necessary to participate effectively in political and military 
formations that can intervene in crises and conflicts.  
Making some political and economic arrangements will likely prevent the 
migration of Turks from regions with current peace operations to Turkey. Therefore, 
the acquisition of Turkish nationality can made difficult and staying in regions with 
peace operations can be made attractive. Especially students going to Turkey for 
their education have the desire to stay in Turkey after their education is finished. 
They do not want to return to their country. They try to fulfill these desires through 
different means (marriage and acquisition of Turkish nationality, etc.). Prevention of 
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these kinds of things and making them return to their country in any case will benefit 
Turkey. It would be useful for both public and private sectors to invest heavily in 
regions with current peace operations. Renting and operating of the factories, which 
were operating before the war, by Turkish businessmen for a certain period of time 
will likely guarantee the future of Turkish society living in regions with current 
peace operations. 
 
4.1.2. Organizational and Educational (Training) 
Turkey has gained several important military benefits from participating in peace 
operations. The Turkish Armed Forces have gained beneficial experiences for 
reshaping its force structure by participating in peace operations. The TAF has been 
compared with the armed forces of other countries and its superior and defective 
points have been determined. In parallel with the concept of forward defense, 
Turkish security policy makers have found it necessary to transform the TAF from a 
conscript based conventional army into a professional army consisting of highly 
mobile and technologically equipped military units (Hickok, 2000:105-120).  
Turkey has transformed its army and gained a new structure and role. In light 
of the critical developments in the post-Cold War era, Turkey adapted and 
transformed its army in order to cope with new security challenges. Participation in 
peace operations and the skills and experiences acquired by the Turkish peacekeepers 
abroad have also contributed to the modernization of the Army in line with the 
changing security understandings during the post-Cold War era. Therefore, in 
response to Turkey’s growing exposure to a constellation of hard and soft security 
threats, security policy makers should have increasingly found it necessary to 
improve the operational capabilities of the TAF. Turkey’s attainment of soft and hard 
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military security capabilities would make it a more credible and influential power in 
the region.  
 
The General Staff now has a particular branch responsible for participation in 
peace operations.148 A brigade, the 28th Mechanized Infantry Brigade, has been 
assigned for peace operations as the result of Turkey’s participation in previous 
peace operations. The Brigade is under the command of the 4th Corps. This unit was 
established on 19 April 1976 as the 28th Motorized Infantry Brigade in Mamak, 
Ankara in place of the 28th Motorized Infantry Division which was deployed to 
Cyprus because of Turkish Military Intervention in 1974 (Kutluhan, 2002:52-57). It 
was organized as the Mechanized Infantry Brigade by restructuring on 1 July 1992 
and was renamed the Peace Force Brigade in 2001.  
The 28th Mechanized Infantry (Peace Force) Brigade, is located within the 
same barracks as the 4th Corps in Mamak, Ankara, and is a unique brigade in Turkey 
as it is assigned for peace operation missions. The brigade carries out all activities 
and training related to peace operations. The brigade consists of one Headquarter 
Company, four mechanized infantry battalions, one tank battalion, one artillery 
battalion, supporting units and units connected to it. One mechanized infantry 
battalion of the brigade serves in Bosnia-Herzegovina, another battalion serves in 
Kosovo, and the other battalion serves in Afghanistan. 
Since 1992, the 28th Mechanized Infantry (Peace Force) Brigade has been 
preparing and training Turkish soldiers who will serve in peace operations. To this 
end, conscripts in particular have been trained for 10 weeks on peace operation 
subjects after completing basic military training, which lasts 3 months. In addition to 
training fields and peace operation classrooms, the 28th Mechanized Infantry (Peace 
                                               
148
 Detailed Information about this branch of the Turkish General Staff can be reached at 
http://www.tsk.mil.tr/uluslararasi/barisidestekharekatkatki/index.htm 
  189 
Force) Brigade has a standing Peace Support Operation Center. It controls and 
follows up Turkish contingent activities, follows their daily activities, takes their 
reports, rapidly examines them and combines their daily actions and exercises to 
convey to Land Forces Headquarter and other related units if needed and transmits 
the commands, directives and instructions to the Turkish contingents. The military 
tasks and the task of suppressing a social disturbance in particular, require sufficient 
training about these issues. The Turkish Armed Forces has established a training unit 
as a subunit of the 28th Mechanized Infantry Brigade and all of the military personnel 
assigned to the TBTF are being trained by this unit. 
 In parallel with Turkey’s increasing participation in peace operations, the 
TAF has also been faced with the need to operate in coordination by rearranging its 
functions related with NATO and to cooperate in crisis areas by using both its own 
and civil sectors’ capabilities. Within this context, the TAF Logistics and 
Humanitarian Aid Brigade was established on July 20th, 2001. The Logistics and 
Humanitarian Aid Brigade is the unique logistics unit for peace operations and 
carries out logistics and humanitarian activities and training related to both peace 
operations and natural disasters. The Brigade Command is composed of Headquarter 
and Headquarter Support Company, CIMIC Unit, Functional Expert Teams, Special 
Engineer Battalion and three Logistics Support Battalion which will serve in three 
different mission region simultaneously. The mission of the Brigade is to provide 
logistics support and humanitarian aid and/or to minimize the negative effects of the 
conditions after natural disasters and to contribute to the efforts in returning to 
normal life conditions. 
The Turkish Armed Forces, which gained a certain experience by 
participating in the activities of peace forces, will train the armed forces of other 
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countries in case of such a demand.  In this way, Turkey has both been publicized 
and foreign exchange has entered the country. Participation in peace operations has 
given this force the opportunity to receive realistic information on the sufficiency of 
arms, equipment, training levels, technologies and communication service support 
belonging to other troop contributing countries, and to compare this information with 
Turkish troops, and to make up the deficiencies.  
 The staff participating in the activities of peace forces have developed a 
broader vision and have taken the opportunity to know the citizens and armed forces 
of other countries. The TAF has gained useful experiences for forming the power 
structure in the future by participating in peace operations. These operations put 
some new criteria forward for the determination of precautions and priorities for the 
modernization of arms systems. When we take into consideration that it will be 
nearly impossible to win fights by occupation of lands, it can be clearly seen that the 
power structure could be formed in this direction. The necessity of forming an armed 
force that aims to have a constant potential to cause great harm to the aggressor came 
into being in order to deter and to obtain national objectives.  
Through participating actively in the peace operation in Somalia, the Turkish 
Army has gained international experience in peace operations, which it could not 
gain during the Cold War era. A significant portion of the military staff has taken 
specialized training, including intensive English language courses, communications 
and driver training. Because of the short deployment cycles in the peace operations, 
experienced personnel regularly returned to their units with greater skills and 
experience, which they helped disseminate to their colleagues. Turkish military 
personnel have also gained the experience of cooperating and working closely with 
the armed forces of allied countries. Forming a friendship between the staff of the 
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TAF and staff of other troop contributing countries has resulted in positive effects for 
the mutual assistance of armed forces. It has given the TAF the opportunity to 
cooperate and work with the armed forces of other countries that participate in the 
peace operations. As evidence, John Mccoll, English Major General, who transferred 
the command of ISAF in Afghanistan on June, 20 2002 said that everybody worked 
in a cooperative manner during the term of Office for the provisional government 
and declared his trust in Turkish Troops.149  
Turkish soldiers have gained considerable experience by contributing to 
peace operations. The added skills and experience acquired by peacekeepers have 
contributed to the overall modernization of the Turkish Army. Turkey’s participation 
in peace operations has benefited the capabilities of individual soldiers and entire 
units. Formal training, field and command post exercises, and operations on the 
ground in peace operations have given hundreds of officers and troops direct 
experience in dealing with devious local political factions, crowds of displaced 
civilians, fiercely independent providers of humanitarian relief, and randomly 
planted landmines.  
The TAF has also shared its capabilities with other troop contributing 
countries and benefited from their experiences in peace operations. Turkish soldiers 
have also helped Turkish politicians and bureaucrats who worked with them in 
gaining experience. The information and skills that have been gained by participating 
in peace operations has developed and it has contributed to the expansion of this 
information to the Turkish Armed Forces. In the field, officers observed and adapted 
to one another’s tactics, techniques, and procedures. Peace operations highlighted the 
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need for much better language capabilities, bilingual capabilities being especially 
important for unit and subunit commanders. Moreover, interpreters were found to 
need more than language facility; they also needed to understand the concept being 
translated, implying a need to be familiar with the other country’s military doctrine, 
methods, and terminology.  
Turkey contributed to this attitude towards the TAF by having special troops 
with high levels of training required in order to be a candidate for peace operations. 
Participating in multinational forces has provided the TAF with the opportunity of 
effective training in real war conditions and has increased its experience. No training 
can replace war experiences for the Armed Forces. War is not a desirable 
phenomenon; however participating in an operation of Multinational Forces in order 
to see what troops are capable of when obligated to fight together, and to detect and 
make up for the deficiencies in this undertaking is important. 
That rules of engagement be well understood by all personnel of Turkish 
contingents and interpretation of the rules be consistent across contingents will likely 
enhance its reliability. The contingent commanders may ensure that all personnel are 
fully aware of the rules of engagement through extensive briefings both before 
deployment and following deployment. It has been understood that all personnel 
know thoroughly the UN legislation, and taking a counselor who knows this 
legislation to the region will probably enhance success.  
Upon arrival in a mission area, receiving a proper induction and orientation 
briefings including familiarization with mission standard operating procedures 
developed and issued at the start of the mission will likely prepare all staff members 
for their tasks. The induction course could cover all relevant subjects, including 
background information on the mission, its mandate, the history of the conflict, 
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information on local cultural and religious practices, the obligations and 
responsibilities of UN personnel in the host country, standards of personal conduct, 
etc. Creating specific induction packages for their new staff members, explaining 
tasks and functions will probably make each component more effective. Establishing 
a staff welfare committee to organize staff activities to promote informal interaction 
between staff in different areas of the mission will encourage greater cohesiveness 
within a mission, hence, improve working relations. In a multinational operation, 
there would be need for effective communications between national contingents as 
well, and the further need to interact and communicate effectively and consistently 
with the local population.  
Having the trained personnel and equipment needed to fulfill the tasks of the 
mandate will likely make Turkish contingents contributing to a peace operation more 
effective. It is the responsibility of Turkish Army to ensure that its contingents are 
adequately equipped, trained, led and motivated for service with a peace operation. 
Developing mission standard operating procedures will likely enhance effectiveness 
of the operation. Other countries’ contingents such as Azerbaijan, Georgia and 
Macedonia which will serve under the command of Turkish units in a peace 
operation have different military cultures and standards of training. These diverse 
backgrounds need to be harmonised for smooth co-ordination during peace 
operations. In this regard, it is gratifying to note that many efforts are being made by 
Turkish Army. Turkey’s efforts in creating joint training institutions, and running 
workshops, seminars, conferences and map exercises will probably ensure some 
common denominators are established. 
Conducting mission-specific pre-deployment training will prepare all 
contingents for peacekeeping duty. This training could include the following topics: 
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mandate of the mission, background to the conflict and the security environment in 
general, mission rules of engagement and other standard operating procedures, Code 
of Conduct and personal behaviour, health and hygiene, drivers’ education, mission’s 
working language, weapons and equipment, and crowd control techniques. 
Meaningful and realistic training will likely build confidence, improves cohesion, 
and prevents boredom. Tasks that have been well-learned and repeatedly practiced 
are less disrupted by stress. Continunation of their own training programmes will 
probably ensure Contingents’ preparedness.  
Preparation of the Turkish Contingents contributing to peace operations to 
undertake the full range of tasks expected in these operations, including robust 
deterrence will likely enhance effectiveness of the operation. Mission training cells 
needs to be encouraged to conduct refresher training courses in addition to the 
induction training/briefings they already conduct for contingents and staff officers. In 
multidimensional missions they can also be used for conducting specialized training 
or integrated training with other mission components.  
Communications means are essential for all units to fulfill their operational 
tasks. Providing properly trained communications personnel and communications 
equipment that is workable upon deployment will likely enhance success of a peace 
operation. Well established Communication and Information Systems was an 
important role and this assisted the success of the peace operations that Turkey 
contributed to. Secure voice, data and video teleconferencing facilities functioned 
well especially in ISAF. Establishing communication teams equipped with high-
technology devices and whose educational levels are high enough are important for 
the success of a peace operation.  
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An important experience has been obtained with the active participation of 
the Air Forces’ components in the peace operation in the Balkans. Establishing a 
modular structured Corps consisting of two brigades that will execute OOTW and a 
Logistics Brigade that can provide Logistics support in these peace operations will 
probably enhance Turkey’s success. Training of the modular structured corps to be 
organized according to the purpose and teaching the required languages to the 
personnel will enhance its effectiveness.  
The Peace Force Training unit could take place in the establishment of that 
Corps and the assignment of modulation personnel after taking enough training on 
operations other than war may improve its accomplishments. Creation of a stable 
environment will likely enhance its success in the task, and CIMIC may be 
constituted so as to have dominance in terms of morale and tactical. A unit that will 
carry out psychological operation activities may be established. Assignment of a 
Special Forces team to the units that will participate in Peace Operations will assist 
them in Special Forces Operation. The presence of at least one NBC (Nuclear, 
Biologic, and Chemical) team in the forces will likely protect the forces against the 
threat of using chemical arms against the parties. The individuals who will direct 
Turkish policy may officiate in the peace force units. For this purpose, it will be 
suitable to assign a representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs so that he/she 
will act jointly with Peace Force units. Forming a team of mine detection dogs under 
the Corps will help the mines, especially the plastic ones, to be found while 
executing the mine clearance mission. A Commando battalion may be established 
under the Corps. A corps that can execute operations other than war operations may 
be self-sufficient and may take advantage of personnel, materials and resources from 
other units, public institutions and organizations.       
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4.1.3. Tactical 
Participating in peace operations has contributed to the testing and made up for the 
deficiencies in command-control and communication systems. For example, US 
troops in Somalia communicated with their country with the help of small portable 
radar and satellites. For the TAF, a need for including such a system to the inventory 
was added to the agenda. Levels of experience were improved through working 
within and being exposed to the multinational environment. Turkey’s participation in 
peace operations has given the Turkish Armed Forces the opportunity to eliminate 
deficiencies in terms of the intervention of events in civil society, media and public 
relations, and management of psychological operations. It will facilitate the harmony 
of Armed Forces with the Combined Joint Operations and will make up for the 
deficiencies. 
Participating in peace operations under the command of the UN and NATO 
has given the TAF an important experience. The tactics needed in using modern arms 
systems in an armed forces’ repertoire were observed.  Especially, the extent of 
effectively using guided weapons, called intelligent ammunition, and to what extent 
force saving can be assured were determined. Turkey’s participation in peace 
operations has given the Turkish Armed Forces the ability to serve in different lands 
(desert, dense forests, and residential areas) and climate conditions (very hot, very 
cold) and the TAF has become able to serve in every climate and land. The mobility 
of the TAF over long distances via highways, railways, naval ways and airways has 
developed.  
The participation of the Turkish Air Force in peace operations of NATO 
brought it the ability and opportunity to perform operations in an international 
environment, including logistics support. The Turkish Air Force is a power that is 
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acquainted with NATO doctrine procedures and training along with national 
doctrines. The national operations or joint or independent operations in NATO, with 
controls and assessments, constantly developed this ability. However, the Bosnia 
peace operation was the first confrontation with a real operation for most NATO 
administrators and forces that participated in the operation. For this reason, available 
concepts and methods were constantly developed and the Turkish Air Force 
immediately benefited from this development. As a result, the TAF did not lag 
behind in the implementation of more developed air forces. 
Along with the acquisitions of the Turkish Air Force as a result of its 
participation in peace operations, the TAF also observed and compared the 
implementations, opportunities and abilities of other air forces with its own 
opportunities and abilities, and that it drew lessons in order to know what should be 
developed and obtained to become a more effective military power. In the Kosovo 
operation, the protection that advanced technology arms and arms systems provided 
the Turkish Air Force and the damage given to the enemy were observed by the TAF 
on hand. 
The Kosovo Operation provided the reinforcement of new air operation 
concepts that were implemented in the Gulf Operation. This is an approach that deals 
not only with the Air Forces of the enemy but also with the administration, economy, 
transportation system, energy resources of the Armed Forces of the enemy as a 
whole and that makes the systems of the target country inoperable and defines targets 
to create a strategic paralysis effect. Political, economic and military targets are 
considered together. Simultaneous attacks are realized at the strategic, operative and 
tactical levels. Thus, taking this new concept into account both in attack and defense 
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of power structuring will probably make the Air Forces a more effective military 
power.  
Regular contacts and consultations with the other troop contributing countries 
(TCCs) are vital for the success of peace operations. The frank and open 
consultations including an honest assessment of the situation on the ground and what 
conditions troops are likely to face will probably increase the success of peace 
operations. Forming a common understanding on what has to be achieved and how 
will improve the efficiency of the force. It may even be essential to establish a 
robust, well-resourced public information component from the initial phase of a 
peace mission. The presence of the force component on the ground as early as 
possible will highly likely explain the mandate of the mission to the parties to the 
conflict, the local population, and the local and international media. This is essential 
to establish the credibility of the mission early on and shape realistic expectations 
among the local population. The other important issue is to avoid any interference 
with the internal affairs of the country politics.  
There had been problems with the administrative and operational control of 
UNOSOM II operation. Owing to the complex, multinational nature of UNOSOM 
operations, Lieutenant General Çevik Bir, the force commander of UNOSOM II, had 
been constrained by the need for extensive consultation before ordering troops from 
different countries to execute tasks which are crucial to the success of their missions. 
Consultations tended to waste vital hours and days, eventually resulting in the loss of 
lives.150 General Bir explained that, as commander of UNOSOM II, he had faced 
some problems since he had almost no authority to charge the contingents under his 
command and control.  Contributing countries had been assigning their forces to the 
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UN with the condition that they could determine their area of responsibility by 
themselves. He had been trying to command these forces according to the preference 
of their countries. This understanding had been one of the difficulties faced by 
General Bir throughout his service (Bir, 1999:79). Respecting to the related authority 
by all of the other units and organizations in the area of responsibility of the Peace 
Force will enhance success. Reacting to incidents and sending timely reports are 
essential for command and control. Force protection of all the units is also an 
important issue in a Peace Operation. 
Security equipment, such as detectors, x-ray devices, armored vehicles and 
narcotic sniffing dogs are essential equipment to ensure the security and force 
protection of the units. In these peace missions, it will be suitable to be focused on 
and give priority to small scale units/facilities having an asymmetrical impact and 
giving support to regional populations and the other country squads taking place in 
the international environment instead of combat squads being superior in numbers. 
Giving priority to helicopter squads in some peace operations will probably improve 
their effectiveness. It has been evaluated that undertaking the responsibility of 
running facilities having a strategic characteristic like airports will probably benefit 
Turkish contingents. It has been observed that charging special squads that are small 
but have operational efficiency and have received alpinism and/ or ski training 
according to the characteristics of the region in which the operation will be carried 
out is important.     
Establishing psychological operation teams which are equipped with 
technological possibilities and with highly educated personnel is important in order 
to ensure that Turkish contingents can become self-sufficient in these matters. The 
national limitations that Turkey puts on the usage of its squads may be compatible 
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with the national limitations of other countries. Some authorities on this subject may 
be given to the commanders, who are operating at the rank of generals in the region. 
Some flexibility may be given to the Commander in the region for the 
implementation of national limitations declared by NATO. It has been demonstrated 
that issues like Special Operations and Psychological Operations are important.    
From past operations, it has been understood that it is necessary to give the 
charged personnel the authority of opening fire in the face of situations like 
skirmishes with ethnic groups, mine dangers, or ambush fires. It has been appreciated 
that team unity in Common and Joint Operations carries a great deal of significance. 
It has been realized that the mines which are not marked can create great dangers. It 
has been revealed that the squads that will participate in these types of operations 
may be trained for various kinds of tasks ranging from the control of an air space to 
the control of a city, and they may be prepared for these issues. It has been realized 
that the fact that far-reaching activities like the foundation of a government and the 
establishment of a State’s functions may be necessary and may be taken into 
consideration, and this is necessary to train personnel on these subjects.  
Unmarked mines had been a danger for the TBTF. Due to lack of personnel 
in the Explosive and Ordnance Disposal (EOD) team, the TBTF was faced with 
some problems during collecting arms. Patrol teams had to wait for EOD personnel 
when they found some materials in some certain places since only EOD personnel 
were authorized to touch them. Utilizing EOD teams in every TBTF during a peace 
operation will likely enhance its success.  
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4.1.4. Operational and Planning 
A geographic information system cell may be established as early as the mission 
planning stage to ensure such coverage from the very beginning. Turkish 
Contingents could be encouraged to conduct pre-deployment visits by assessment 
teams to their future areas of operation, when possible. Teams may include experts 
on logistics and operations. In later peace operations, the Turkish Army carried out 
pre-deployment reconnaissance visits to their future areas of responsibility to 
understand the situation on the ground and better prepare their troops. This initiative 
led to very good results in terms of the preparation of contingents prior to 
deployment.   
Pre-deployment reconnaissance, which is essential to achieving a rapid and 
structured military deployment schedule, can be a prerequisite for all new missions. 
Perfect coordination with the specialists before coming to the theatre is of crucial 
importance to clarify the requirements of personnel, logistics, communications and 
all of the other equipment. Careful determination of the structure of troops to be 
deployed will likely increase the effectiveness of Turkish Army in peace operations. 
For instance, while ISAF II had roughly 4,800 personnel, only 850 were infantry 
troops assigned for patrolling and check-point duties. The rest were staff and support 
personnel. This is because many countries preferred not to provide combat troops. In 
order to be effective, it may be necessary to remove bottlenecks in the organizational 
structure of Turkish units in peace operations. Having special tables of organization 
and equipment (TOE) for units including upgraded communications, observation, 
and mine clearance capabilities, as well as psychological warfare (PSYOPS), and 
civil affairs capacity will likely enhance the success of Turkish Units sent into peace 
operations.  
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It has been understood that the Planning Group, which will be formed after 
the UN’s decision, could prepare all sorts of plans before the components come to 
the region. This group could also define clearly the functions and responsibilities of 
the units when they arrive in the region. The probability plans may even be prepared 
4 or 5 months beforehand, and the detailed handbooks of strategically important 
regions that can enter in the sphere of interest may be prepared by coordinating 
related ministries in order to be prepared for future peace operations. The 
characteristics of local people and of the forces that will participate in the operation 
may also be specified in these books.  
It would be beneficial to contact with people having the knowledge of the 
region beforehand, such as journalists and traders, and to attain knowledge about the 
region. Having learned from past operations, contributing to peace operations at the 
right time will likely be more favorable for Turkey. When it is decided that the 
Turkish Armed Forces will participate in a peace operation, the time should be 
determined in the best way. For instance, avoiding creating an unrealistic 
environment, such as stating “Look, Turkish soldiers are turning back after long 
years” will benefit Turkey. A wrong evaluation that will be made on this subject can 
both decrease the respectability of Turkey in the public opinion of the world and 
make Turkey a military target.   
Rumors are common before deployment. Providing accurate information to 
soldiers and their families will get them have appropriate expectations and will 
prepare them psychologically. Transmission of information from the chain of 
command may be scheduled on a routine basis so that soldiers will learn to rely on 
official sources, rather than rumor. Information about the mission’s background, the 
rules of engagement, the length of deployment, the culture of the country of 
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deployment, the threat of disease, etc. will give soldiers a concrete focus for plans 
and actions.  
Selecting well trained personnel for the peace operation is another key issue 
for the operation’s success. It has been noted that some of the personnel serving in 
early peace operations do not have the enough skills and competencies to represent 
the Turkish Armed Forces and Turkish Republic abroad and do not know how to 
behave. The success of a peace operation relies heavily on the individual and 
collective skills of its personnel, particularly its leadership. For instance, the 
appointment of a Turkish Commander to Afghanistan was cited by many as a critical 
element in winning the confidence of the local people.  
Selection and appointment of staff with the necessary professional skills and 
experience for key positions from the start of a mission will highly likely increase 
operation’s success. Senior military leaders, such as the Force Commander, Deputy 
Force Commander, Chief Military Observer, may be selected not only for their 
extensive military experience, but also their ability to work in a multinational and 
multicultural environment. They may have excellent political and diplomatic skills 
and demonstrate the ability to build a team. They may be able to command the 
respect of both their own forces as well as those of the parties to the conflict. As far 
as possible, they may be involved in the initial planning of the mission and the 
development of the concept of operations.    
Being represented effectively inside all of the headquarters at an operative 
level in the operation area will probably increase the influence of the Turkish Army. 
Giving priority to be represented in the command groups of the headquarters or in 
the sections of G-2 (Intelligence Officer), G-3 (Operation Officer), and CIMIC is of 
crucial importance. To be represented in the headquarters at the rank of general and 
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if not possible, at the rank of colonel is also important factor. The permanent 
representation of especially critical offices in these headquarters, rather than the 
cyclical change in the participation of these offices, may be taken into consideration. 
It has been observed that selecting the cadres and units that can create maximum 
representation through minimum usage of forces and resources, with the maximum 
influence on the local people and on the personnel of other countries who can 
provide the possibility of obtaining the maximum amount of information about the 
developments and orienting the events are important. 
Some of the problems experienced by the Turkish contingent are directly 
related to linguistic diversity. The contributing countries have different languages as 
well as their different military cultures and standards of training. These diverse 
backgrounds have sometimes created problems. Peacekeepers were not talking about 
the same thing as happened in NATO. There was no plan, standard procedures etc.151 
Since the common language within the UN or NATO peace operations has long been 
English, assignment of personnel who have proficiency in English to the cadres will 
likely increase the success of Turkish contingents. It has been evaluated that the 
language level of the personnel who will take charge in the International 
headquarters should be ‘very good/good, the language level of those who will take 
charge in the other cadres should be ‘intermediate’.  
It has been demonstrated that intelligence is important in peace operations. 
Problems of control in peace operations have been exacerbated by a lack of 
meaningful intelligence. It is common knowledge that for any operation to succeed 
there is the need for adequate intelligence which will enable cohesive planning. 
Dispatching troops to the mission area with very little information about the people, 
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their culture, their beliefs, traditions and customs will likely decrease the efficiency 
of Turkish contingents. Many of the troops were inadequately briefed on Somali 
culture, leading to inappropriate behavior on their part. There was not Somalia 
handbook on Somali culture. In UNOSOM II, some personnel of the Turkish 
contingent had some problems since they were not made fully aware of the mission’s 
rules of engagement.152  
Intelligence gathering is a serious business and needs to be carried out by 
trained and competent staff in order to achieve coherent planning. Coordinated 
training for peacekeeping troops and civilian staff alike in intelligence and counter 
intelligence is necessary for success in future operations. It will be suitable to 
support the activities of Turkish contingents with information support elements and 
the teams of HUMINT (Human Intelligence). In order to ensure that Turkish 
contingents can become self-sufficient, establishing intelligence teams which are 
equipped with technological possibilities and with highly educated personnel is 
important. It has been revealed that the number of arms declared by the clashing 
groups is different from the real numbers and taking special measures for arms 
control will likely increase the success of the operation. It has been seen that the best 
way of collecting combat intelligence is to meet regional people and speak with 
them. It has been understood that the confirmation of reconnaissance information 
obtained from the air is important. It has been realized that it is essential to know the 
local languages (in addition to English) of the regional people along with their social 
and cultural characteristics. Currently, the possibilities and competences of the 
menacing countries must be known in order for the modern airplanes can perform 
their functions in the most efficient ways. In order to have a better situational 
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awareness, the Turkish Air Forces could have the possibility of real-time 
intelligence and employ unmanned aerial vehicles.  
The system of liaison officership had been well organized by the US Army in 
Somalia. Every unit which arrived to Somalia had been provided with an American 
liaison officer and this officer had been staying with his vehicle, driver and radio. 
Most of them held in the rank of Captain or Major and had been serving voluntarily. 
If Turkey assumes the leadership of a peace operation in the future, using this 
method will be useful. 
 
4.1.5. Logistic 
Deployment has provided the opportunity to field-test equipment and methods, to 
gain first-hand experience in the field and to assess the capabilities of other nations 
deploying or supporting the peace operation. Additionally, deployed units have been 
provided with the newest equipment. For instance, medical units bring the latest in 
field ambulances and mobile operating theaters, while other units utilize 
communications equipment and light arms which they are able to test and refine 
under field conditions. Turkey’s participation in peace operations gave the Armed 
Forces the opportunity and ability to try and implement the planning, transportation 
and control of operations that will be held thousands of kilometers away from Turkey 
and to ensure logistics support. Overseas deployments tested Turkish logistics 
systems, and provided opportunities to experience and learn from other nation's 
systems. 
The Turkish contingent in Somalia experienced some operational setbacks 
initially because there were no updated maps of the area of operations for accurate 
operational planning or orders. Locations of hostile incidents were difficult to report, 
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deployments of troops and patrols were hard to plan and operational tasks were made 
much more difficult because of the lack of good maps.  
For the soldiers to better orient themselves in a new environment, the best 
cartographic information of the mission area can be made available before 
deployment. Updated maps of the area of operations are essential tools for soldiers to 
conduct their operational activities on the ground. 
There was also a lack of water, food, medicine, oil etc. in Somalia which 
could not meet the requirements of the Turkish contingent as well as the other troop 
contributing countries (Bir, 1999:30). The Turkish contingent thus faced significant 
difficulties in the beginning of its deployment. Adequate logistic support is a 
necessity for Turkish contingent to be successful in peace operations. Basic items 
such as tents, flak jackets, ballistic helmets and ambulances to carry their sick and 
wounded to the field hospital will enhance its success. Without effective logistics 
support, an essential element of peace operations, contingents will always feel 
abandoned and unable to operate at their optimum. In this regard, the pre-positioning 
of essential logistical items in the peace operation regions is of vital importance. The 
logistical capability of the military makes it well suited to perform certain kinds of 
assistance interventions, such as road repair and other reconstruction activities. 
Turkish contingents undertook many humanitarian projects, which benefited the 
local population immensely. These projects were all funded from the contingents’ 
own resources.  
Somalia was an alien and formidable environment for the Turkish contingent. 
Deployed soldiers confronted a very harsh climate and risked exposure to diseases. 
Many more serious infectious diseases existed in Somalia than in Turkey. Not only 
were many infectious diseases present, but the insects and other means of 
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transmitting them were also present.153 Large numbers of displaced, malnourished, 
sick and dying people living in crowded unsanitary conditions increased the risk of 
epidemics. The Turkish soldiers were particularly vulnerable because they had not 
been exposed to many of these diseases and had no immunity to them. Decreasing 
health problems through pre-deployment ‘Preventive Medicine Measures’ and 
vaccinations according to the regional characteristics of the area of operation will 
probably improve operational effectiveness. Peace missions’ effectivity requires the 
adoption of a multi-pronged preventive and treatment strategy for serious health 
hazards, such as malaria and HIV/AIDS.  
Logistics is the main problem area and need to be carefully planned and 
executed. Availability of planes (transportation or tactic) and various construction 
equipment (in particular military engineering construction equipment) to Turkish 
contingents will improve their efficiency. It has been realized that the materials and 
the equipment that are given to both preliminary delegation and the real force could 
be portable and arranged in such a way enabling them to be carried by containers.   
Although many troop contributing countries had troubles with their clothing and 
equipment because their uniforms were not suitable for the characteristics of the 
operation and operation region, the Turkish personnel seemed not to be troubled by 
this (Bir, 1999:44). It has been noted that the performance of the force will be likely 
affected by the suitability of their clothes to the regional weather conditions.  
It has been further observed that satellite communication capability will 
improve personnell’s morale. Today, the need for Airborne Warning and Control 
System (AWACS) planes in addition to warning systems deployed on land for the 
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expedition and direction of the operation is obligatory if the Turkish Air Forces 
participate in a probable operation inland or abroad. For this reason, accelerating the 
procurement of airborne early warning planes will increase the efficiency of the air 
force.        
A modular structure of the logistics unit will be more appropriate; it will be 
suitable to transform the unit rapidly according to the structure of the peace operation 
and to train and organize this unit in such way that it will support at least four peace 
operations that may be executed at the same time. Following a very brief warning, 
establishing the logistics units suitable to the operation type to be implemented in the 
peace operation will be appropriate. Organizing a flexible and modular structure that 
can fit to the establishment and to the structure arising from the differences of 
function in the peace keeping and peace enforcement operations will probably 
enhance logistical support.      
The Turkish soldiers experienced some stressors related to dangerous 
situations and separation from their family. The environment in Somalia was also 
highly stressful for all staff. They had to adapt to this new situation. Yet, none of the 
staff had access to a stress counselor. The Turkish contingent did not have a 
psychologist in Somalia. There is a need for qualified stress management personnel 
to counsel staff in peacekeeping operations. Regular counseling session may improve 
personnell’s psychological health.  
 
4.1.6. Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) 
The Turkish Armed Forces has gained experience especially in CIMIC activities. 
After all, the ultimate aim of peace operations is to restore peace and stability 
which will enable people to return to a normal way of life. It has been 
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demonstrated that issues like Press and Public relations and civil- military 
cooperation activities are important. In order to defuse the negative effects of the 
intimidation people feel in a peace operation region because of the economic, 
military, and manpower strength displayed by the international community, it is 
essential to show to the people respect. Showing respect is also the key to gaining 
the trust of the people living in peace operation region.   
Projects undertaken by military contingents to improve the life of the local 
population where they are deployed are essential for building a positive 
relationship with the local population. These projects serve also as an important 
confidence building and peace-building measure that has important political 
benefits. A civil-military coordination cell could be established to coordinate such 
activities. Many CIMIC projects also paid political and security dividends beyond 
the initial humanitarian purpose. Resurfaced and rebuilt roads improved security 
and access, encouraging refugee returns and increased commerce. Rehabilitated 
market facilities and schools provided opportunities for ex-combatants to return to 
civilian life. Soccer fields and balls donated by Turkish contingents occupied 
young people who otherwise had nothing to do. Most projects were undertaken in 
consultation with the local communities.  
Since CIMIC personnel officiates in the peace operation for six months is 
disadvantageous, the period in office can be lengthened. While the personnel are 
trying to become acquainted with the public and vice-versa, the period comes to an 
end. It will take the personnel approximately three months to establish an 
understanding of the people connected in the operational region, and to learn the 
environment. The fact that the personnel may be sent to the region in an 
overlapping way will probably remove a weakness in this subject. The task of 
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securing and maintaining mutual trust and respect is the most crucial aspect of any 
peace support operation. The main principle in a peace operation should be “to 
show polite behavior to local people.” For this reason, it is essential for countries 
to provide prior training to their personnel on the delicate nature of peace 
operations, which requires courteous behavior towards the local population. Being 
seen to act impartially, being of mature age and/or having experience in your field, 
taking the time to listen to representatives of the population, and never losing your 
temper all contribute to gaining the population’s trust and respect, which in turn 
enables a more effective discharge of the mission’s mandate.  
In a peace operation, it is a necessity that all personnel respect the country’s 
customs, cultural values and religious beliefs, in other words, they pay attention to 
the sensitivities of the people. At the same time, in a peace operation all personnel 
should take great care to set an equal approach to all ethnic groups of the country. 
Otherwise, people can easily see peacekeepers as invaders. On the CIMIC issues, 
working in very close consultation and coordination with the local authorities, the 
UN and other Non-Governmental Organizations are another important aspect of 
peace operations. A common CIMIC fund for peace operations’ assistance activities 
towards the local community would be useful.  
 Ignoring the role of the media will likely decrease the operations’ success. 
Media plays an important role in achieving goals by informing local and 
international community about the activities of peace operations and incidents that 
have taken place in the area of operations. The media is also of crucial importance in 
reporting on time and accurately, and preventing incorrect news production. For this 
reason, holding press briefing will inform the public through one source and correct 
information. Some UN agencies, notably the UN High Commissioner for Refugees 
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(UNHCR), the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and the World Food Programme 
(WFP), as well as a number of NGOs may indeed be considered valuable partners to 
the military in the saving of lives. These organisations have financial and material 
resources that peacekeeping forces do not have. In many peace operations, however, 
friction has developed between the peacekeeping troops and the NGOs. With 
adequate and coordinated training, the differences in culture and modus operandi can 
perhaps be sorted out and the gap between these groups bridged for the benefit of 
those who are affected by conflicts.  
There has also been friction between the military components of peace 
missions and the media. The duty of the media is to inform and educate. If 
accurate information is concealed from them, they will find some information 
from inadequate sources any way. On the other hand, when handled properly, the 
media can be a very powerful tool for commanders in a stressful and desperate 
situation. It will also be suitable to support the activities of these components with 
information support elements, and the teams of CIMIC. Of further note is that the 
team commanders who have local translators speaking the local language and 
knowing how to approach local people are more successful in the peace 
operations. Considering the characteristics of the region and the ethnic structure, 
planning of at least one translator among the local or military personnel for each 
team doing CIMIC activities will likely enhance communications with local 
people. 
Peace operations personnel will benefit from being educated in public 
relations and civil-military co-operation at the orientation program before taking 
responsibility. In addition, CIMIC standart operating procedures will highly 
probably improve standartization of activities.  It has been revealed that CIMIC, 
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Press and Public relations carry a great deal of importance in the operation of 
peace enforcement and protection. Of note is that, the US has the trained units and 
personnel on the subject of CIMIC and this area has been left to the US 
completely.  
Increased number of Turkish NGOs in addition to assistance organizations 
could be directed to the region. Officer and non-commissioned officer selection 
process for CIMIC units in peace operations will determine how effective those 
units will be. Instead of selecting the persons who cannot realize the spirit of the 
mission; selection of those having the competence to carry the notion of Special 
Force will be more appropriate. Particularly those who will be charged with the 
duty of local institutions Communication officer and Humanitarian Aid officer 
may be experienced, strong in bilateral relations, know themselves, have a few 
weaknesses, and have a strong character. Assignment of inexperienced people will 
likely decrease effectiveness of the mission.    
A hospital that will be built in the region and the supplies and the doctors 
who will be assigned to the region by Turkish financial assistance will be a great 
factor for gaining public trust. Turkish units may operate health facilities having a 
characteristic of serving both local people on the wide plain and the other military 
units in the region   
It is to be noted that VHF/FM radios cannot be used efficiently in the 
mountainous regions without transmitters. It has been experienced that the initiative 
can be held easily by applying C4ISR (Command, Control, Communication, 
Computer, Intelligence, Surveilance and Reconnaisance) activities completely. An 
efficient command control system can be implemented without any faults and the 
desired result can be taken with the least loss, in the most efficient way and in the 
  214 
shortest time. Therefore, the needs for including the systems that will maintain an 
efficient C4ISR environment in the inventory have been revealed.      
Most of the F-16 and F-4 planes in the inventory of the Turkish Air Force 
have Self Protection systems. However, nowadays electronic combination has 
obtained a great deal of importance in order to paralyze the land and air command-
control systems and other arms systems of the enemy. For this reason, the Turkish 
Air Force need the obtaining programs of electronic combination systems (Stand off 
jamming and Escort jamming). The needs for including the systems that will 
maintain an efficient Command-Control and Correspondence environment in the 
inventory have been revealed. Providing short-range portable radio equipment to the 
units will likely increase the efficiency. Efficient and effective official lines of 
communication with the home-base rear detachment may even be established 
promptly. Soldiers may be encouraged to write home. Unofficial communication, 
such as a unit newsletter written by deployed soldiers, can be effective in reducing 
rumors back home and families’ fears about their loved one’s living and working 
conditions.  
 
4.2. Domestic Impact 
This impact may be mentioned under the subheadings: Public Opinion Impact; 
Historical and Cultural Impact; Religious Impact; and Economic Impact. 
 
4.2.1. Public Opinion Impact 
Another set of impacts on Turkey’s participation in peace operations in the post-Cold 
War era has been the role of public opinion in Turkey. Due to the presence of large 
numbers of Turks who had migrated from the neighbouring places, particularly the 
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Balkans, to Turkey over the years, the impact of its participation in peace operations 
on public opinion that have relatives in these regions is noteworthy. Turkey’s 
participation in peace operations in the Balkans and Afghanistan has helped Ankara 
develop its policies concerning the peoples living in these regions. Everyday events 
and achievements of the Turkish Battalion Task Force in the Balkans were noted in 
the Turkish press and played a role in public opinion (Lesser, 2000: 183-199) for 
they involved parties with strong cultural, ethnic or religious ties to Turkey. 
Therefore, Turkish people have welcomed the sending of Turkish troops to the 
Balkans since this has possibly increased the welfare of their relatives. Ankara has 
contributed to the happiness and well-being of its citizens by participating in peace 
operations in the Balkans since many Turks have relatives in the Balkans. This has 
helped prevent any domestic disturbance in Turkey. 
 
4.2.2. Historical and Cultural Impact 
Turkey’s contribution to peace operations in the Balkans has protected the historical 
cultural heritage of the Ottomans. It has contributed to the restructuring of the 
country socially and economically and has restored and rebuilt the traces reflecting 
the historical heritage of the Ottoman era (Bosna-Hersek Gerçeği, 1995:47). 
Turkey’s participation in Multinational forces has enabled it to protect the works of 
art which were in the operation area and had impacts from Turkish history and also 
helped it to prevent the annihilation of the people with whom Turkey has historical 
ties. It has promoted Turkish culture and traditions in different parts of the world 
with the help of the Turkish Armed Forces. Important historical and cultural ties 
exist between the peoples of Turkey and the Balkan countries, which in effect mirror 
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Turkey’s close ties with the region.154 Turkey, which had been active in the Balkans 
since the 14th century, kept historical ties and relative relationships with Kosovo up 
to date. By participating in peace operations, Turkey has embarked upon relations 
which will bean fruit in 50-100 years in the country where this operation is held. It is 
obvious that the establishment of the feelings of friendship and mutual understanding 
between nations requires many decades. Its relation with the Republic of Korea is a 
good example for this. Turkey has sown seeds of friendship in Afghanistan, similar 
to those which it had sewn and reaped concrete results from it in Korea in 1950, and 
led to a consolidated Turkish friendship with Korea. 
Turkey’s participation in peace operations has given the opportunity to 
establish close and deep-rooted relations with the host country as in the example of 
Korea. This friendship has enabled them to become closer and have close relations 
between them. This friendship and good relations is reflected in the political 
platforms and also solidarity in other different fields. For example, the Korean 
people supported the Turkish team and made advertisements with Turkish flags 
during the 2002 FIFA World Cup. The match to determine the third and fourth place 
between Korea and Turkey was a display of friendship rather than a harsh 
competition.  
 
4.2.3. Religious Impact 
Its contribution to peace operation in Somalia has had significant impact on Turkey 
regarding religion, for Turkey’s population is overwhelmingly Muslim. Turkey, 
which was unable to prevent ethnic cleansing in Bosnia, much of it directed at 
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Muslims, has helped other Muslims in Somalia. Seen in this way, the participation of 
Turkey in peace operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo has also helped ease 
tensions in Turkey since the Muslim populations of Bosnia and Kosova are 43 % and 
87 %, respectively. Turkey established a refugee camp in Kırklareli and hosted 
18,000 Kosovar deportees. In addition, Ankara established two refugee camps in the 
Republic of Macedonia and Albania and provided shelter for more than 10,000 
refugees (Turkish General Staff , 2001: 3).  
 
4.2.4. Economic Impact 
There is a rising trend of governments making financial gains from peace operations. 
The poorer nations may attempt to improve their financial positions by extracting as 
much money from UN peace operations as possible. Unlike these examples, Ankara 
is motivated by a boost in international stature. For Turkey, motivation for 
participation in peace operations is altruism and national prestige. Participation in 
peace operations is not supposed to generate financial benefits for Turkey. However, 
Ankara has gained several economic benefits from participating in UN or NATO 
peace operations. Its participation has made a contribution to the revival of the 
Turkish economy as the equipment for UN logistic support is provided from Turkey. 
Even though participating in peace operations for humanistic reasons is more 
important, its material contribution to Turkey cannot be undervalued. Some of the 
countries that participate in peace operations make economic contributions by 
leasing transportation means (plane, ship, etc.). Turkey has also gained in economic 
terms by leasing its available transportation means to the UN.   
The presence of a Turkish contingent in a peace operation has encouraged 
Turkish businessmen to make business contracts. Deploying in Bosnia, Kosova and 
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Afghanistan has brought investment to those countries. Its participation in peace 
operations has given Ankara the opportunity to increase its export and to realize 
technology transfer by obtaining new economic markets and having close relations 
with other contributing countries. The use of war weaponry and equipment (F-16, 
Aselsan, etc.) that are produced in Turkey has given the opportunity to find a market 
for these products and might contribute to the growth of the defense industry. An 
opportunity to find new markets for the home produced armored combat vehicle 
(ACV), F-16, light arms, radio, equipment and training uniforms that are used in the 
peace operations by Turkish contingents has arisen. Participation in peace operations 
has also enabled Ankara to take its place in the peace talks to be held after the 
conflict.  In this way, the private sector has taken the opportunity to find new 
markets. In the conflict areas, the restructuring and development after the end of 
conflict and conclusion of final peace agreement create a big market.  
Participation in the peace operation has also made an important material 
contribution to Turkey. This has increased the economic wealth of the staff working 
there and it has also become a contribution to the Turkish economy. For example, the 
soldiers of the countries that participate in the UN peace operation receive a certain 
wage. Turkish soldiers in Bosnia-Herzegovina were paid 25 US Dollars and officers 
and non commissioned officers were paid 25 to 70 US Dollars per day. Turkey’s 
participation in peace operations has helped an important amount of the material 
contribution that Turkey annually pays to the UN to come back to Turkey. By 
participating in peace operations, Turkey has established close relations with other 
participant countries, has obtained new economic market opportunities, and ensured 
the future transfer of technology.   Provision of supply materials and equipment that 
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are part of the logistics support needs of the UN from Turkey has indirectly ensured 
revival of the Turkish economy.   
 
4.3. Ideational Impact 
Turkey’s participation in peace operations has had a significant ideational impact on 
Turkey. This impact may be mentioned under the subheadings: Security 
Understanding of the West; Western Values; Relations with the US; Turkey’s Image 
as a Security Producer Country; Turkey’s Western/European Image; and EU 
Membership. 
 
4.3.1. Security Understanding of the West 
 Turkey’s increasing participation in peace operations during the post-Cold War era 
has demonstrated that it has successfully been adapting its security 
conceptualization/identity/culture/understanding to that of the West. Turkey’s 
participation in peace operations has also accelerated the process of its successful 
socialization into the idea that ‘during the Cold War era the armies of the western 
states were deployed on the ground to simply prevent the armies of the weak and 
totalitarian states from doing bad things outside their border whereas during the post-
Cold War era the armies of the western states are now deployed to urge them to do 
good things inside their borders.’ 
The European continent and its surrounding regions have been passing 
through a critical period from the end of the Cold War towards a new system in 
which security, politics, economy, and society are becoming increasingly 
interrelated. The concept of security, which is one of the most basic issues for human 
beings, has gained new definitions, understandings and applications (Sperling and 
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Kishner, 1997; Buzan, 1991).  The international community defines the greatest 
threats to international security and stability as those that stem from 
weak/failed/rogue states where domestic instability and economic underdevelopment 
prevail. In case of any domestic turbulence, the dangers would spill over to other 
places because in today’s world, security concerns are transregionalised in nature 
(Oğuzlu, 2003:51-83). 
Turkey now holds that defense starts outside territorial borders and what 
happens in other countries closely impacts its security interests. What happens 
outside of states did gain a priority for the western security interests. Thus, peace 
operations of the post-Cold War era became about the aspect of identity. It is without 
a doubt that Turkey’s experiences in peace operations abroad have helped transform 
its security understanding in this way. The TAF has begun to define Turkey’s 
security identity and interests in a way consistent with EU norms and principles.  
In the post-Cold War era, Turkey’s security concerns increased, its security 
burden became overloaded, and the new security issues influenced its security 
understanding. Ankara’s increasing emphasis on socio-economic and cultural-
political aspects of security (soft security) by contributing to peace operations 
provided positive implications for Turkey’s being recognized as Western/European 
in the post-Cold War era. The ISAF experience demonstrates that in the post 9/11 
world, Ankara has signed onto the logic that international security and internal affairs 
of states are closely related to each other.  
 
4.3.2. Western Values 
Turkey’s participation in peace operations has demonstrated that it has been 
considering legitimate western countries’ attempts to extend western values to non-
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western areas. In particular, the PfP Training Center is of great importance in this 
vein. In addition to providing the Alliance with hard military power in risky locations 
on the world map, Turkey has also tried to adapt to the new changing identity of the 
Alliance by taking part in many of the NATO-led peacekeeping and peacemaking 
operations in and around Europe and by redesigning its defense policy in line with 
the defense reforms in NATO. Turkey has proved to be an ardent participant of the 
Partnership for Peace Program and to this end hosted a PfP Training Center in 
Ankara (Karaosmanoğlu and Kibaroğlu, 2002: 131-164). 
Turkey, as a NATO member, has actively participated in the deliberations 
aimed at establishing and enhancing the PfP and launching the Euro Atlantic 
Partnership Council (EAPC), and has wholeheartedly supported regional co-
operation within the PfP (White Paper, 2000:14). Ankara pays great importance to 
the PfP programme, and considers the PfP programme an important mechanism to 
enlarge the peaceful environment by improving friendly relations further with all PfP 
countries. Turkey is very eager to contribute to international peace and stability 
within the framework of the PfP (Turkish General Staff, 2001:15). Within this 
context, Turkey decided to establish a ‘PfP Training Center’ in light of NATO’s 
Partnership for Peace initiative and the 5th paragraph of Point 25 of the Washington 
Summit Communique and declared that decision at the ministerial meeting of the 
NACC/EAPC in Sintra/Portugal, on 30 May 1997. Then Under-secretary of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador Onur Öymen stated in the opening of this 
Ministerial Meeting:  
“… we attach particular importance to the more operational role of 
the enhanced PfP. We have already decided in principle to create a 
multinational unit, which will be used for possible peace support 
operations. Our military authorities will develop the modalities of 
this project in consultation with the partners concerned. 
Furthermore, Turkey is planning to establish a PfP training center, 
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which will contribute to achieving peace and stability in our 
region.”.155 
 
The Turkish PfP Training Center was inaugurated with an international 
opening ceremony on 29 June 1998 in Ankara along with the first PfP Orientation 
Course held between 29 June-03 July 1998.156 In accordance with the ‘Concept of 
PfP Centers,’ all requirements were completed and the center was recognized and 
accredited by NATO on 12 February 1999 (Turkish General Staff, 2001:16). It is 
worth mentioning that it is the first recognized PfP training center by NATO of the 
nine PfP training centers.157 
The principal objective of the PfP Training center is to provide qualitative 
education and training support to military and civilian personnel of partners in 
accordance with NATO and PfP general principles and interoperability objectives 
and to organize courses in various fields ‘in the spirit of’ the PfP, bringing together 
officers from PfP member countries (Von Moltke, 1994:3-7). The mission of the PfP 
Training Center is to plan and coordinate all PfP and peace operation training and 
education activities (except for exercises) at strategic (military-political), operational, 
tactical-technical level and language courses. Military-political, operational and 
tactical courses have been carried out directly in the PfP Training Center while 
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technical courses and courses requiring field/sea training have been conducted in 
academies, military schools and training centers throughout Turkey under the 
command of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Gendarmerie Training and Doctrine 
Commands (TRADOC) and Joint Staff Colleges within the coordination of the PfP 
Training Center (Turkish General Staff, 2001:16). 
In addition to the PfP countries, Turkey provides training opportunities to 
personnel from non-PfP countries like the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, 
Bangladesh, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Gambia, Egypt, Jordan, Malaysia, 
Pakistan and South Korea. The course’s subjects given in this center related to peace 
operations are such as: Legal Aspects of Peacekeeping, Peace Support Operations, 
Land, Air, and Navy Forces in Peace Operations, Logistics in Peace Support 
Operations; CIMIC in Peace Operations and International Decision Mechanism 
(Sezgin, 1998). 
One of the main focuses of the PfP is the development of greater co-operation 
in the field of peace operations. NATO and partner countries are increasingly likely 
to find themselves side by side in responding to, and implementing, UN and OSCE 
mandates in peace operations (Von Moltke, 1994:3-7). The Ankara PfP Training 
Center makes great contributions to the efforts of PfP countries to meet their 
requirements to reach NATO standards. The purpose of the support given by Turkey 
to the personnel of these PfP countries is to assist them for adaptation to NATO’s 
doctrine, principles, tactics, procedures and standards. It’s obvious that Turkey, by 
means of the PfP Training Center, has contributed to peace and stability by 
developing a common understanding and methodology and will continue to play its 
key role in supporting peace operations (İnan and Yusuf, 1999: 68-84). 
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4.3.3. Relations with the US 
Turkey’s participation in peace operations has demonstrated that Ankara has been 
able to co-operate with the United States on the basis of its well-established strategic-
security understanding. The overlapping of American interests with those of Turkey 
in peace operation areas has made it possible for Turkey to follow such a course. 
Turkey’s contribution to peace operations has fostered bilateral cooperation with the 
United States in economic, social and military areas. Bilateral co-operation with the 
United States, particularly in the aftermath of 11 September 2001, through 
participating in peace operations in the fight against global terrorism has offered the 
state elite in Turkey a valuable opportunity to underline once again Turkey’s western 
identity and its indispensable place within the western international community 
(Turan, 2002: 10-18). The security culture of the Turkish Republic made it possible 
to cooperate with the United States in the above-mentioned regions. Both Turkey and 
the United States are used to operating in the international arena in accordance with 
the principles of realpolitik (Oğuzlu, 2003:294). 
With Turkey’s increasing participation in peace operations, US 
administrations have expressed support for Turkey’s membership in the EU. They 
have played the role of consoling Turkey when it has been rebuked by the 
Europeans. Washington had the most influence in promoting the significance of 
Turkey and its support for Turkey’s membership in the EU has gained further 
significance not only for Turkey’s aspirations to join the EU but also for Turkey’s 
increasing contribution to peace operations.  
Participation in peace operations has become an effective strategy to help re-
establish Turkey’s western and pro-American identity. That is why Turkey led the 
peace force in Somalia, sent substantial numbers of military troops to Bosnia and 
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Kosova, and recently joined the International Assistance Force in Afghanistan. For 
example, by assuming command of NATO forces in Afghanistan, Turkey has 
demonstrated the solidarity of the US-Turkey strategic partnership and Turkey’s 
resolve to combat terrorism. Turkey’s participation in ISAF was also a well thought 
out strategic calculation on the part of Ankara to help mend faces with the Americans 
following the deterioration of the bilateral relations in the wake of the latest Iraqi 
War (Kapsis, 2005: 380-389). 
When the Turks claim that Turkey is a ‘security producing’ country because 
it has participated in many of the NATO and UN international peace operations, as 
well as in NATO’s Partnership for Peace activities, they have found a receptive ear 
in Washington (Oğuzlu, 2002: 74). Washington has often praised Turkey’s 
participation in peace operations and has stated that Turkey is a security producing 
country. The words of Mark Parris, the former US Ambassador to Turkey are 
important in illustrating the effect of Turkey’s participation in peace operations to 
US-Turkish relations in the post-Cold War era; “From a security perspective, the 
military dimension of the relationship proved as important as during the Cold War. 
Turkish participation in peacekeeping actions in Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo and 
Macedonia demonstrated to Pentagon and White  House planners Ankara’s 
capabilities and readiness to shoulder responsibility as a ‘security producing’ nation” 
(Parris, 2003:7). 
On 1 November.2001, President Bush remarked that Turkey’s decision to 
deploy special troops for the fight against terrorism in Afghanistan refuted 
allegations that the US-led war was one against Islam. Recalling that Turkish-
American cooperation had been initiated during the Korean War and had continued 
with the Gulf War and Kosovo conflict, Bush said, “Today, Turkey and the US are 
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growing closer than ever before as part of our efforts to establish a world order based 
upon peace.” Meanwhile, the former US Ambassador to Turkey Robert Pearson said 
that the US was highly appreciative of Turkey’s decision to send troops to 
Afghanistan.158  
Another impact of Turkey’s participation in peace operations is that the US 
wants to see Turkey as a stability factor in the Balkans. The fact that Turkey is the 
only Muslim country that is considered as the representative of the Muslim World by 
western civilization has given Turkey the opportunity to take its own place in the 
peace talks. Turkey’s contribution to peace operations across the globe and its 
adoption of western security understanding appear to be among the most important 
reasons why the United States invited Turkey to send its troops to Iraq in the summer 
of 2003.   
 
4.3.4. Turkey’s Image as a Security Producing Country 
Turkey’s contribution to peace operations helped the members of the western 
community understand that Turkey is a security producing country in the region and 
is always a part of the solutions, rather than the problems. Turkey’s image as a 
security producing country has been enhanced. Turkey was seen as a “security 
burden or consumer” country.159 Since the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of 
the Soviet Union, it has become rather commonplace among EU policymakers to 
present Turkey as a consumer and not a producer of security in Europe. The EU’s 
move to transform itself from a purely civilian power to a military power and its 
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growing interest in the constitution of a European military crisis management 
capability has created an opportunity for Turkey to prove itself useful as a producer 
of security in Europe. Investment in the military sector, which inevitably resulted in 
identifying Turkey as a “security consumer” at the beginning of the 1990s, shifted to 
investment in the civilian sector in peacekeeping and peacemaking operations by 
visualizing the country as a “security provider” towards the end of the 1990s 
(Hürsoy, 2005: 419) 
The decision to initiate BLACKSEAFOR and the Southeast European 
Brigade should be interpreted in this vein. These initiatives have nothing to do with 
Turkey’s efforts to increase its security against regional threats. All of these 
initiatives were undertaken among others with the prime motivation of helping the 
members understand that Turkey was a security producing country in the region and 
always a part of the solutions, rather than the problems (Karaosmanoğlu, 2000:199-
216). 
Turkey’s participation in such operations has also helped dispel fears of a 
rising-hegemon Turkey. Scandinavian countries and countries such as Canada and 
Austria regularly participate to the activities of peace operations. These countries are 
known and respected as pacifist countries. Turkey’s participation in the UN Charter 
and in the activities of the peace keeping in line with the spirit of this Charter has 
increased its dignity in the international arena and contributed to its pacifist image. 
Its pacifist image as a country has changed the widely held negative view of Turkey. 
It has caused the negative propaganda against Turkey to fail. 
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4.3.5. Turkey’s Western/European Image 
Turkey’s contribution to western security interests had in the past constituted the 
most important link tying it to the West, and therefore making it easy for Turkey to 
be recognized as western. Turkey’s relationship with Europe and the West had been 
questioned deeply with regard to identity concerns especially after the collapse of the 
bipolar world system in the beginning of the nineties. The difference between the 
Turkish way of modernization and European civilization were clearly exposed. In 
such a negative atmosphere participation in peace operations appears to have offered 
Ankara a window of opportunity to help register its diminishing Western/European 
identity. Appearing to contribute to western security interests was hoped to re-
establish the most important link tying Turkey to the West, viz. the security. The 
more useful Turkey became for western security, the more western it would be 
recognized by the West. 
Turkey’s contribution to peace operations solidified its European/Western 
identity and provided effective functioning for Turkey’s relations with the western 
international community. Participation in peace operations provided Ankara with a 
western identity in international politics. Turkey’s Western/European image in 
Washington and European capitals has improved through its active involvement and 
successful performance in peace operations. The roles Turkey played in peace 
operations have served as occasions on which Turkish policy makers articulated and 
defined its Western/European identity as well as maintaining its security needs and 
interests.  
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Turkey proved that it is successful as a regional power160 and ready to assume 
higher responsibilities by participating in peace operations. Both sides of the western 
world now consider Turkey as a regional power contributing to peace and stability. 
Turkey has been regarded as an island of stability in the midst of regional 
instabilities. In this sense, Turkey’s concern of being recognized as 
Western/European country has been met by its participation in peace operations and 
close cooperation with the West against new challenges.161 Given that many 
locations where Turkey sent peacekeeping units did not directly affect its security in 
the realist or neo-realist sense, its participation has become a policy instrument to 
help bolster Turkey’s Western/European identity. 
Ankara pays close attention to every international organisation in the region, 
including NATO, OSCE, WEU, and the EU. By participating in peace operations 
within these organizations, Turkey did not stay out of their activities which may have 
had implications for Turkish foreign and security policy if they had. Ankara’s 
stronger links with the UN, NATO, the EU and OSCE within the framework of 
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peace operations has strengthened its western orientation and bolstered its European 
identity. With its participation in peace operations, Turkey has been seen much more 
in the activities of the UN and has played a much more active role in the 
international arena after the end of the Cold War. Turkey has shown its respect for 
the new values of the United Nations in the post-Cold War. Although it has not been 
elected as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council as of writing this 
dissertation, Turkey has gained international respect on the world stage. Turkey’s 
increased activity in international organizations provided it with new additional fora 
to express its views about security issues in Europe and other regions.  
States participate in peace operations to acquire a desired position in the 
hierarchy of states. Peacekeeping is a high profile international activity and 
participation can result in the elevation of status. Status and influence in international 
affairs is what states strive for, and therefore, participation in peace operations may 
be motivated by national interest. By contributing to peace operations, Turkey has 
rose to a favourable position in the international hierarchy of states.  A realist 
perspective of state participation in peace operations recognises that, if a state's 
interest is linked to the continuation of the international status quo, it will use 
whatever means at its disposal, including peacekeeping, to preserve that favourable 
status quo. By contributing to peace operations, Ankara preserved the continuation of 
the international status quo. The fact that Turkey is a prestigious member of the UN 
has a certain effect on the neighbor countries and on the countries in the region. This 
is a worldwide advertisement and publicity for Turkey. One of the most important 
methods of protecting peace is deterrence. For this aim, there should be armed forces 
that are strong enough to protect peace. In this way, the threats and aggressions of the 
neighbors and other countries can be prevented. The fact that Turkey participates in 
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peace operations under the umbrella of the UN or NATO and that it has strong armed 
forces has reinforced the importance of Turkey’s force and has increased the 
importance and bargaining power of Turkey in the political platforms.  
It is widely known that the media directs the international public in the 
information and communication era. In the framework of UN resolutions, the whole 
world watched live, the operation made in Iraq by Coalition Forces for 15 days. Live 
broadcasting of humanitarian aid given to the hungry people in Somalia had an 
important role in the publicity of the countries and their armed forces that 
participated in this operation. Participation in the activities of peacekeeping forces 
has introduced Turkey and the Turkish Armed Forces to the world. 
 
4.3.6. EU Membership 
It is also worth mentioning in this regard that Turkey’s participation in ISAF and 
signing on to the security logic in the post-9/11 era has contributed to the EU’s more 
constructive attitude towards Turkey’s demands to join the EU. EU membership was 
viewed as evidence of Ankara’s claim to belong to the western civilisation. Turkey’s 
chances of EU membership are strongly bound to its performance in successfully 
adopting distinctive EU values and norms, which are less about security than they are 
about democracy, human rights, the rule of law, and transparent and impartial 
procedures. Although the EU required Ankara to meet very complex and detailed 
accession criteria if it wanted to join the EU, Turkey’s participation in peace 
operations has increased its chances of becoming a member of the EU from a 
strategic-security perspective. During its Laeken Summit in December 2001 the 
European Union invited Turkey to take part in the European Convention scheduled 
for April 2002. This was a remarkable development given that the EU prior to 11 
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September had refused to issue an invitation to Turkey, even though it had invited all 
of the other candidate countries. 
The EU has started to see Turkey’s participation in peace operations as 
strengthening Ankara’s international profile. Statements by many senior generals 
indicate that the Turkish Armed Forces has begun to define Turkey’s security 
identity and interests in a way consistent with EU norms and principles.162 The new 
emphasis on economic development and political liberalization at home, and 
participation in multilateral peacekeeping operations and the use of economic 
diplomacy abroad, attest to this changing rationale.163  
The European Union has been eager to develop its own autonomous military 
capability not because of a desire to prevent unconventional security risks and 
challenges from disrupting the stability and prosperity of the continent. The major 
goal of the European Army has been to enable EU members to respond to any former 
Yugoslavia type crises that may occur within the European continent in the future 
(Rasmussen, 2002: 54). It seems that the EU’s approach towards the European Army 
is in accordance with its security understanding and threat perceptions in the post-
Cold War era (Oğuzlu, 2002:65). For any country to join the EU, the first 
requirement is adoption of the conceptual basis and dynamics of the EU’s security 
modelling. It is only through this that the EU can feel secure against possible sources 
of threat that may originate from the EU’s periphery.  
Turkey has proved its commitment to European security both during the Cold 
War era and in its aftermath. It has also decided to allocate a significant number of 
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troops and other more sophisticated military capabilities to the emerging European 
Army.164 Turkey’s participation in peace operations has demonstrated that the EU 
needs Turkey to function in the European theatre to intervene in possible crises that 
might erupt on the peripheries of the continent (Petersberg tasks) until such time as 
the European Union is able to mount its own army in the field. Turkey is a NATO 
member with geopolitical and sophisticated military assets (Baç, 2000: 489-502) and 
can help the EU establish an autonomous European Army and help the EU with tasks 
of humanitarian intervention, peacekeeping and conflict management.   
The important point here is that Turkey’s development of peacekeeping 
capabilities and potential contribution to the European military force in peace 
operations would not only enhance its bargaining power vis-à-vis the EU, in the 
sense that the EU would benefit from Turkey’s military capabilities in an 
instrumental manner, but also suggests that Ankara is transforming its security 
identity into that of the European Union around the principles of crises management 
and human security (Oğuzlu, 2005:83-104). 
Its close strategic relationship with the United States in Eurasia, Central Asia 
and the Greater Middle East inhibited Turkey’s internalization of the EU’s security 
identity in the past (Oğuzlu, 2003:294). However, Turkey’s participation in peace 
operations has helped this process. Closer co-operation between the EU and Ankara 
within peace operations has had the added benefit for Turkey of bolstering its hopes 
that the credentials of its European identity (and the security this identity would 
bring) are more solid. Turkey’s membership from a security perspective seems to 
have become more likely as the post-11 September era has presented the parties with 
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new rationales for bridging their security differences and as Turkey’s participation 
has increased in this new era. 
With its participation in the ISAF, Turkey sided with the western 
international community on the new security strategy. In addition, Turkey’s leading 
role in the ISAF also implies that the West can successfully deal with the security 
challenges of the post-September 11 era only in close collaboration with the Muslim 
world. Turkey, a secular and western oriented state with an overwhelming Muslim 
population, would certainly add to the legitimacy of the western-led international 
peace operations in the eyes of the Muslim communities around the globe.   
Turkey’s participation in EU-led operation, such as Operation Althea 
(EUFOR) has an important impact in this regard. This would send the strongest 
signal, it can be argued, to the Muslim world that the EU does not define its security 
identity and its interests in opposition to the Muslim world (Oğuzlu, 2005:99). This 
is an important reason why the EU asked if Turkey would join the EU mission in 
Congo. Turkey’s eagerness to join the EU-led peacekeeping force in Congo should 
be seen as a strategic action on the part of Ankara that this would help bolster 
Turkey’s its European identity.165 Turkey does not have any strategic interest in 
Congo. Participation would suggest that Turkey helps the West project its 
constitutive values onto problem areas.  
It would be difficult to prove that Turkey’s transformation of its security 
understanding in a peacekeeping friendly manner on the one hand and active Turkish 
participation in peace operations on the other have increased the prospects of 
Turkey’s accession to the Union and prompted the EU leaders to officially start the 
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accession talks with Ankara. However, it would also be wrong to underestimate such 
an impact. Now, an increasing number of westerners underline Turkey’s contribution 
to western security and try to justify their arguments by pointing to Turkey’s 
participation in peace operation across the world (Calleya, 2006:40-47; Barysch, and 
et al., 2005). 
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
This dissertation aimed at understanding Turkey’s motivations behind its 
policies and attitudes toward peace operations mostly organized under the leadership 
of the UN and NATO in the post-Cold War era. First of all, this dissertation 
described the changing nature of the UN peace operations which have evolved out of 
the collective security’s failure since the beginning of the Cold War era. Peace 
operations are not, and never were, intended to be an alternative to a system of 
collective security. But as a result of the failure of the collective security system of 
Chapter VII of the Charter, peace operations were considered as a second best option 
as a useful instrument for the management of conflict. Peace operation evolved out 
of necessity as a pragmatic solution to a practical problem. 
Peace operations evolved in size, complexity, legitimacy and effectiveness 
and went through periods of innovation, development and expansion. One of the 
main incentives behind the development of the UN peace operation was the Cold 
War political climate in which it evolved. The main concern was to localize conflicts 
and tensions and prevent them from escalating to a superpower confrontation. In this 
sense, the peace operations undertaken during the Cold War era were conflict-
management activities. 
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However, peace operations were not been applied to all violent conflicts 
during the Cold War. The attitude of the two superpowers had a crucial impact on the 
performance of peace operations. The rivalry between the two superpowers often 
prevented the UN Security Council from taking effective action to contain and 
control conflicts. The UN was excluded from playing any peace operation role within 
the super powers’ own “spheres of influence.” More often than not, peace operations 
dealt with regional violent conflicts which had a wider potential for threatening 
international peace and security, in which the superpowers were likely to become 
involved. In almost every case, peace operations were applied to areas beyond the 
dominance of superpowers. 
As written in the UN Charter, the UN has two main purposes. The first is to 
establish and maintain international peace and security. The second is to improve the 
political, economic, and social justice of the world’s peoples. During the Cold War 
era, the first purpose meant the principle of non-involvement in states’ internal 
affairs. The link between regional and international security on the one hand and the 
domestic orders of states on the other, was not fully established. External sovereignty 
used to be more important than internal sovereignty. As the second principle started 
to gain more legitimacy in the 1990s, observers have increasingly noted dramatic 
increases in UN-led peace operations.  
The demand for, and the scope of, peace operations have steadily increased in 
the post-Cold War era. The UN has authorized or deployed a series of new missions. 
In order to understand the reasons for the expansion and the change in the nature of 
peace operations, this dissertation examined the international climate in this new era. 
The main reason for this expansion in the number of peace operations and observer 
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missions has been the increased capacity of the UN Security Council to agree on 
action in particular crises. 
  The second reason for the expansion of peace operations has been the large 
number of minor armed conflicts. The end of strategic competition between the US 
and the Soviet Union created an environment much more amenable to minor armed 
conflicts breaking out between small states. These minor armed conflicts transformed 
the global context of peace operations and significantly broadened peace operations’ 
potential as a technique of peaceful settlement. The third reason behind the 
expansion has been the settlements of conflicts. The end of the Cold War allowed 
peaceful initiatives in the old conflicts caused by the spheres of influence inherent in 
the East-West rivalry and facilitated settlements of conflicts. The fourth reason has 
been the breaking up of states. Since the super power support, which suppressed 
internal divisions, withdrew, the number of states falling victim to domestic violence, 
often ethnically based, has increased. Further reasons have been a widespread mood 
of optimism, the process of globalization and the importance given to the 
multilateralism in international relations in the post- Cold War era. 
There have been dramatic changes in the nature, as well as in the volume, of 
the UN activities in the field of peace and security. In addition to the increase in the 
application of peace operations, the types of missions, which have been mandated, 
have also altered. The objectives of peace operations have in fact, changed 
considerably: from helping in maintaining cease-fires during the Cold War, to 
becoming increasingly involved in peace-building missions during the 1990s. The 
peace operations undertaken during the Cold War era were conflict-management 
activities, whereas the ones undertaken during the post-Cold War era could be better 
classified as conflict-resolution activities. This dramatic increase in the number of 
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peace operations can be attributed to the changing nature of security challenges and 
threats. Today’s conflicts are more likely to be intra-state rather than international 
conflicts, triggered by a range of factors, including social, ethnic or religious strife, 
the violation of human rights, poverty, the inequitable distribution of resources, 
environmental degradation, large-scale migration, drug trafficking, organized crime 
and terrorism.  
Peacekeepers have now been given more challenging mandates such as 
organizing and supervising free and fair elections, monitoring arms flows and 
demobilizing troops, supervising government functions, the rehabilitation of 
refugees, disarmament, monitoring human rights obligations, assisting in the delivery 
of humanitarian relief and most importantly, nation-building. The development of 
post-Cold War peace operations have taken place in the integrated operational 
environment (conditions, circumstances of deployment) and in the multilateral or 
multifaceted nature of peace operations with various organizations taking into 
account supportive roles for either military objectives or preventative mediation 
objectives. The increased peace operation activity has strained the UN’s resources 
and capacity because of both quantitative and qualitative changes in the operations 
themselves. The task of peace operations, which once seemed to belong exclusively 
to the UN, has become the growing area of interest for regional security 
organizations in the 1990s.  
Just as the enlargement of the EU and NATO to Central and Eastern 
European countries has helped stabilize these regions and has improved European 
security, growing peace operations in the Balkans and other geographies have served 
similar functions (Smith and Timmins, 2000:80-90). Developing NATO’s crises 
management capabilities on the one hand and endowing the EU with 
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peacekeeping/peacebuilding capabilities with crises-management and human security 
dimensions on the other, should be interpreted in line with this changing security 
understanding (Cornish and Edwards, 2001:587-603). These efforts are not only 
security oriented but also cover an ideational dimension in the sense that peace 
operations have enabled westerners to maintain the legitimacy of the core western 
values in the volatile international system. Peace operations have proved effective 
tools through which the West could project its constitutive values to non-western 
areas.      
Even though Turkey’s involvement in UN-led peace operations has increased 
in the post-Cold War era, Ankara shied away from such missions during the Cold 
War years. This was so despite the fact that 7 out of 13 peace operations were 
deployed in the Middle East. Turkey did not contribute to peace operations 
established during the Cold War era for several reasons. The international systemic 
change from a ‘balance of power’ to a ‘bipolar’ system with the onset of the Cold 
War era dramatically curtailed the maneuvering capability of small and medium 
sized countries, Turkey being no exception. Although Ankara did not remain 
completely isolated from these developments it did not contribute actively to the 
United Nations peace operations undertaken in the Cold War.  
Turkey’s attitude towards peace operations in the Cold War era was 
determined by its membership in NATO. Turkey had to streamline its peacekeeping 
policy with that of the alliance in general and the United States in particular. Given 
that the US/NATO was lukewarm to the idea of setting up peace operations for 
troubled conflicts, lest such contingencies might lead to dangerous confrontations 
between the US and the Soviet Union, Turkey had also hesitated to develop a strong 
interest in such operations. Another factor that appears to explain Turkey’s 
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reluctance to join peace operations during the Cold War era concerns the fact that 
Ankara focused its energy on internal development and sought to avoid foreign 
tensions that could divert it from that goal. Instead of projecting power and 
contributing to peace operations, Turkey focused strictly on protecting borders and 
maintaining internal security. 
Most of the regions where peace operations had been established were not a 
priority area in Turkish security calculations. Turkey did not want to provoke the 
Soviet Union by contributing to peace operations in the Caucasus and Central Asia, 
which were under the control of Moscow. Turkey’s regional environment displayed 
far more stability than it does in the post-Cold War era. Turkey was not exposed to 
spillover risks since these conflicts did not involve Turkic and other Muslim peoples 
with whom Turkey had historic ties.  
With the advent of the post-Cold War era, Turkey’s contribution to peace 
operations increased. Several factors caused such a development. First, the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union and the subsequent transformation of the political 
and strategic landscape of Eastern Europe and Central Asia and the eruption of 
violent ethno-national conflicts in the Balkans and the Caucasus affected Turkey. 
Ankara found itself at the very center of crises areas, where ultra-nationalist, 
aggressive and irredentist tendencies were vibrant. Unlike the Cold War era, Turkey 
geopolitically has become a unique country bordering several regions very different 
from each other. In parallel to such tectonic changes in Turkey’s neighborhood, 
Turkey has become increasingly exposed to the side effects of intra and inter-state 
conflicts in all of these regions. 
During the Cold War years, Turkey was mainly concerned with the existence 
of a direct military attack by a pre-determined enemy, the Soviet Union. In the post-
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Cold War era, this hard-security threat disappeared, but new soft-security issues have 
come to occupy Ankara’s agenda. Ethnic nationalism, religious fundamentalism, 
ethnic or religious terrorism, social and economic instabilities, illicit trafficking of 
arms and drugs, refugees and illegal migration became issues of concern. For the first 
time since the Second World War, Turkey has also faced sudden mass movements of 
refugees into the country.  
Therefore, in response to Turkey’s growing exposure to a constellation of 
hard and soft security threats, Turkey’s security policy makers have increasingly 
found it necessary to improve the operational capabilities of the Turkish Armed 
Forces. In parallel to the concept of forward defense, Turkish security policy makers 
have found it necessary to transform the Turkish Armed Forces from a conscript 
based conventional army into a professionalizing army consisting of highly mobile 
and technologically equipped military units. Transformation of the Turkish Armed 
Forces with a view to dealing with a new type of security threats would be seen more 
legitimate were this transformation process carried out as part of Turkey’s efforts to 
join peace operations organized under the leadership of the western international 
community.    
Second, Turkey had to develop its military capabilities, particularly the ones 
in relation to peace operations, for it was no longer guaranteed that Turkey’s 
membership in NATO would imply a full western commitment to its security. 
Turkey’s defense against new type of threats would be possible through the 
transformation of the Turkish Armed Forces in such a way as to meet peacekeeping 
demands.  
Third, the dynamics of Turkey’s security relations with the western 
international community constitute the most important reason explaining its 
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decisions to join international peace operations, particularly in the post-Cold War 
era. Turkey’s relations with the United States on the one hand and the European 
Union on the other, can help readers understand the rationale behind Ankara’s 
decision to be part of such operations in troubled parts of the globe. Absent the 
western dimension, one cannot grasp the logic driving Turkey’s policies. In addition 
to the western dimension, this dissertation also argued that the changing security 
dynamics in Turkey’s neighborhood in the 1990s have contributed to the shaping of 
Turkey’s peacekeeping policies. Turkey’s decisions to improve its peacekeeping 
capabilities and growing aspirations to join such operations cannot be fully 
understood without taking into account the changing nature of Turkey’s relations 
with the European Union in the post-Cold War era. Given that the end of the Cold 
War era had somehow decreased Turkey’s European character regarding the 
European security architecture, it was hoped in Ankara that Turkey’s successful 
performance in peace operations might reinforce Turkey’s European image and then 
increase the prospects of its possible entry to the Union.   
The important point here is that Turkey’s development of peacekeeping 
capabilities would not only enhance its bargaining power vis-à-vis the EU, in the 
sense that the EU would benefit from Turkey’s military capabilities in an 
instrumental manner, but also suggest that Turkey is transforming its security 
identity into that of the European Union around the principles of crises management 
and human security. Sending peacekeeping units abroad would at the same time 
imply that security is understood as effective governance at home.  
Turkey wants to show the Europeans that its military capabilities, particularly 
in the field of peacekeeping, could help the EU deal with the emerging security 
threats in Europe’s peripheries. Therefore, Turkey’s decision to join many peace 
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operations in the Balkans and other places in Europe’s peripheries can be attributed 
to the purpose of registering Turkey’s security producing image with the Europeans.  
Participating in peace operations would also imply that the Turkish Armed Forces 
were becoming professionalized. Because peace operations demand special 
expertise, Turkey’s involvement in such operations was hoped to increase the 
professionalism of the Turkish Armed Forces.  
Therotically speaking, we may define professionalism in two different ways. 
First, professionalization may mean the transformation of the Turkish Army from a 
conscript based structure into a professional soldier based army. I think there is not a 
clear connection between Turkey’s participation in peace operations and 
transformation of the Turkish Army in this way. Second, professionalization may 
also mean the transformation of the Turkish military in line with emerging security 
conceptualizations of current military strategies across the world. In other words, 
professionalization in this regard can be defined as Turkey’s efforts to modernize its 
army in a peacekeeping friendly manner. Above all, the second case suits the 
definition/idea of professionalization in the Turkish Army. The Turkish Armed 
Forces are already highly professional (its officer cadres). I think the problem rather, 
is its soft power aspects need to further improvement. In general, peace operations 
are man power intensive operations and in some respects they are low-tech. They 
require soft power experience and capability. Turkey’s participation in peace 
operations contribute to the improvement of soft power aspects of the Turkish Armed 
Forces. 
This dissertation argued that even though Turkey’s security has come under 
serious challenges from regional developments, this can not convincingly explain 
Turkey’s participation in peace operations. Stated somewhat differently, such 
  245 
regional security threats are not compelling enough of a factor for Turkey to seek its 
security through peace operations. Neither the crises in the Balkans nor Caucasus 
seriously threatened Ankara’s vital security interests. Besides, Turkey’s own 
conventional military capabilities would likely deter possible aggressors. Moreover, 
how the neo-realist logic would explain Turkey’s active involvement in the US led 
peace operations in Somalia and Afghanistan where Turkey did not have clear 
security interests, remains a puzzle.  
Fourth, ethnic conflicts in Turkey’s region generated extensive interest and 
concern in Turkey due to the presence of large numbers of Turks who had migrated 
from neighboring places, particularly the Balkans, to Turkey. The impact of pressure 
groups living in Turkey on Ankara’s decisions to send troops to peace operations in 
the Balkans and Caucasus was noteworthy. Finally, the cooperation and 
understanding between the US and Turkey in their approach to regional security 
issues proved to be instrumental in facilitating greater Turkish activism to peace 
operations. Turkey contributed several peace operations as a consequence of the 
United States’ insistence. It was partly under the urging of the United States that 
Turkey took part in the UN operation in Somalia, where the forces were actually led 
by a Turkish general. This logic, the need to ally with the United States against new 
threats, also played a significant role in Turkey’s decision to contribute to the 
International Security Assistance Force in 2002. Turkey not only sent troops to this 
force but also commanded the international units there when NATO took over the 
lead of the operation in Afghanistan.   
In sum, the reasons for Turkey’s participation in peace operations are to show 
its respect for the values of the United Nations; to help improve the soft power 
experience and capability of Turkish Armed Forces; to show its western identity and 
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continue the cooperation with its strategic partner, the United States; to increase the 
prospects of its admission to the Union; to maintain its geo-strategic importance in 
global politics; to preserve regional and global peace and stability; to help reduce 
tensions and contain conflicts; to resolve disputes through peaceful means; to 
encourage the propagation of democracy and the rule of law; to prevent ethnic 
conflicts from spilling over into its territory; to create a peaceful and stable 
environment around it; to meet the public’s expectations; to improve relations with 
the Balkan countries; to avoid behavior that may isolate Turkey in the international 
community; to keep close relations with international organizations carrying out 
peace operations; and to meet the requirements of the new concept of war.  
Of all, two factors seem critical in understanding the rationale behind 
Ankara’s peacekeeping policies. One is to improve Turkey’s military capabilities to 
deal with new types of security threats, mainly emanating from its near abroad. 
Conventional military planning was designed with the sole goal of eliminating hard-
core security threats, viz. territorial attacks from other states, mainly the Soviet 
Union. The 1990s, however, have gradually made it clear that security is structural 
and more about effective governance. The process of globalization has further 
increased security-interdependence. Seen in this way, the transformation of Turkey’s 
military capabilities in a peace operation friendly manner would enable the country 
to deal with new type of security threats. Contributing to the good-governance of 
neighboring weak-states through the deployment of peace operation units abroad 
would certainly improve the security feeling at home.     
Changing security conceptualizations in the West has undoubtedly led Turkey 
to attach an increasing value to peace operations. Participation in such operations did 
not merely imply Turkey’s material presence in western initiatives but also suggest 
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the ongoing transformation of Turkey’s security mentality in line with the West’s 
changing security norms emphasizing crisis-management and the human dimension 
of security. Ankara’s decisions to join peace operations have been mainly motivated 
by the ideational concern of being included in the western international community. 
While Europe sees peace operations as a constructivist effort to reshape the 
principles of international politics around the goals of crisis management and human 
security, Turkey has tried to register its western identity in the eyes of its western 
partners through its participation in such operations. 
This dissertation argued that Turkey’s involvement in peace operations during 
the post-Cold War era can better be explained by the dynamics of its relations with 
the West. Turkey’s contribution to western security interests had in the past 
constituted the most important link tying Turkey to the West, and therefore making it 
easy for Turkey to be recognized as western. Turkey’s concern with being 
recognized as western was met by its membership in NATO and close cooperation 
with the West against the common Soviet threat. In addition, Turkey’s security 
identity and interests were in accordance with those of the western international 
community. While the West itself defined its security identity/interest in opposition 
to the Soviet Union and prioritized the preservation of western style of living as the 
most important security goal, Turkey did not find it difficult to become socialized to 
this understanding (Aybet and Müftüler Baç, 2000:567-582). What happened inside 
states did not gain a priority for the western security interests. Thus peace operations 
of the Cold War era fell short of having an identity-constructing aspect.   
This situation has completely changed in the post-Cold War era. When the 
West started to see peace operations from a new perspective, Turkey’s interest in 
such operations also developed. Turkey would not have remained outside such a 
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western project, while the credentials of its western identity have come under strong 
challenges following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and growing criticisms 
regarding its contributions to western security. While NATO has gradually lost its 
European and western character following the transformation of the Alliance from 
being a western collective defense organization into a semi military-semi political 
collective security organization, the EU increasingly emphasized liberal-democratic 
transformation of state-society relations as the most important criterion for 
membership (Cornish, 2004:63-74; Kurth, 2001:5-16; Webber, and et al., 2004:3-
26).  
Without denying the significance of political, social, cultural and economic 
factors, this dissertation shares the view that the more Turkey and the EU cooperate 
within peace operations framework, the greater Turkey’s chance of being admitted to 
the EU. Developing peacekeeping capabilities would not only increase Turkey’s 
leverage vis-à-vis the European Union and the United States in an instrumental 
manner, but also imply that Turkey has been adapting its security understanding to 
the security norms of the western international community, namely the significance 
of effective governance around the principles of liberal democracy, and the emphasis 
on crises-management and human security. Such a transformation would likely 
increase Turkey’s chances of being admitted to the European Union in the long-term.   
Turkey’s most important security interest is to be seen as a modern and 
western country and to be included in western institutions. Given that security has 
traditionally constituted the most important link tying Turkey to the West, it would 
be critical for Turkey to adapt its security identity to that of the western international 
community, particularly that of the European Union, in order to be still regarded as 
western in the post-Cold War era. If Turkey were not to be seen as western in the 
  249 
field of security, it would be much harder for it to be regarded as such in other 
realms. Given that many locations where Turkey sent peace operation units did not 
directly affect Turkey’s security in the traditional sense, one can eventually claim 
that decision-makers in Ankara have tended to consider participation in peace 
operations as a policy instrument to help bolster its western identity, first and 
foremost in the realm of security. 
Such an ideational concern has come to the forefront as western aspects of 
Turkey’s international/security identity have been exposed to serious challenges in 
the 1990s. When the prospects of Turkey’s accession to the EU remained low and the 
European character of NATO had gradually eroded, Turkey has increasingly turned 
to peace operations as an important instrument to help re-establish its weakened 
western identity. Turkey simply wanted to be seen that it was aiding the leading 
western powers in their efforts to project the constitutive norms of the West onto 
non-western places through peace operations. Such a stance has also been in 
conformity with the changing meaning of security in the post-Cold War years.  
 Even though security-related factors and the presence of pressure groups 
inside the country might have motivated Turkey’s decision makers to actively take 
part in peace operations, their impact proved to be limited. Turkey did not have to 
join such operations in order to deal with the emerging security threats in its 
environment. Its own military capabilities would have proved to be too deterrent a 
factor in this regard. Moreover, Turkey did not have clear cut security interest in 
such regions as Somalia and Afghanistan. However, participation in peace operations 
in the Balkans and Caucasus has helped Turkey preserve regional and global peace 
and stability, reduce tensions and contain conflicts, resolve disputes through peaceful 
means, encourage the propagation of democracy and the rule of law, prevent ethnic 
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conflicts from spilling over into its territory, create a peaceful and stable environment 
around it, and finally, improve relations with the countries in these regions.  
 On the other hand, gauging the impact of pressure groups on Turkey’s 
approach to peace operations has been a daunting task due to the problems of 
measurement. We know that a significant portion of Turkey’s population have come 
to Turkey from the Balkans and Caucasus and they still have family connections with 
their relatives there. We also know that these people helped organize public meetings 
against the inhuman treatment to which their relatives were exposed in these 
geographies. They wanted the Turkish government to take a more active role by 
urging the international community to immediately stop the bloodshed. However we 
cannot be sure that decision makers agreed to send Turkish troops abroad due to the 
activities of these circles.   
That said, participation in peace operations has had significant impact on 
Turkey. First, wearing a blue helmet has promoted Turkey’s reputation as a 
concerned, responsible regional power. Turkey’s image as a security producing 
country has been enhanced. Its participation in such operations has also helped dispel 
fears of a rising-hegemon Turkey. Turkey’s image in Washington and European 
capitals has also improved through Turkey’s active involvement in peace operations. 
Both sides of the western world now consider Turkey as a regional power 
contributing to peace and stability. Turkey has been regarded as an island of stability 
in the midst of regional unstabilities. In this sense Turkey’s concern with being 
recognized as western and as a security producing country has been met by 
participation in peace operations.166  
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It would be difficult to prove that Turkey’s transformation of its security 
understanding in a peacekeeping friendly manner on the one hand and active Turkish 
participation in peace operations on the other, have increased the prospects of 
Turkey’s accession to the Union and prompted the EU leaders to officially start the 
accession talks with Turkey. However, it would also be wrong to underestimate such 
an impact. Now, an increasing number of westerners underline Turkey’s contribution 
to western security and try to justify their arguments by pointing out to Turkey’s 
participation in peace operation across the world (Calleya, 2006:40-47; Barysch, and 
et al., 2005).  
Participation in peace operations has also contributed to the modernization of 
the Turkish military in line with the changing security understandings in the post-
Cold War era. The skills and experiences acquired by the Turkish peacekeepers 
abroad have contributed to the overall modernization of the Turkish army. A 
significant portion of the military staff have taken specialized training, including 
intensive English language courses, communications and driver training. Because of 
the short deployment cycles in the peace operations, experienced personnel regularly 
returned to their units with greater skills and experience, which they helped 
disseminate to their colleagues. Turkish military personnel have also gained the 
experience of cooperating and working closely with the armed forces of allied 
countries.  
Turkey has also gained the operational capability of dealing with the PKK- 
KONGRA GEL terrorism through the experiences it gained abroad. This is important 
because PKK- KONGRA GEL offers a non-traditional security threat and coping 
with it requires expertise on low intensity conflicts and OOTW. The Turkish military 
has gained such expertise through joining peace operations. Turkey’s national 
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security and defense policy has also been affected by participation in peace 
operations. Ankara now holds that defense starts outside territorial borders and what 
happens in other countries does impact Turkey’s security interests. It is without a 
doubt that Turkey’s experiences in peace operations abroad have helped transform its 
security understanding in this way.  
For example, Turkey is now more eager to take part in peace operations in 
troubled parts of the globe, particularly the Middle East. Three recent examples from 
the recent past are worth mentioning in this regard. In the first case, the US 
government asked Turkey to send a substantial number of troops to Iraq in the 
summer of 2003. The Turkish government reciprocated positively for the internal 
instability and chaos in Iraq could potentially threaten Turkey’s domestic security. 
Even though the prime reason behind Turkey’s acquiescence to such an American 
proposal was to help improve Turkey’s tarnished image in the eyes of the Americans 
in the aftermath of the March 1 crisis, Ankara’s eagerness to comply with this 
American demand can also be explained with reference to Turkey’s changing 
security understanding. Internal chaos in neighboring countries closely affects 
Turkey’s internal peace and the best defense starts outside the territorial borders. 
Ankara also positively responded to European claims that Turkish troops should be 
deployed in Congo as part of the EU mission there. 
As of writing this dissertation, there have been speculations that Turkey 
might participate in the proposed UN peace operation in southern Lebanon to 
oversee a permanent ceasefire between Israel and Hizbullah forces. The decision of 
the Turkish Parliament in September 2006 to support the governmental decree 
regulating deployment of Turkish troops in Lebanon as part of the multinational 
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peace operation after the Israel–Hezbollah war underpins the ideational motivations 
behind Turkey’s approach to peace operations. 
The national interest argument appears to drop out here. Turkey does not have 
a vital strategic interest in sending troops to the already fragile and unstable southern 
Lebanon where the possibility of Hezbollah and Israeli forces exchanging bullets and 
rockets still remains extremely high. It is probable that Turkish troops will find 
themselves in the middle of skirmishes. In such a case the Turkish government 
would find it difficult to persuade Turkish public opinion to tolerate casualties in 
Lebanon, especially as Turkey’s own struggle with the PKK terrorist cells continues 
to worsen. During the deliberations by the parliament prior to the approval of the 
government’s decree, it became clear that both the main opposition party and the 
majority of the Turkish people were against the idea of sending Turkish troops 
abroad while Turkey itself has been enmeshed in more serious security challenges.167 
The impact of domestic ethnic interests on Turkey’s decision has also been 
very limited. Turkey is not home to active pro-Israeli or pro-Arab ethnic lobbies. 
Besides, the majority of Turkish public opinion has embraced a sympathetic view of 
Hezbollah during the latest war in Lebanon. Turkish people overwhelmingly believe 
that the deployment of the UN-led mission in southern Lebanon will serve more 
Israeli than Lebanese interests. The goal of the mission has been understood as being 
to help demilitarise Hezbollah and protect Israel from the possibility of assaults that 
might originate from southern Lebanon. 
The ideational factors behind Turkey’s decision to send troops to Lebanon 
can be noticed in several respects. First, the US and the EU countries have supported 
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the idea of sending such a force. Turkey hopes to improve its tarnished relations with 
the US by sending troops to Lebanon. Turkey is a secular and westernising country 
with a predominantly Muslim population. Turkey’s presence in such a force would 
make it clear that Turkey shares the security interests of the US in the region. 
Another consideration on the part of Ankara appears to be the hope that the US will 
revise its approach to the PKK and northern Iraq in line with Turkey’s priorities in 
return for Turkey’s  support for the UN mission to Lebanon. 
Second, the majority of troops will come from the member countries of the 
EU. As a candidate country, Turkey’s contribution to the UN mission in Lebanon, 
signals support for EU foreign and security policies and readiness to help bolster 
EU’s military capabilities. Third, the legitimacy of the force has already been 
secured as the United Nations Security Council authorised the mission.168 
This dissertation has also demonstrated that participating in peace operations 
positively improves the international status and legitimacy of Turkey and probably 
has similar effects for other middle power states.169 Turkey’s participation in peace 
operations has earned it a good reputation and added to its soft power. None of the 
contingencies in which Turkish troops served as part of multinational peace 
operations directly concerned Turkey’s security. This point is important because it 
shows that major powers and middle powers approach peace operations from 
different angles. The ideational concerns are much more visible in the second case. 
This dissertation offers a novel understanding of the reasons why a particular 
country participates in peace operations. In this regard the dissertation underlines the 
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differences between motivations that guide behaviours of major and medium power 
states. In the absence of the common Soviet threat and in the presence of the 
changing geopolitical priorities of the US, NATO and the EU, Turkey’s participation 
in peace operations showed a different and transformed side of the country 
previously missing from foreign perceptions. As a deliberate goal, this ideational 
policy cannot be examined from a pure neo-realist security perspective.  
The meaning that Turkey has attached to participation in peace operations 
differs from that understood by the EU and the US. For the emerging European 
Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), peace operations would be important and 
much-needed assets. While peace operations have become the basic justification for 
the existence of European armed services and have become an instrument for their 
expenditures, they have been of relatively minor importance for the US and Russia. 
Although the major powers like US, Russia and China have retained their focus on 
war-fighting and have war-making armies, European countries without existential 
security threats have embraced policing duties and have police-like armies. They 
define national security in terms of combating terrorism, disrupting drug trade, and 
participating in peace operations to provide stability to troubled regions (Ripsman 
and Paul, 2005:208-213) 
As a committed peacekeeper, Canada views peace operations from a different 
perspective. The first and foremost Canadian national interest, both during and after 
the Cold War, was to support the Western allies, especially the US and NATO 
members. Canada contributed a substantial number of troops to the peacekeeping 
force in Cyprus for almost three decades (1964-1993) in order to prevent two NATO 
allies (Greece and Turkey) from going to war over Cyprus and splitting the alliance. 
Similarly, Canada’s participation in the UN’s first peacekeeping force during the 
  256 
Suez crisis in 1956, was done to help the UK and France out of a predicament from 
which they could not withdraw their forces without great embarrassment. Canada’s 
large contributions to the UN’s successive missions in Haiti are also explained in part 
by a desire to assist the US in the continental backyard. 
Whether the motive is idealistic or pragmatic, Canada seeks a place and some 
recognition in the wider world. Canada seeks to find a special role that great powers 
like the US have difficulty filling. These powers did not participate in peace 
operations during the Cold War because they were deemed unable to act impartially, 
given their global involvement, ideological struggles, and intelligence activities. A 
middle power country like Canada was seen as a better choice for the peacekeeper 
role.  
Are Pakistan, Bangladesh, India, Ethiopia, and Nepal altruistic or mercenarial 
because in a period spanning the end of 2004 and the beginning of 2005 they 
provided over forty percent of all UN military and civilian police contributions? 
These states are disengaged from the horrors the peace operations are preventing or 
cleaning up by their own needs, similar to Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs. So why do 
they participate with soldiers without first-world professional training, without a 
first-world professional officer corps, and typically without proper equipment and 
training to carry out the mission effectively. These countries view peace operations 
from a financial perspective. Given their economic realities they are highly likely to 
be motivated by financial gains to participate in UN peace operations. They usually 
profit financially from UN service depending on the arrangements made with UN 
Headquarters.170  
                                               
170
 For discussion see Kabilan Krishnasamy, Autumn 2002, “Pakistan’s Peacekeeping Experiences,” 
International Peacekeeping, 9(3): 111-113 
  257 
  From a national perspective, participation in UN peace operations tends to 
elevate the profile and prestige of the country. For a military institution like 
Argentina’s, still laden with the baggage of years of military dictatorship, and the 
fiasco of the Falklands/Malvinas defeat, involvement in UN peace operations offers 
the opportunity to recover some of the prestige and self-respect lost after many years 
of negative image in the world and in their own country.  
 In contrast to these approaches, Turkey has placed great ideational 
importance on its participation in peace operations. They have been important for the 
re-construction of Turkey’s Western identity as well as the maintenance of Turkey’s 
number one security interest, being a part of the West. Participation in peace 
operations is an integral and important part of Turkish security and defense policy. 
Through its involvement Turkey makes a contribution towards peace while at the 
same time demonstrates its solidarity with the international community. Taking these 
kinds of roles in the future may result in Ankara’s more active involvement in world 
affairs. It may boost its influence not only in regions where Turkish personnel serve, 
but also on the UN Security Council and among other voting members of the UN, as 
well. By contributing to peace operations, Turkey will rise to a more favorable 
position in the international hierarchy of states. 
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TABLE I 
PRESENT PEACE OPERATIONS (1948-2006) 
 
1. UNTSO UN Truce Supervision Organization May 1948 
2. UNMOGIP UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan January 1949 
3. UNFICYP UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus March 1964 
4. UNDOF United Nations Disengagement Force June 1974 
5. UNIFIL United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon March 1978 
6. MINURSO UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara April 1991 
7. UNOMIG UN Observer Mission in Georgia August 1993 
8. UNMIK UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo June 1999 
9. MONUC 
UN Organization Mission in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo 
Nov. 1999 
10. UNMEE UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea July 2000 
11. UNMIL United Nations Mission in Liberia Sept. 2003 
12. UNOCI United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire April 2004 
13. MINUSTAH UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti June 2004 
14. ONUB United Nations Operation in Burundi June 2004 
15. UNMIS United Nations Mission in the Sudan March 2005 
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TABLE II  
PAST PEACE OPERATIONS (1948-2006) 
 
1. UNEF I                First United Nations Emergency Force    Nov. 1956-June 1967 
2. UNOGIL UN Observation Group in Lebanon    June 1958  Dec. 1958 
3. ONUC            United Nations Operation in the Congo July 1960- June 1964 
4. UNSF    UN Security Force in West New Guinea Oct. 1962-  Apr. 1963 
5. UNYOM   UN Yemen Observation Mission July 1963- Sep. 1964 
6. DOMREP 
Mission of the Representative of the SG 
in the Dominican Republic  
May 1965- Oct. 1966 
7. UNIPOM UN India-Pakistan Observation Mission  
September 1965- 
March 1966 
8. UNEF II              Second UN Emergency Force Oct. 1973- July 1979 
9. UNGOMAP 
UN Good Offices Mission in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan  
May 1988-  Mar. 1990 
10. UNIIMOG UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group  Aug. 1988- Feb. 1991 
11. UNAVEM I        UN Angola Verification Mission I  Jan. 1989- June 1991 
12. UNTAG UN Transition Assistance Group Apr. 1989- Mar. 1990 
13. ONUCA     UN Observer Group in Central America  Nov. 1989-Jan. 1992 
14. UNIKOM UN Iraq - Kuwait Observation Mission  Apr. 1991- Oct. 2003 
15. UNAVEM II    UN Angola Verification Mission II June 1991- Feb. 1995 
16. ONUSAL UN Observer Mission in El Salvador  July 1991- Apr. 1995 
17. UNAMIC     UN Advance Mission in Cambodia  Oct. 1991-Mar. 1992 
18. UNPROFOR UN Protection Force Feb. 1992 –Dec.1995 
19. UNTAC UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia  Mar. 1992 –Sep. 1993 
20. UNOSOM I    United Nations Operation in Somalia I  Apr. 1992- Mar. 1993 
21. ONUMOZ     UN Operation in Mozambique  Dec. 1992- Dec. 1994 
21. UNOSOM II UN Operation in Somalia II Mar. 1993- Mar. 1995 
23. UNOMUR UN Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda June 1993- Sep. 1994 
  282 
24. UNOMIL UN Observer Mission in Liberia  Sep.1993- Sep. 1997 
25. UNMIH United Nations Mission in Haiti  Sep. 1993 -June 1996 
26. UNAMIR      UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda  Oct. 1993 Mar. 1996 
27. UNASOG UN Aouzou Strip Observer Group  May 1994- June 1994 
28. UNMOT UN Mission of Observers in Tajikistan  Dec. 1994-May 2000 
29. UNAVEM III UN Angola Verification Mission III Feb. 1995- June 1997 
30. UNCRO 
UN Confidence Restoration Operation 
in Croatia  
May 1995- Jan. 1996 
31. UNPREDEP UN Preventive Deployment Force  Mar. 1995- Feb. 1999 
32. UNMIBH      UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina Dec.1995- Dec. 2002 
33. UNTAES 
UN Transitional Administration for 
Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western 
Sirmium 
Jan. 1996- Jan. 1998 
34. UNMOP    UN Mission of Observers in Prevlaka  Jan. 1996- Dec. 2002 
35. UNSMIH UN Support Mission in Haiti July 1996- July 1997 
36. MINUGUA UN Verification Mission in Guatemala Jan. 1997- May 1997 
37. MONUA UN Observer Mission in Angola June 1997- Feb. 1999 
38. UNTMIH   UN Transition Mission in Haiti  Aug. 1997- Nov. 1997 
39. MINOPUH UN Civilian Police Mission in Haiti Dec. 1997- Mar. 2000 
40.  UN Civilian Police Support Group    Jan. 1998-Oct. 1998 
41. MINURCA UN Mission in the Central African Rep. Apr. 1998- Feb. 2000 
42. UNOMSIL UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone  July 1998- Oct. 1999 
43. UNAMSIL UN Mission in Sierra Leone  Oct. 1999-Dec. 2005 
44. UNTAET 
UN Transitional Administration in East 
Timor 
Oct. 1999- May 2002 
45 UNMISET UN Mission of Support in East Timor May 2002- May 2005 
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 TABLE III         
 
 
 
        
 
     THE NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE OF PEACE OPERATIONS BY REGIONS AND PERIODS  
          
 
 
REGIONS  
COLD WAR                         
1946-1985                                   
P.O.                %  
TRANSITION PERIOD                            
1985-1989                                  
P.O.                % 
POST-COLD WAR           
1989-TO PRESENT           
P.O.             %  
TOTAL                               
P.O.             %   
 
MIDDLE EAST 7 53,8 1 20 1 2,7 9 16.2  
 AFRICA 1 7,7 2 40 20 54 23 42,6  
 
ASIA AND THE 
PACIFIC 3 23,1 1 20 5 13,5 9 16,2  
 EUROPE 1 7,7 - - 9 24,3 10 18  
 AMERICAS 1 7,7 1 20 7 18,9 9 16,2  
 TOTAL  13 21,5 5 7 42 71,5 60 100  
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TABLE IV      
VETOES CAST IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL   
   
YEAR CHINA  FRANCE UK USA USSR/ RUSSIA TOTAL  
1946-55 (1*) 2 - - 80 83 
1956-65 - 2 3 - 26 31 
1966-1975 2 2 10 12 7 33 
1976-1985 - 9 11 34 6 60 
1986-1995 - 3 8 24 2 37 
1996 - - - - - 0 
1997 1 - - 2 - 3 
1998 - - - - - 0 
1999 1 - - - - 1 
2000 - - - - - 0 
2001 - - - 2 - 2 
2002 - - - 2 - 2 
2003 - - - 2 - 2 
2004 - - - 2 1 3 
2005 - - - - - - 
2006 - - - 1 - 1 
TOTAL  4-5 18 32 81 122 258 
*Between 1946 and 1971, the Chinese seat on the Security Council was occupied by the 
Republic of China (Taiwan), which used the veto only once (to block Mongolia's 
application for membership in 1955). The first veto exercised by the present occupant, 
the People's Republic of China, was therefore not until 25 August 1972. 
Table compiled by Global Policy Forum from UN information  
  
 
